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CHANGING AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON WELFARE 
ATTITUDES AND WELFARE REFORM 
 
The purpose of my dissertation is to further our understanding of why some states 
restricted immigrant access to welfare in the 1990s while other states granted immigrants 
access to social programs.  With the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), many states diverged from equal access to 
welfare programs, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), for 
immigrants arriving after 1996.  Very little scholarly work examines the variance in 
immigrants’ access to welfare programs.  Current research studying welfare attitudes and 
policy has largely failed to investigate whether and how the influx of immigrants over the 
last three to four decades has decreased public support for welfare programs and resulted 
in policies that both decrease benefit levels and restrict access to programs based on 
citizenship. This is a serious shortcoming because immigration since the 1970s 
represents the largest population shift since the early 20th century, a change that has 
increased the size of the underclass and transformed the cultural and racial makeup of the 
United States.  Accordingly, in my dissertation, I will examine how changes to the 
American political environment, immigration levels and the increasing number of 
immigration media stories, trigger authoritarian attitudes that in turn form a breeding 
ground supporting restrictive welfare programs.  The results from the individual-level 
analysis provide strong evidence that authoritarians prefer less welfare spending, fewer 
immigrants, and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs.  In 
addition, authoritarians view immigrants as a threat due to their perceived failure to 
socially conform to American society. Building on these individual-level results, I find 
that states with large authoritarian populations are more likely to adopt restrictive welfare 
policies. 
Jason E. Kehrberg 
March   30,   2013 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
“The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants; the public 
services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers.”  William Jefferson Clinton in the 
State of the Union (1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) in 1996 fundamentally changed the United States welfare system. 
PRWORA ended welfare as an entitlement program by replacing Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
TANF created work requirements, imposed time limits on assistance programs, restricted 
eligibility requirements, and increased the role of the states in policy formation (e.g., 
Fellowes and Row 2004; Soss et. al. 2001; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). 
Welfare reformers also included several provisions to prevent immigrants from 
receiving assistance. Congress included policy changes in PRWORA that impacted 
immigrants’ right to access welfare programs at the federal and state-levels. At the 
federal level, immigrants arriving after 1996 were restricted from accessing several social 
programs, including TANF (welfare), as well as food stamps, Medicare, Supplemental 
Security  Income,  and  government  healthcare  programs.    For  example,  the  federal 
1  
government adopted a 5-year moratorium on TANF benefits1 to immigrants arriving after 
1996. Policy makers argued that such restrictions were necessary to decrease immigrant 
dependence on government benefits, end the so-called "magnet" effect of attracting 
undesirable immigrants to the United States, and encourage the naturalization of 
immigrants (see Borjas and Hilton [1996] for a justification of such arguments). 
Ultimately, advocates of such reforms argued that the policy would "promote immigrant 
self-sufficiency" and increase the "quality" of admitted immigrants (Fix, Capps, and 
Kaushal 2009)2. 
Like with many of the other components of PRWORA, the policy option to deny 
 
immigrants access to social spending programs was also included in the devolution of 
powers to the states (Hero and Preuhs 2007). The devolution of powers provided states 
with the policy flexibility to include or exclude immigrants from state-originated funds. 
Very few studies examine why some states deny immigrants access to welfare programs 
and why other states grant access. Most studies of state-level welfare policy examine 
dimensions of policy related to cash benefit levels (e.g., McGuire and Merriman 2006), 
work requirements (e.g., Soss et. al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004), or sanctions for 
non-compliance (e.g., Soss et. al. 2001; Fording et. al. 2007). Additional forms of policy 
stringency are often understudied by researchers, such as the initial eligibility to 
government programs. All state welfare programs are means-tested, meaning that 
program eligibility is fundamentally based on income levels, but some states also attach 
 
1 The time length of the ban varied from one social program to the next. For example, Medicaid had a 7- 
year federal ban, instead of the 5-year ban used for TANF benefits. 
2 The scholarly evidence is inconsistent on whether immigrants actually create a drain on social programs 
and are attracted to states with more generous welfare benefits.  See Capps, Fix, and Henderson (2009), 
Van Hook and Bean (2009), and Zavodny (1999) for evidence against the magnet hypothesis and 
immigrant drain on social programs for evidence supporting such arguments see Borjas (1995; 1999) and 
Borjas and Trejo (1991). 
2  
citizenship requirements to welfare boundaries, thus statutorily denying immigrants 
access to public assistance (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009; Graefe et. al. 2008; Hero and 
Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 2002). 
The granting of these policy options to the states represents a critical change in 
American politics for several reasons. First, devolution is the transfer of political powers 
from the federal government to state and local governments. Devolution in welfare 
policymaking means that states and localities are responsible for crafting decentralized 
policies. The result of devolution is substantial variation in state-level welfare policies 
(Soss et. al. 2001; Fording and Kim 2010) including immigrant access to these programs 
(Hero and Preuhs 2007). Second, PRWORA granted states some authority over 
immigration. In 1875, the Supreme Court ruled in Henderson v. the Mayor of New York 
that immigration control and policies are a federal power and subject to Congressional 
regulation. PRWORA represents the beginning of a trend in the increasing role of states 
in the policy intersection of immigration and U.S. domestic policies (Filindra and Kovacs 
2011). The increasing role of the states is changing the two legal “worlds” that 
immigrants face. Traditionally, immigration policy has been described as “hard on the 
outside and soft on the inside” (Bosniak 2006). The hard outer shell describes U.S. 
border control and immigration policy. The soft inside refers to U.S. domestic policy and 
legal norms that used to treat immigrants with a high degree of social citizenship by 
providing access to social programs and legal protections. Policy reforms, at the state 
and federal levels, have “harden” the soft middle by decreasing immigrant rights and 
access to social programs (Boehme 2011). PRWORA represents an important and early 
case in the study of how domestic policies have been shaped to discourage immigration. 
3  
This dissertation seeks to explain why states vary in their policy responses in 
granting and restricting immigrant eligibility to social welfare programs. Why are some 
states more generous and offer redistributive benefits to immigrants while other states 
adopt more stringent welfare boundaries that exclude immigrants? I believe that public 
opinion represents one key explanation to this research question. Public opinion shapes a 
state's willingness to incorporate immigrants into welfare programs. To study the 
relationship between public opinion and immigrant access to welfare, my dissertation 
examines both individual-level support for welfare, welfare chauvinism (desire to limit 
immigrant access to welfare), and state-level policy reforms. My analysis of welfare 
support finds that authoritarianism is a driving force behind anti-immigrant welfare 
chauvinism. Authoritarianism is a general orientation built around a personality cluster 
including conformity, obedience, and aggression to outsiders (Altemeyer 1988). As a 
result, authoritarians are more likely to show intolerance to ethnic, religious, and sexual 
minorities (Adorno et. al. 1950; Stenner 2005). In regards to policy, authoritarians prefer 
programs that enforce social norms by decreasing perceived threats from such outgroups 
as immigrants and aggressive and restrictive policies that punishing non-conforming 
minorities (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009. I build on this 
individual level finding by predicting that states with higher levels of authoritarianism are 
more likely to adopt restrictive policies denying immigrant inclusion to social programs. 
It is important to understand the climate of opinion and the determinants of state 
welfare policies for several reasons. First, the construction of imagined communities 
creates group boundaries (Anderson 1983), justifying the exclusions of outgroups. For 
immigrants and Latinos, group boundaries help to “rationalize and justify governmental 
4  
practices and policies that stigmatize and punish certain categories of immigrants and 
their children” (Chavez 2008, p. 42). Second, numerous studies find that, in general, 
public policy responds to public opinion (e.g., Erickson et. al. 1993; Lax and Phillips 
2009a; 2009b; Stimson 2004), and more specifically, state welfare policies are influenced 
by mass political ideology and racial attitudes (e.g., Johnson 2001; 2003). Third, the 
generosity of social spending programs influences inequality within society by having a 
profound and positive economic impact on disadvantaged groups (e.g., Brady 2009; Fix 
and Passell 1999; 2002; Moller et al. 2003). In summary, we need a better understanding 
of how the climate of opinion shapes inclusive and exclusive state-level policies. 
 
 
 
THE PLAN FOR THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
My dissertation traces welfare chauvinism from mass political attitudes to policy 
reforms in 1996. I start with a basic theory of predisposing factors (racial stereotypes, 
authoritarianism, economic self-interest, and political identifications) and situational 
triggers (immigration levels and mass communication) and end by showing that states 
with higher levels of authoritarianism were more likely to restrict immigration access to 
welfare programs. The dissertation will consist of six chapters. Below I provide a brief 
description of each of the remaining chapters. 
In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical argument for why immigration trends and media 
coverage trigger predisposing factors that decrease public support for welfare programs. 
Drawing from literature on group-identity, political behavior, and immigration, I theorize 
that media effects about immigration and immigration patterns are likely to trigger core 
predisposing   factors   (e.g.,   authoritarianism,   economic   self-interest,   Latino   racial 
5  
stereotypes, or political identifications) that shape welfare preferences. One such media 
effect is the Latino Threat Narrative (Chavez 2008). The Latino Threat Narrative is the 
media’s portrayal of immigrants as being a culturally different threat to the U.S. society. 
Once triggered, predisposing factors influence welfare attitudes by decreasing the 
willingness of individuals to support welfare and grant immigrants access to welfare 
programs, resulting in conservative policy preferences. 
In Chapter 3, I examine two situational triggers, immigration levels and mass 
communication, in greater detail. I show that the rate of both triggers has increased since 
the 1960s. As the Latino immigration population increased, the United States shifted 
from a dual ethnic society dominated by the black-white paradigm to a multi-ethnic 
society. As a result, U.S. society became more diversified due to the increasing Latino 
population. In addition, I show an increased rate in the number of media stories on 
immigration. I also re-analyze Chavez’s (2001) data on magazine covers to show how 
the media primarily uses negative images of immigrants. In the end, Chapter 3 helps to 
explain why the public became increasingly concerned about immigration in the 1990s. 
In Chapter 4, I examine individual level support for welfare policies based on the 
theory presented in Chapter 2. I discuss four predisposing factors that can be triggered by 
immigration and media effects: authoritarianism, political identifications, economic self- 
interest, and racial stereotypes. I test several hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between each of these predisposing factors and policy preferences for welfare and 
immigration. I find that authoritarianism is a strong predictor of individual preferences 
for welfare spending, immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism, the restricting of 
immigrant access to welfare programs.  Based on these initial results, I conduct further 
6  
studies into the relationship between policy preferences and racial stereotypes regarding 
Latinos and authoritarianism. I find that racial stereotypes are a moderating influence on 
authoritarianism by increasing the likelihood that non-authoritarians will hold similar 
policy preferences as authoritarians. 
In Chapter 5, I use the findings in Chapter 4 to predict which political attitudes, 
authoritarianism, influenced welfare reforms. To test my argument, I conduct a 
comparative study of immigrant access to social spending programs across all fifty states. 
Using a recently developed statistical method, multi-level regression with 
poststratification (MRP), I estimate macro measures of public opinion for each state. I 
find that states with higher levels of authoritarianism were much more likely to restrict 
immigrant access to social spending programs. Additionally, I test the robustness of this 
finding by controlling for political institutions, demographics, geographic location, and 
economics. 
Finally in Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation by summarizing my findings and 
discussing the implications of my results. I discuss how my study offers important 
insights into American politics from public opinion formation to public policy outcomes. 
Further, I briefly talk about the unanswered questions from my research and how future 
research can expand on my dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jason Eugene Kehrberg 2013 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Complexity of Immigration Politics: 
 
A Theory of How Immigration Influences Public Opinion 
 
 
 
 
 
“… no nation in history has gone through a demographic change of this magnitude in so 
short a time, and remained the same nation… uncontrolled immigration threatens to 
deconstruct the nation we grew up in…” Patrick J. Buchanan, OPPONENT OF 
IMMIGRATION, in The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant 
Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Immigration is a political issue that sits at the intersection of both domestic and 
foreign affairs. The impact of immigration reaches beyond border control and policy 
reform of immigration by also influencing domestic policies. The connection between 
immigration and domestic politics, particularly social spending policies, is described as 
the “new politics of immigration” by Calavita (1996, p. 284-286), who argues that in 
addition to wanting to limit immigration flows, opponents of immigration also complain 
that immigrants should be denied the benefits of social services. What is unclear in the 
scholarly literature is when, why, and how mass preferences for restricting immigration 
help to fuel policy reforms, such as PRWORA. 
An individual's desire to restrict immigrant access to social programs can be 
motivated by several considerations, from, “balanced-budget conservatism” (Calavita 
1996) to cultural threat (Huntington 2004).   The evidence on the economic and social 
8  
impact of immigrants is mixed3. In the end, the important factor may not be the actual 
impact of immigration but the perceived negative consequences of immigration among 
the general public. It is understandable to expect negative messages about immigration 
from the media and political elites to shape public opinion, resulting in strong preferences 
for limiting immigrant access to domestic programs like welfare. 
In this chapter, I present a theory to explain why some states placed many more 
limitations on immigrants’ access to welfare than other states in 1996. My focus is on the 
linkage between public opinion and public policy in the states. I start with a discussion 
of how immigration patterns and political rhetoric about immigration trigger predisposing 
factors and end with how these attitudes are related to state welfare reform. At the 
individual-level, I theorize that people hold various predisposing factors, like 
authoritarianism, economic self-interest, political identifications, and racial stereotypes, 
that can be “triggered” or activated by an influx of immigrants in the state and negative 
news coverage. Once certain predisposing factors are triggered, individuals become less 
willing to support immigrants’ access to welfare programs. At the state-level, mass 
attitudes influences social policymaking. Public policies imperfectly mirror the 
preferences of citizens (e.g., Burstein 1998; Manza and Cook 2002; Brooks and Manza 
2007; Lax and Phillips 2011). Scholars find policy responsiveness between elected 
officials and mass opinions that forms an opinion-policy linkage through representative 
democracy (Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Burstein 
2003).   The opinion-policy linkage is strongest when the masses are concerned about 
 
 
3 For evidence on the negative economic impact of immigration, see Borjas (1994; 1998); for evidence on 
its positive impact, see Bean and Stevens (2005). For arguments on the negative social consequences of 
immigration, see Huntington (2004); and for contrary evidence refuting such arguments, see Alba and Nee 
(2005). 
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policy outcomes of relevant issues, the majority supports a particular policy outcome, and 
"the attitudes in question must reflect some non-zero degree of salience among the 
public" (Brooks and Manza 2007, p. 28). 
 
 
(Figure 2.1 about here) 
 
 
 
 
 
My theoretical argument is depicted in Figure 2.1, which captures the relationships 
between individual predisposing factors, policy preferences, situational triggers, and 
macro policy outcomes. At the individual level, socio-demographic characteristics 
(gender, education, and age) influence various relevant predisposing factors (e.g., 
authoritarianism, political identifications, racial stereotypes, and economic self-interest) 
that people then use to form policy preferences (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2007; Citrin, 
Reingold, and Green 1990; Feldman 2003; Goren 2001; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). The activation of particular 
predisposing factors will vary depending on the situational triggers in the environment 
(e.g., Feldman 2003; Sniderman et. al. 2004; Stenner 2005). As indicated in the diagram, 
external situational triggers thus “activate” specific predisposing factors. Once activated, 
individuals use these predisposing factors as considerations when forming policy 
preferences. Next, the aggregation of citizens’ attitudes influences policy outcomes by 
forming a constituency to support elite policy preferences (e.g., Erickson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009b, 2011; 
Manza and Cook 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004).  I expect mass attitudes 
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to  help  explain  the  variation  across  the  states in welfare policy reforms concerning 
immigration access. 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF TRIGGERS AND PREDISPOSING FACTORS 
 
 
 
Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are shaped by two types of 
factors: internal predisposing factors and external situational triggers (Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Predisposing factors are preexisting considerations that 
individuals draw upon to form more specific attitudes (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009). Each of us holds numerous predisposing factors. For example, a single 
individual holds multiple predisposing factors that are associated with their social class, 
racial identifications, political ideology, and gender with the importance of each 
predisposing factors varying across time and issues. Exactly which of these different 
predisposing factors end up being used to form opinion statements varies depending on 
the situational triggers present in the environment and the individual characteristics that 
interact with those triggers. 
People are cognitive misers with a very limited amount of working memory (Fiske 
and Taylor 1991). In addition, the average citizen has little incentive to survey the news 
or engage in deep or deliberative thought about most political issues of the day (Downs 
1957). Consequently, most citizens on most issues process political information in a 
rapid and superficial way by relying on a variety of cognitive heuristics or short cuts to 
quickly and efficiently process information and form their political opinions (Lau and 
Redlawsk 2001).   For example, individuals are only able to access limited amounts of 
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information when forming their political attitudes. Rather than exhaustively searching 
for all relevant information about a complex political issue, they rely on salient, long- 
term predisposing factors like social stereotypes, prejudices and various identifications to 
form their political attitudes (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). This strategy allows individuals 
to quickly and efficiently form opinions on complex political issues on which they lack 
specific information, like immigration (Citrin and Sides 2007) and welfare policies 
(Gilens 1999). For example, when Americans’ think about a wide variety of issues, they 
consider their stereotypes and prejudices toward various groups—i.e., the policy’s 
primary intended beneficiary (or target). As Nelson and Kinder (1996, p. 1055-56) 
argued “Public opinion on matters of government policy is group-centric: shaped in 
powerful ways by the attitudes citizens possess toward the social groups they see as the 
principal beneficiaries (or victims) of the policy. Racial stereotypes, political 
identifications, and authoritarianism are easy predisposing factors for individuals to 
evaluate policies and form their policy preferences (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; 
Peffley and Hurwitz 1997; Wong 2010). For example, previous research shows that 
racial stereotypes influence a wide variety of policy preferences from welfare (Gilens 
1999) to the death penalty (Peffley and Hurwitz 2007). 
The simplicity of predisposing factors and situational triggers raises a concern. 
Immigration is a complex issue that can be framed in various ways by elites—i.e., 
politicians and the press. Framing is defined as “the process by which people develop a 
particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong 
and Druckman 2007, p. 104). Thus, elites can trigger opposition by framing the issue of 
immigration in a way that emphasizes xenophobic, economic, and cultural fears that help 
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activate particular types of predisposing factors. Immigrants have routinely been 
described as posing a variety of threats to Americans--cultural threats to social cohesion 
and national identity such as the perceived failure of immigrants to learn English and 
adopt American norms and customs (e.g., Buchanan 2002; Hetherington and Weiler 
2009; Huntington 2004; Kinder and Kam 2009; Schildkraut 2011), economic threats to 
jobs and government resources (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Kunovich 2004; 
Lubbers et. al. 2002; Quillian 1995), and as criminals (e.g., Arnold 2010)4.  Associating 
 
immigrants with social threats, economic competition, and crime creates a framing effect. 
Each of these immigration frames can potentially trigger predisposing factors. The 
frames must be stored in memory to be recalled when forming political attitudes (Chong 
and Druckman 2007a). When a frame triggers a pre-existing and often used predisposing 
factor, individuals are more likely to use that predisposing factor to interpret and react to 
the issue. The simple exposure to elite frames, media and political messages, can result 
in the connection between predisposing factors and political issues that in the end form 
the basis for policy preferences. If the frames are negative, such as those associated with 
immigrants, the activation of various predisposing factors can lead individuals to support 
restrictive and discriminatory policies. 
In addition, elite messages can also shape stereotypes of immigrants through 
persuasion, defined as mass communication that changes an individual’s evaluation 
component of their attitude on an issue (see the discussion in the next section on the 
components of an attitude) (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Nelson and Oxley 1999). Elite 
frames  of  non-assimilating  immigrants  who  take  American  jobs  while  draining 
 
 
4 Additionally, these frames are not mutually exclusive and individuals can use multiple considerations 
when forming an opinion statement (Zaller 1992). 
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government programs can change Americans’ views of immigrants (Chavez 2001; 2008). 
Persuasion effects are more likely to be successful when the message appeals to the 
motivations or predisposing factors of the individual (Fabrigar and Petty 1999) and 
individuals lacking meaningful social contact, particularly friendship (Ellison, Shin, and 
Leal 2011). Many White Americans do not have much contact with immigrants and 
Latinos, particularly older Whites in the baby boom generation who grew up in an era 
when the percentage of foreign born was lower than it’s been in many years (see Martin 
and Midgley 2003; Leal and Trejo 2010 for changes in immigration patterns that can 
influence social contact), and are likely more susceptible to negative elite portrayals of 
Latino immigrants in the news. In the end, the result is the same. Negative images 
become associated with immigrants and the issue of immigration and then images 
become easily activated by individuals holding certain predisposing factors, such as 
authoritarianism. 
 
Situational Triggers: Influence on Attitudes 
 
We do not encounter stimuli as blank slates, but instead we hold prior predisposing 
factors that influence our attitudes. Individuals possess multiple predisposing factors that 
can be triggered by a stimulus. 
Following Chong and Druckman’s (2007a, p. 105) conceptualization, attitudes are 
the “weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that object.” Specifically, 
Attitude = ∑vi*wi, where the first part is the evaluation of the attitude object, vi, and the 
second is the salience or weight of the consideration wi.  Given this concept of attitudes, 
there are two possible mechanisms to change an individual’s overall attitude (Eagly and 
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Chaiken 1993). First, one can change their evaluative components (vi) or change their 
salience components (wi). 
The weighted sum of all evaluations5, or equivalently, considerations, defined as 
 
“any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or the 
other” (Zaller 1992, p. 42), determines the overall summary evaluation of the attitude 
object (Chong and Druckman 2007a, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). For example, an 
individual's attitude towards immigration is the weighted sum of both positive and 
negative considerations about immigrants. A hypothetical individual may view 
immigrants as positively adding to the multi-cultural American melting pot. This 
positive cultural view is the first consideration. The same individual may also view 
immigrants as having a negative economic impact, either personally, because immigrants 
are seen to compete with the individual (and her family) for jobs, or sociotropically, 
because low-skilled immigrants are seen as a drain on society’s resources (Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2010). Even though this individual holds both positive and negative 
considerations about immigrants, s/he does not necessarily have a neutral overall 
evaluation (attitude) toward immigrants because economic considerations may be 
weighted (wi) much more heavily than cultural ones, or vice versa.  Because elite framing 
and other situational triggers influence the weight of people’s considerations, they can 
have a crucial impact on people’s overall evaluations of political issues—i.e., their policy 
preferences or attitudes (Nelson and Oxley 1999). 
This conceptualization of attitudes also fits well with Zaller’s (1992) memory-based 
theory of the survey response, the "Receive-Accept-Sample" (RAS) model, which helps 
 
 
5 It is important to note that I use the terms considerations and evaluations interchangeable throughout this 
manuscript. 
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to explain elite opinion leadership. The RAS model includes four axioms: reception, 
resistance, accessibility, and response. The first axiom concerns the reception of 
information. The second axiom is the resistance axiom. Individuals who receive 
messages inconsistent with their predisposing factors are able to resist these messages if 
they have the necessary knowledge. The accessibility and response axioms are closely 
related to framing effects. The accessibility axiom addresses the probability of a 
consideration coming to mind when forming political attitudes: recently received and 
frequently used considerations have a greater probability of being accessed and therefore 
influencing attitude formation. The fourth axiom, the response axiom, states that 
“individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are 
immediately salient or accessible to them.” In other words, people do not search their 
memories for all relevant information or considerations when forming attitudes. Rather, 
survey responses and attitude formation are disproportionately influenced by the few 
accessible considerations of the top of people’s heads. 
Predisposing factors are conceptually distinct from considerations or evaluations of 
the attitude object. Predisposing factors, such as authoritarianism and racial stereotypes, 
are more long-term and general orientations, whereas evaluations are more specific to the 
attitude object. Situational triggers influence attitudes in two ways. First, situational 
triggers activate predisposing factors like authoritarianism. Second, situational triggers 
can also directly influence the formation and weight of evaluations. I am unable to test 
the specific links between situational triggers, predisposing factors, and evaluations due 
to the use of observational survey data. Previous research used experimental data to test 
the relationship to test the direct link between predisposing factors and situational triggers 
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(see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stenner 2005). An experimental design 
allows the researcher to control exposure to the situational trigger, but regardless of the 
pathway, I can examine the correlation between predisposing factors and political 
attitudes in relation to one situational trigger: levels of immigration. 
In the end, situational triggers can alter people’s attitudes by either changing their 
evaluative components (vi) or changing their salience components (wi). In this manner, 
situational triggers act as a shock that alters an individual’s overall evaluation of an issue. 
The degree of this shock varies depending on the situational trigger and the individual 
accepting or resisting the frame (see the discussion on framing below for more on 
resistance). 
 
Situational Triggers 
 
Two situational triggers stand out as likely suspects for activating predisposing 
factors during the time period under study: levels of immigration and news coverage of 
immigration. The important factor is the public perception of immigration and how the 
public interprets the increasing immigrant population and news coverage. In his book, 
The Death of the West, conservative commentator, Pat Buchanan (2002), described the 
recent influx of illegal immigrants from Central, Latin, and South America as one of the 
greatest changes in the history of the United States. Over the last four decades, from 
1970 to present, the rate of immigration increased and, even more importantly, shifted 
from developed European countries to developing Asian and Hispanic countries, which 
Buchanan viewed as a serious threat to American society. I argue that the way these 
changes in immigration patterns were interpreted by many elites served to trigger 
particular individual predisposing factors (economic self-interest, political identifications, 
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authoritarianism, and racial stereotypes) that shaped attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration and welfare. In Chapter 3, I provide more historical detail about various 
situational triggers, but for now I focus on a more general argument. 
Several theories of social conflict—i.e., ethnic competition theory, realistic conflict 
theory, and group-threat theory suggest that the relative size of the immigrant population 
is likely to influence public opinion (e.g., Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, and Scheepers 2004; 
Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). These theories share a 
common element. As the proportional size of the immigrant population increases so 
should the level of perceived threat to the native population. In the end, each of these 
theories predict that threat to natives results in hostility in areas with large immigrant 
populations due to competition between the two groups. 
Different group threat theories point to different types of threat posed by immigrants 
and postulate different consequences of group threat. For example, different scholars 
argue that group threat serves to increase political competition (Glaser 1994), and 
economic competition (Quillian 1995; 1996), or prejudice (Taylor 1998) against the 
outgroup, while others emphasize the resulting social cohesion among the ingroup 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Putnam 2007). Each group threat theory is based on an 
interaction between threat and individuals’ predisposing factors resulting in hostile 
attitudes. For example, Lincoln Quillian (1995) wrote that group threat "is a function of 
two factors: the numerical size of the subordinate group relative to the dominant group, 
and economic circumstances.” 
In the end, group threat theories predict that as the proportion of immigrants 
increases, the threat to natives' political power, economic structure, and/or society should 
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also increase resulting in prejudice or at least more negative attitudes among natives. The 
evidence to support group threat theories is mixed from one study to the next. The 
research finds that increasing immigrant populations can result in more hostile attitudes, 
less hostile attitudes, or simply null findings (Hopkins 2010). The nature of immigration 
may not directly create a group threat effect. Immigrants live and work in segmented 
communities and work sectors which can make economic and social threat much less 
noticeable for large portions of the public. In the end, group threat theories assume that 
individuals are aware of objective demographic changes around them and connect the 
demographic changes to their political attitudes. 
A second trigger is the influence of the news media on public opinion. Media 
messages may not be a necessary condition to alter individual policy preferences, but 
media messages can be a sufficient condition. In contrast to the “limited  effects” 
position, which concluded that the impact of news messages on public opinion was 
limited to reinforcement of prior attitudes rather than persuasion (i.e., changing attitudes), 
in an important paper, Zaller (1996) makes the forceful argument that persuasion is one 
of the primary influence of the news media on public opinion. Zaller (1996, p. 18) 
argued that “mass communication is a powerful instrument for shaping the attitudes of 
the citizens who are exposed to it, and it exercises this power on an essentially continuous 
basis.” He finds much more evidence for persuasion in his study that takes advantage of 
better measures of reception and better variance in the content and volume of mass 
communication. Focusing on the second condition, persuasion occurs when the media 
changes overall volume and “directional thrust.” These conditions increase the likelihood 
that an individual is exposed, recessives, and accepts the content of the news story.  For 
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example, the increasing number of immigration stories in the early 1990s that portrayed 
immigrants as a drain of government programs should persuade the mass public to 
decrease the number of immigrants. As we will see in Chapter 3, immigration news 
stories fits the pattern that Zaller predicts can create "massive" influences on individual 
attitudes. 
Contemporary research on media effects also identifies three second-order influences 
of news messages on public opinion: framing, priming, and agenda setting. The three 
media effects shape public opinion by influencing how individuals "develop a particular 
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and 
Druckman 2007a). 
Starting with framing effects, Chong and Druckman's (2007a) theory of competitive 
framing is perhaps the most current and developed theory of how (media and other) 
frames influence people’s attitudes. Their work (Chong and Druckman 2007a; 2007b; 
2010), mentioned briefly above, led to two significant developments in the way scholars 
think about framing. First, they examined how the influence of frames is tempered in the 
presence of competing frames. For example, some elites praise the United States as a land 
of freedom and opportunity to all hardworking immigrants, while other elites frame 
immigrant labor as economic competition for Americans. 
Second, they argued that under certain conditions the effects of framing and priming 
are similar. Research indicates that priming may not increase accessibility, as  the 
concept is defined by Iyengar and Kinder (1987), but instead operates through the same 
common processes as framing (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman, Kuklinski, and 
Sigelman 2009; Miller and Krosnick 2000).  As such, priming and framing may use the 
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same mental process and “the two terms can be used interchangeably” (Chong and 
Druckman 2007a, p. 115). Overall, frames can influence how individuals think about 
political issues. The emphasis on certain aspects results in individuals focusing on those 
aspects of an issue when forming opinion statements (Druckman 2001; 2004). For 
example, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) conducted an experiment changing the 
frame of an immigration media story. When the frame included either negative 
consequences of immigration or a Latino immigrant, individuals became more supportive 
of restrictive immigration policies because the frame changed the weight of the issue and 
the considerations by increasing the importance of immigration as a political issue and 
the ability of people to access the negative frame when forming political attitudes. 
As emerging research on framing in political science has demonstrated, a frame is 
likely to influence individuals if the fame is repeated, triggers a predisposing factor, or is 
salient (Chong and Druckman 2007a). First, frames are more likely to influence people’s 
attitudes when they are repeatedly exposed to a frame, thus making the issue more salient 
to the individual (Chong and Druckman 2010). Repeated exposure increases the 
individual’s ability to access the images and information associated with the frame, 
which Chong and Druckman call the loudness hypothesis. The result is a higher 
probability of individuals using the frame to form policy preferences. Using survey data, 
Branton and Dunaway (2009) found that increased newspaper exposure to negative 
immigration stories is associated with less support for immigration. 
Second, when a frame appeals to a pre-existing predisposing factor, the individual is 
less likely to resist the frame. In this situation, the media frame is increasing the 
probability of accessing an existing predisposing factor.   For example, frames about 
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immigrants failing to socially conform should be of greater concern and less resisted 
among authoritarians, due to their concern about social conformity, than non- 
authoritarians. In my example, the frame and the predisposing factor point in the same 
direction. Authoritarians are by nature concerned about social conformity and, as a 
result, are less likely to resist frames showing perceived threats to society. Individuals 
are likely to resist a media frame when they do not trust the source (Druckman 2001) or 
when media frames conflict with their predisposing factors (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 
2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2007). Going back to my example, authoritarians will resist 
frames showing immigrant assimilation. Third, frames related to issues perceived by the 
public as being important are more likely to influence individuals. Contextual factors can 
influence both the salience of the issue and the accessibility of the frame by motivating 
the individual to pay attention to the frame (Chong and Druckman 2007a). Branton and 
Dunaway (2009) found that counties in California that are closer to the border and with 
larger immigrant populations have more newspaper stories about immigrants and, on 
average, these stories are more negative. 
Agenda setting is defined as the impact of the frequency of news coverage on the 
public’s evaluation of the importance of problems or issues facing the country (Iyengar 
and McGrady 2007). Agenda setting is directly related to the salience (view of how 
important) of the issue among the general public. Political issues that the media 
determines to be important receive additional attention. Agenda setting results in an 
increasing proportion of the public that views an issue as being important. 
Another media effect is priming. Instead of changing the individual's attitude on an 
issue, priming alters the perceived importance of the issue and the criteria people use to 
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evaluate policy-makers (Miller and Krosnick 2000). Political priming helps describe the 
process by which agenda setting influences people’s attitudes. As the term was used by 
Iyengar et. al. (1984) and many political scientists, priming was cast narrowly as the 
process by which a ballast of political information can influence the weight of criteria 
that people use to evaluate politicians. An example is the news coverage of the Iran- 
Contra affair during the Reagan administration, where increasing negative stories about 
the scandal resulted in a large decrease in President Reagan's popularity (Krosnick and 
Kinder 1990). Individual evaluations of politicians can change as media stories provide 
new information and the weight and importance of political issues shifts due to media 
exposure (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Thus, "the standards citizens use to judge a 
president may be substantially determined by which stories newscasts choose to cover 
and, consequently, which considerations are made generally accessible" (Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987). 
In conclusion, media effects and mass communication should have a large impact on 
immigration attitudes. Rates of mass communication should influence when and where 
people believe immigration to be important and alter (persuasion) people's attitudes on 
immigration. Framing and priming shape the considerations that people use when 
forming policy attitudes and their views of policy-makers. The ability to create mass 
communication that relates to predisposing factors only increases the influence of the 
media on individuals and their resulting attitudes. Unfortunately, I do not have detailed 
data on the influence of triggers, except for immigration and news story trends. As a 
result, I will not be testing theories of media effects but inferring influences of the news 
media and political rhetoric from the differential weights of antecedents of immigration 
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attitudes –i.e., predisposing factors.  Most importantly, the theories of media effects helps 
guide my hypotheses and interpretation of my findings. 
In this section, I provided a theoretical argument for how context can influence 
public opinion. In sum, situational triggers (immigration levels and media effects) trigger 
predisposing factors (authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, economic self-interest, and 
political identifications) that in turn shape policy preferences (support for welfare). My 
argument occurs at the individual-level but I believe that macro public opinion creates a 
feedback loop that influences public policy. In the following section, I provide more 
details about the opinion-policy linkage that is tested in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
 
Thus far I have discussed, an individual-level theory of situational triggers and 
predisposing factors that shape public policy preferences. I focused on how situational 
triggers, mass communication and immigration patterns, can trigger predisposing factors 
that act as considerations when forming policy preferences. I predict that the triggered 
predisposing factors will result in lower levels of support for welfare. In this section, I 
discuss how mass political attitudes can influence public policy. 
Earlier in this chapter in the discussion on media effects, I presented what must be 
considered a top-down view of mass communication influencing individual attitudes, 
which is an elite-driven model of political change. At the same time, I presented a 
bottom-up view of immigration trends where increasing immigration levels results in 
greater public concern that is then communicated to policy-makers. On the surface, an 
opinion-policy linkage appears to be a bottom up or mass-driven model of change.  In 
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reality, the causal arrow runs in both directions. The masses do constrain elite behavior, 
under certain conditions (Brooks and Manza 2007). Elites do send cues (situational 
triggers) that influence public opinion. In return, a complex feedback loop constrains the 
policy options available to elites. 
The relationship between the public and policy is a fundamental and necessary 
component of liberal democratic theory. Liberal democratic theory requires at least weak 
policy responsiveness to public mood. Citizens identify, support, and elect elites with 
similar views to their own and the elites in return adopt policies that mirror their 
supporters' preferences (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989). Perfect policy 
responsiveness results in the tyranny of the majority, an undesirable outcome based on 
the characteristics of the public. In general, the public is intolerant (e.g., Gibson 1988; 
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan et. al. 1993), lacks political knowledge 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1993, 1996), and has low levels of political interest 
(Treadway 1985). Each of these characteristics can prevent the development and 
application of a democratic society. On the other hand, the failure to respond to the 
masses results in the questioning the legitimacy of democracy. In the end, the opinion- 
policy linkage is a delicate balance between responding to and ignoring public opinion or 
maintaining legitimacy while avoiding tyranny of the majority. 
Research supports a causal relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes 
(e.g., Brooks 2006; Brooks and Manza 2007; Burstein 1981, 1982; Erickson et. al. 1989; 
Erickson et. al. 2002; Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux 2005; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 
2009b, 2011; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stimson 2004). First, the issue needs 
to  be  salient  to  the  general  public.    Second,  the  public  needs  to  be  aware  of  and 
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concerned with the policy outcomes. Third, the message from the public to the elites 
should emphasis one policy option over another. If these three conditions exist, the 
public's message is clear and strong. A clear message limits the options available to 
elites resulting in public policy that mirrors public opinion. Or as Brustein (1981, p. 295) 
argued, policy reflects the preferences of the public when "what the public want in those 
instances where the public cares enough about an issue to make its wishes known." 
While a number of scholars accept the idea of policy responsiveness, there is less 
consensus on which opinions matter. The majority of this research examines an opinion- 
policy linkage focusing on political ideology. Unfortunately, political ideology may not 
tell us much about specific issues (Converse 1964; Lax and Phillips 2009b). The 
weakness of the opinion-policy response using ideology is that immigration, as a political 
issue, cuts across the traditional ideological spectrum (Tichenor 2002). 
More recent research has focused on the relationship between specific policy 
opinions and policy outcomes (Lax and Phillips 2009a; 2009b; 2011; Johnson et. al. 
2005). For example, Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux (2005) examine how environmental 
policy preferences responded to changes in pollution emissions. Johnson et. al. found 
that increases in pollution levels were associated with preferences for tougher 
environmental laws and increased environmental spending. Lax and Phillips recently 
examined over thirty different state policy areas finding a strong relationship between 
policy and policy specific attitudes in most areas (2011). The relationship between 
immigrant attitudes and immigration policy was the weakest opinion-policy relationship 
in their study. 
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There are at least two problems with using policy attitudes in a study of policy 
responsiveness. First, individual policy attitudes vary over time at a greater rate than 
government policy. Second, the use of policy attitudes ignores the possibility of an 
underlying predisposing factor that connects one policy preference to another or what 
some scholars call "core values" (Goren 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 1987), "embedded 
preferences" (Brooks and Manza 2007), "worldview" (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), or 
"predispositions" (Stenner 2005). 
This can be problematic for the study of welfare and immigration policies. Korpi 
wrote that "it can be argued that major welfare-state institutions are organized by 
reference to the social relations and contexts in which individuals are situated" (2003, p. 
598). Brooks and Manza’s theory groups sources of welfare preferences into 
demographics, social identities, and institutional environments (2007). A very similar 
theoretical design applies to immigration. Immigration attitudes and immigration policy 
reforms are shaped by demographics, identities, and coalitional formations (see 
Sniderman et. al. 2004 at the individual attitudes level and Tichenor 2002 regarding 
immigration policy in the United States). 
In Chapter 5, I apply this theory of policy preferences to welfare reforms regarding 
immigration access. I expect to find a strong relationship between mass attitudes and 
policy outcomes as state governments, being closer to the people, are better able to adopt 
policy to the preferences of their residents. Further, I expect that predisposing factors 
will be a strong predictor of immigrant accessibility than specific policy preferences. The 
issue of immigrants receiving welfare benefits combines two policy areas, immigration 
and welfare, and the common link between the two policies are predisposing factors. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have covered significant and complex ground about two central topics in political 
research: political attitudes and the opinion-policy relationship. The goal of this chapter 
was to present a general theory that can be used to explain why some states adopted 
restrictive policies limiting immigrant access to welfare programs and other states 
granted access to immigrants. Fundamentally, the public's willingness to grant immigrant 
access to welfare programs is the deciding factor on which states adopted generous 
policies and which states passed exclusionary policies. 
Beginning with public opinion, I have argued for a simple theory of predisposing 
factors and situational triggers. A theory of predisposing factors and triggers stresses the 
interaction of individuals and environmental triggers, such as media effects and 
immigration demographics. Every individual interacts with the world around them, 
which they view through "rose colored" lenses of the predisposing factors triggered by 
the surrounding environment. I test this basic theory at the individual-level in Chapter 4. 
The result of the increased awareness and concern about immigration can create a 
constituency for specific policy outcomes under the right conditions. Conditions or 
political barriers can strengthen or weaken the representation of mass attitudes. As I 
demonstrate in Chapter 5, the convergence of negative attitudes and political conditions 
result in the adoption of restrictive policies limiting immigrant access to state welfare 
funding. 
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Figure 2.1A The Relationship between Situational Triggers and Predisposing 
Factors. 
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Figure 2.1B The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy Outcomes. 
Note:  The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. 
To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a direct relationship between several 
variables. Variables that appear in the earlier stages of the funnel of casualty can influence any variable or 
relationship that appears in later stages. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Situational Triggers: The Changing Immigration Politics 
 
 
“In the 1960s powerful movements began to challenge the salience, the substance, and 
the desirability of this concept of America.” Samuel P. Huntington in Who are We? The 
Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act (PRWORA) into law to restructure the welfare system. PRWORA 
created federal restrictions limiting immigrant access to welfare programs. At the state 
level, PRWORA granted states the power to adopt their own restrictive gate-keeping 
policies. As a result, the degree to which immigrants are provided access to welfare 
programs varies from one state to another. 
In the previous chapter, I presented a theory focusing on public opinion as an 
influence on the policy-making process resulting in different state policies restricting 
immigrant access to welfare. I theorized that political attitudes are shaped by 
predisposing factors and situational triggers. I briefly mentioned four possible 
predisposing factors (authoritarianism, political identifications, economic self-interest, 
and racial stereotypes) that are potentially activated by two situational triggers (mass 
communication and immigration levels). In Chapter 4, I provide more details about the 
particular predisposing factors that are likely to influence immigration and welfare policy 
attitudes.   In this chapter, I present a brief historical narrative describing the changing 
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patterns of news coverage on immigration and immigration levels. This historical 
narrative helps explain why restrictive immigration policies were adopted in the 1990s, 
which states were likely to limit immigrant access to social programs and how 
immigration is tied to worldview evolution 
In summary, I argued that political attitudes are shaped by situational triggers, 
specifically mass communication and immigration levels. As the masses receive elite 
cues, they sort themselves into constituencies supporting specific policy reforms 
(Levendusky 2009). Mass support for policy reforms creates a feedback loop that 
constrains elite policy making (Jacobson 2006; Lassiter 2006; Lee 2002; McCarty, Poole 
and Rosenthal 2006). I believe that the changes in U.S. demographics and the American 
political culture have influenced the public's willingness to provide welfare benefits to 
immigrants. 
In order to understand which predisposing factors structure and shape immigration 
and welfare attitudes, I need to examine how American politics changed over time from 
the 1960s to the present. I argue, along with Hetherington and Weiler (2009), that 
authoritarian attitudes are central elements in shaping a worldview that organizes a wide 
range of policy preferences, including immigration. I begin this chapter with a discussion 
of Hetherington and Weiler's theory of worldview evolution (2009) and how it relates to 
Levendusky's concept of mass sorting (2009). Contemporary America is  polarized 
around cultural issues including race (Carmines and Stimson 1989), the role of 
government (Baer 2000), and new political issues that became central to national politics, 
such as crime (Black and Black 2002), gay rights (Lax and Phillips 2009a), and 
immigration   (Calavita   1996).      Many   scholars   trace   the   contemporary   political 
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environment back to changes that began in the 1960s resulting in a restructuring of 
American politics (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; 
Levendusky 2009). This chapter provides a limited narrative, since it is impossible to 
address the change in each political issue over nearly a half of a century. I limit my 
discussion beyond the basic concepts of the worldview evolution and two situational 
triggers: news coverage on immigration and immigration levels. My description of 
worldview evolution emphasizes the role of immigration issues to help set the stage for 
the empirical analysis at the individual-level and state-level in Chapters 4 and 5. This 
historical narrative discusses how immigration became incorporated into the changing 
American political environment. In the 1960s, immigration was not a polarized political 
issue, but it eventually became part of a broader constellation of issues, along with crime 
and gay rights, that still polarizes the electorate. I do not mean to imply by the discussion 
below that immigration is the only important issue, but wish to maintain the focus on the 
subject at hand. 
 
 
 
WORLDVIEW EVOLUTION: A CHANGING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
In this section, I discuss how the political culture of the United States has evolved 
since the 1960s to ultimately show how immigration and other issues became bundled 
together and shaped, in part, by authoritarianism and a sorting along party lines. I begin 
this section by discussing the theory of issue evolution, an explanation for how the 
American political culture has changed since the 1960s, and how issue evolution relates 
to partisan sorting. I then present a more recent theory, worldview evolution, that builds 
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on issue evolution and sorting.  Finally, I explain how worldview evolution helps set the 
stage for immigration to emerge as a major political issue in the 1990s. 
Over four decades ago, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Immigration Act of 
1965.  The act marked a change in Johnson's position on immigration.  While in 
Congress, President Johnson had a voting record favoring restrictive immigration 
policies, but as President, he supported progressive immigration policies. Thirty-one 
years later, another Democratic President, Bill Clinton, also changed his position on 
immigration, but in the opposite direction from supporting progressive immigration 
policies to signing restrictive policies into law (Teichenor 2002). Unlike 1965, the 
immigration debate in 1996 was not about restricting or expanding the flow of legal 
immigrants.  Instead, the debate focused on the flow of illegal immigration and the 
domestic impact of legal immigrants, mostly from Latin America, and more specifically, 
Mexico.  For example, the Republicans’ Contract for America in 1994 called for denying 
immigrants; access to Medicaid, Food Stamps, and other welfare programs6.  Another 
 
important difference in the Johnson and Clinton presidencies is that Johnson signed many 
Great Society programs like welfare into law, while Clinton signed legislation to “end 
welfare as we know it.” 
Many scholars argue that the different postures of the Johnson and Clinton 
presidencies on the immigration and welfare policies stemmed from the evolution of 
those issues in the political environment from 1960 to the present (e.g., Carmines and 
Stimson 1989; Carter 1996; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009).  Issue 
evolution is the process by which party positions on a powerful issue like racial politics 
 
6 Immigrants arriving after 1996 are denied access to federally funded benefits for their first five years of 
permanent residence in the United States. States are able to determine their own policies for their part of 
welfare funding. There are some exceptions to the ban including children, refugees, and the handicap. 
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can change and influence the reshaping of party coalitions, a process that is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1 (Carmines and Stimson 1981; 1986; 1989). The process of issue evolution 
starts with political elites sending cues to the mass public, such as messages through the 
media, about their activities and positions on political issues. A critical component of 
this first step is elites changing their position on a salient issue. One reason party officer 
holders change their position on an issue is that they are pressured by party activists to 
not only change their position, but also to adopt a clear and distinct position. Carmines 
and Stimson (1986) analyze data from 1945 to 1980 to show that the Republican Party 
started out as the more racially liberal party in the 1950s but the 1970s ended as the more 
racially conservative party. As the parties changed their position on the issue, party elites 
in Congress and the White House sent clear signals about the parties' changing positions. 
The second step in issue evolution is called clarification, which occurs when individuals 
change their “cognitive perceptions of the parties with respect to the new issue 
dimension” (Carmines and Stimson 1986, p. 903).  In the next step, labeled “Affect 
Toward Parties” in the figure, people who care about the political issue develop affection 
and disaffection for the parties and the political issue shapes people’s attitudes on other, 
related issues.  For example, the issue of race reshaped American attitudes across a range 
of issues including welfare (Gilens 1999), crime (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), and 
immigration (Voss, Kehrberg, and Butz 2013).  In the final stage, Americans sort 
themselves between Republicans and Democrats based on their affection and disaffection 
with the political parties (detailed further below). 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.1 about here) 
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Once the political elites have adopted competing positions on issues, the mass public 
is, to a degree, “redistributed” in the two parties through a “sorting effect” (Fiorina and 
Levendusky 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009). Hetherington and 
Weiler (2009, p. 17) conceptualize sorting as individuals “aligning their preferences with 
their respective parties” or bringing their partisanship more into line with their issue 
preferences. Levendusky (2009, p. 3) provides a more specific definition of partisan 
sorting as the “alignment of partisanship and ideology” where ideology is either 
represented as identifying oneself as liberal or conservative or as a series of preferences 
on different issues. In the end, sorting is the process by which individuals realign their 
views of the parties and various issues. 
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) build on the concepts of sorting and issue evolution 
with their idea of worldview evolution. Worldview is defined as “a set of connected 
beliefs animated by some fundamental, underlying value orientation that is itself 
connected to a visceral sense of right and wrong” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, p. 3). 
Conceptually, a worldview is a constellation of political attitudes driven by a more 
general predisposing factor or “value orientation” that structures and shapes attitudes 
across a range of issues, such as immigration and welfare. Hetherington and Weiler 
describe the idea as "a cluster of issues tethered to an underlying disposition [that] 
animates a distinct way of understanding political reality and of shaping political 
behavior" (2009, p. 64). The key difference between worldview evolution and issue 
evolution is the concept of a broad predisposing factor being used by individuals to sort 
their ideological and issue positions (worldview evolution) rather than a single issue 
reshaping the political environment (issue evolution). 
35  
The process of worldview evolution and partisan sorting was well underway when 
immigration became a major national political issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
the following sections, I describe the evolution of immigration as a national political 
issue and how it became part of a constellation of new issues – i.e., race, crime, and 
foreign affairs - that now polarize elites as well as the mass public in the U.S. 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION POLICY, THE IMMIGRATION POPULATION, AND 
FEDERALISM 
 
 
 
Dramatic changes in the rate of immigration and the cultural makeup of the 
immigration population can influence immigration attitudes and policy preferences 
related to immigration (Hopkins 2010; 2011). The United States has undergone a 
dramatic change both in the rate of immigration and in the country of origin of 
immigrants over the last fifty to sixty years. To see how the rate of immigration has 
changed, Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of foreign-born individuals (immigrants) in the 
United States from 18507  through 2006.  The percentage of immigrants increased from 
 
about 10% to over 14% between 1850 and 1925. Policy reforms restricted the flow of 
immigrants entering the United States after 1925. As a result, the overall percentage of 
immigrants steadily decreased to a historic low in 1970. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 
opened the Golden Doors allowing for a large increase in the flow of immigrants. From 
1970 to 2006, the percentage of immigrants in the U.S. population almost tripled from 
4.7% to 12.5%. 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.2 about here) 
 
7 1850 is the first year that the U.S. Census tracked immigration. 
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To understand the changes in immigration demographics one needs a basic 
understanding of the historical evolution of immigration policy and the division of power 
over immigration policy between the federal government and state governments. Before 
the American Revolution, immigration policy was established by each colony. Even 
during this time period, some colonies were concerned about immigration. For example, 
immigrants to Pennsylvania were required to take an oath of allegiance to the colony. 
From the American Revolution to the late 1800s, federal policy focused on naturalization 
and legally defining the rights of citizenship. At the same time, states began to adopt 
restrictions on immigrants by adopting anti-immigrant domestic policies, such as 
charging taxes to immigrate. 
In the 1870s, the federal government became a central player in immigration policy, 
as displayed in Figure 3.2. First, Congress restricted immigration from China and the 
United States negotiated similar immigrant restrictions with Japan. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first instance of racism or ethnocentrism in immigration 
policy8.   By 1917, a literacy test was adopted that virtually prevented all Asians from 
immigrating9.   Second, the Mayor of New York was charging a tax on immigrants 
 
arriving by ship. In 1876, the Supreme Court ruled this local-level policy was 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court declared immigration a type of foreign commerce. 
As a result, immigration policies became the dominion of the federal government, 
particularly the U.S. Congress. 
 
 
8 The Immigration Act of 1875 barred prostitutes and criminals from immigrating to the United States. 
9 The separate immigration policy for Chinese was finally lifted in 1943 due to our World War II alliance 
with China. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 restricted Japanese immigration until the 1960s. 
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The pattern of exclusion based on ethnicity and race became the norm for 
immigration policy accumulating with the passage of the National Quota Law of 1921. 
The two National Quota Laws, 1921 and 1929, and the National Origins Act of 1924 
restricted immigration based on census data. The National Quota Law of 1921 limited 
immigration to 3% of the number of foreign-born individuals living in the United States 
by country. By using the 1910 census, Congress was attempting to limit immigration 
from Ireland, southern Europe, and Eastern Europe and increase immigration from 
northern Europe. In 1924, Congress decided to further restrict the quotas to 2% of the 
persons of nationality in the 1890 census. Finally in 1929, the quotas were changed to 
the 1920 U.S. census. 
Between 1929 and 1965 the national origin quotas formed the foundation of U.S. 
immigration policy. The national origin quota system severely limited the flow of 
immigrants into the United States10. The census data in Figure 3.2 shows a decrease in 
the immigrant population between 1910 and 1970. The pattern changes after 1970, the 
proportion of immigrants in the United States suddenly starts to grow due to immigration 
reform in 1965. 
The Hart-Celler Act of 1965 ended the use of national origin quotas that favored 
immigration from Europe. Opposition to the national quotas was based on the system 
being racist and inconsistent with civil rights (Tichenor 2002). Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey directly linked immigration to racism when he said “We have removed all 
elements of second-class citizenship from our laws by the Civil Rights Act. We want to 
bring our immigration law into line with the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  As a 
 
 
10 Immigration levels had already begun to decline by 1921 due to World War I and the anti-German 
backlash in the United States. 
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result, the Hart-Celler Act removed restrictions preventing immigration from developing 
countries. Without these policy restrictions, the flow of immigrants increased from 
developing countries due to demand for cheaper labor. 
After 1965, immigration legislation continued to define U.S. refugee policy (1975, 
1977, and 1980), increased the annual immigration limit (1978, 1990) and provided 
amnesty for illegal immigrants (1986) (Tichenor 2002). The majority of the immigration 
policies passed between 1965 and the early 1990s are considered liberal policies, those 
that expand immigration or the rights of immigrants. In the 1990s, political rhetoric 
began to shift with immigrants viewed as a threat to domestic social programs. One of 
these policy changes was PRWORA. 
The Hart-Celler Act created an immigration policy based on family reunification and 
a seven-category system. The act allowed for 120,000 immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere and 170,000 visas from the Eastern Hemisphere with no country being 
allotted more than 20,000 visas. As seen in Table 3.1, the 290,000 visas were divided 
across a seven category system. In addition to the set number of visas, the Hart-Celler 
Act established unrestricted amount of visas for the spouses, minor children, and parents 
of U.S. citizens. 
 
 
 
(Table 3.1 about here)  
 
 
The new U.S. immigration policy, combined with Western Europe shifting from an 
exporter of immigrants to an importer, resulted in a change in U.S. immigration patterns. 
The first change is the actual rate of immigration. In 1960, immigrants made up 5.4% of 
the U.S. population.  The percentage of immigrants continued to decline over the decade 
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to 4.7% by 1970. By 1980, the percentage of foreign-born individuals climbed to 6.2%. 
From 1980 to 2004 the proportion of immigrants increased to 12.0%. 
Additionally, the racial and ethnic composition of the immigrants changed to 
include more people of color. From the earliest immigration records to the 1960s, 
European immigrants were the vast majority of newcomers to the United States. By 
1980, European immigrants accounted for less than 20 percent of the legal admissions. 
Overall, the number of European immigrants decreased from roughly 1.3 million between 
1951 and 1960 to about 800,000 between 1971 and 1980 (INS Statistical Yearbook 2000). 
On the other hand, third world immigrants increased from 800,000 in the 1950s to over 
1.8 million in the 1970s. As Figure 3.3 shows, the American racial divide changed 
dramatically over the last fifty years. The graph, on the left side of the figure, shows the 
change in the proportion of Blacks, Latinos, and immigrants. The solid line represents 
the proportion of the American population made up of Blacks based on the U.S. Census 
(1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) and the Population Survey (2004). The line is 
relatively flat as the Black proportion of the U.S. population increased by 1.7%.   The 
more  dramatic  changes  involve  the  Latino11    and  immigrant  populations12.     The 
 
proportion of Latinos and immigrant populations almost tripled in size to 12.5% by 2000. 
Further, Latinos are now the largest minority in the United States and the legal 
immigration population is the same size as the Black population. 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.3 about here) 
 
 
11 The proportion of Latino in the United States starts with the 1970 U.S. Census since the 1960 census 
lacked a Latino option as an ethnic or racial category in the survey. 
12 The Latino and immigrant lines are not exactly parallel but there is a significant overlap between the two 
groups since the categories are not mutually exclusive and many immigrants over this time frame are 
Latino. 
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Due to the zero sum nature of population proportions, a rise in one or more groups 
must correspond with a decline in another group. In the case of the United States, the 
White majority declined as shown in the second graph. In nearly a half a century, the 
White proportion of the U.S. population declined from nearly 90% to roughly 65% 
between 1960 and 2000. If the trend continues, the White population is likely to decline 
below 50% by 2042. Table 3.2 shows the changes for the White population. In 48 of the 
50 states, the proportion of Whites decreased between 1960 and 2004. The proportion of 
the White population increased slightly in South Carolina and Mississippi. In both states 
the increasing proportion of the White population is a result of the decreasing percentage 
of the Black population and the lower than average growth in the Latino and immigrant 
populations. The pattern is mixed for the Black population, as seen in Table 3.3. The 
overall pattern is a shift from the southern states to the other regions of the country. 
Blacks have mostly migrated to the upper Midwest and East Coast states. 
 
 
 
(Table 3.2 about here) 
 
 
 
 
(Table 3.3 about here) 
 
 
 
 
At the state-level, the distribution of racial groups varies across space and time. 
First, once immigrants gain entry into the United States, they are free to move to any 
state. Second, internal migration patterns result in unequal distribution of racial groups. 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the composition of racial groups for 1960 and 2004, 
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as well as, the change in racial groups between these two time points. Table 3.4 shows 
the demographic changes for Latinos at the state-level between 1970 and 200413. Every 
state experienced an increase in the Latino population between 1970 and 2004. The 
Latino population is concentrated in several states, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, 
Texas, California, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, and New Mexico, which contain 80% of 
the Latinos in 2000 (Pew 2005). On the other hand, the immigration demographic 
patterns, in Table 3.5, are not as clear as those for Latinos. The immigrant population 
increased in the majority of states. In sum, immigrants and Latinos represent the largest 
change in the American population in the last half century. 
 
 
 
(Table 3.4 about here) 
 
 
 
 
(Table 3.5 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The change in immigration patterns from European and Canadian immigrants to 
Hispanic and Asian immigrants creates a tangled web in understanding the impact of 
immigration on American politics. Previous waves of immigrants resulted in cultural 
conflicts between Italian, Irish, Polish, and other European immigrants with Americans. 
Previous immigration waves have been romanticized in popular culture. Many 
Americans mistakenly believe that modern immigrants desire to keep their cultural 
identities and native languages in a way that past immigrants did not (Chavez 2001; 
2008). In reality, current immigrants and natives hold similar views of what it means to 
be  American  (Schildkraut  2011).    In  addition,  immigrants  value  learning  English 
 
13 The U.S. Census began collecting data on Latinos in 1970. 
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(Dowling, Ellison, and Leal 2012) and American customs (Schildkraut 2011). And just 
like the immigrants of the 1800s, current immigrants wish to become American while 
also holding some of their cultural practices. 
Changing immigration levels, by themselves, are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
creating perceptions of threat that alter individual political attitudes. Immigrants live in 
segregated areas, work in segmented markets, and many are unable to vote due to lacking 
citizenship. These factors limit the political and economic threat of immigrants and 
reduce interactions with natives. Daniel Hopkins (2011) developed the politicized place 
hypothesis to group conflict. The politicized place hypothesis uses both demographic 
changes and framing effects to explain anti-immigrant sentiment. Hopkins predicts that 
individuals will view immigrants as a threat if they are in areas with a sudden inflow of 
immigrants and negative news coverage that portrays immigrants as economically and 
culturally threatening. For example, media stories discussing crimes  committed  by 
illegal immigrants can result in additional support for "tougher" enforcement of 
immigration laws. 
 
 
 
SITUATIONAL TRIGGERS: CONTEMPORARY MEDIA IMAGES OF 
IMMIGRANTS 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed how media images can act as situational triggers that shape 
political attitudes. I build on that argument in this chapter by presenting evidence that the 
news coverage of immigrants has increased in frequency since the 1960s. In addition to 
the increasing frequency of news stories, the frames of the stories have become 
increasingly negative by portraying immigrants as a threat to American citizens.   This 
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pattern of the prevalence of negative images is similar to Gilens’ (1999) content analysis 
showing that negative news stories on welfare (e.g., welfare queens) were far more likely 
to be illustrated with images of Blacks, whereas more positive or hopeful stories on 
poverty were more likely to be illustrated with Whites. 
In 1996 magazine cover of the Atlantic Monthly shows an image of the Statue of 
Liberty rewriting her book and the title of the article is "The Price of Immigration: Can 
we still afford to be a nation of immigrants?" A few years earlier, the same magazine 
describes immigration as a "tidal flow of refugees" that will result in "wars... fought over 
scarce resources." According to Chavez, these images are representative of other 
magazine covers on immigration, including the National Review, Time, U.S. News & 
World Report, the Nation, the Progressive, and Newsweek (Chavez 2001). Magazine 
covers have a significant influence on public perceptions about political issues. People 
are more likely to recall images than words and more likely to recall images even if the 
person does not read the news story (Gilens 1999). 
The media commonly use a negative frame in stories about immigration, 
emphasizing the cultural and economic threat of immigrants (Chavez 2001). The 
negative frame found in political rhetoric and media images creates a socially threatening 
and symbolic image of Latinos and immigrants called the Latino Threat Narrative 
(Chavez 2008). Chavez's 2001 study examines magazine covers from 1965 to 1999 for 
ten different national magazines. The results suggest that immigration is being framed as 
an “invasion” of poor Latinos that threatens American society. The Latino Threat 
Narrative appeared on 64.5% of the studied magazine covers. Only 10.5% of the covers 
are considered neutral and 25% of the covers are affirmative or positive images of 
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immigrants. Additionally, the negative trend of magazine covers with  immigration 
images is increasing, as is the number of covers using negative frames of immigrants. 
Chavez’s analysis of magazine covers spans 1965 to 1999. The earliest cover is a U.S. 
News and World Report on July 22, 1974 (Chavez 2001, p. 16). Not a single magazine in 
Chavez's study had a cover on immigration from 1965 to 1974. Over the next twenty- 
four years, seventy-six magazine covers were published with images on immigration, as 
seen in Figure 3.5. The number of covers per decade is pretty consistent with twenty 
covers during the 1970s and twenty-eight covers in both the 1980s and 1990s. During the 
1970s, 50% of the covers have positive images and slightly less than 50% have negative 
images of immigrants. By the 1990s, the proportion of positive covers decreases to 
14.3% but the proportion of negative or alarmist covers increases to 71.4%. 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.4 about here) 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.5 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Magazine covers are only one form of the popular media that may be more 
oriented to attentive or educated publics than other news outlets. A more popular news 
source is the evening news on the major networks. Data on the evening news are 
archived at Vanderbilt University. Using a simple keyword search for immigration 
provides each instance of a news story on immigration starting in the late 1960s through 
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2008. In Figure 3.6, I graph the number of news stories about immigration by year14. 
The number of immigration stories clearly increases since the 1960s. 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.6 about here) 
 
 
 
 
To simplify the distribution of Figure 3.6, I report the mean number of television 
news stories on immigration for each year in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in Figure 3.7, 
which shows that the average number of news stories per year increases for each decade. 
Across the three decades, I find an almost 200% increase in the number of news stories 
on immigration. A smaller increase in the average number of news stories on 
immigration occurs between the 1980s and the 1990s. Finally, a significant and dramatic 
surge in stories occurs in the 2000s. The average number of immigration stories per year 
almost triples in the 2000s and is 700% greater than the number in the 1970s. 
Unfortunately, my data on television news stories featuring immigration can only show 
the overall volume of stories and how the volume changes over time. I do not have data 
about the tone of television coverage. 
 
 
 
(Figure 3.7 about here) 
 
 
 
 
In  conclusion,  the  number  of  news  stories  and  magazine  covers  focusing  on 
immigration increased over the last few decades.  Following theories of agenda setting, 
 
14 I limit the analysis of television news stories to the “loudness” hypothesis or the number of stories over 
time due to the amount of time that would be required to watch, analyze, and code each news story’s media 
frame. I assume that the media frame for television news stories show immigrants as a threat to U.S. 
society, criminals, and made up of individuals from a different ethnic and racial background. This 
assumption is based the pattern found in regards to magazine covers on this issue (Chavez 2001). 
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increased coverage of immigration likely led to the public viewing immigration as a more 
important political issue. Unfortunately, it is difficult to directly test the influence of 
media coverage of immigration and public attitudes about immigration over time. For 
example, Gallup rarely included an immigration survey question until after the issue 
gained national attention in the late 1990s. Before 1999, Gallup surveys included 
questions about immigration in five surveys: 1965, 1977, 1986, 1993, and 1995. The 
Gallup data is not a complete loss; in 1965 one-third of respondents wanted to decrease 
immigration levels. By 1995, the year before welfare reform and the year after Contract 
with America, nearly 65% of Americans wanted to decrease immigration levels. More 
recent research provides additional support for the influence of agenda setting on 
immigration attitudes. Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano (2010) compare newspaper 
coverage and public opinion data for border and nonborder states in 2006. They find 
greater newspaper coverage is significantly related to the percentage of the mass public 
that views immigration as an "important issue" regardless of geographic location. 
Research on immigration and the Latino Threat Narrative both find a pattern 
similar to Gilens' research on welfare news stories and images of Blacks. The end result 
is that immigrants are viewed as undeserving recipients of welfare, similar to Blacks. 
Both Blacks and immigrants are believed to have violated American social norms. In the 
case of Blacks, public perceptions are that "most welfare recipients are taking advantage 
of the system and would rather sit home and collect benefits than work" (Gilens 1999, p. 
5). Gilens’ (1999) research shows that these perceptions are paralleled in stereotypes of 
Blacks as being lazy. In the early 1990s, the public also viewed Latinos as being lazy. 
The correlation between 1992 Black and Latino work-ethic stereotypes is .494 (p<.05). 
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Some political elites viewed immigrants as being lazy and the U.S. welfare system as a 
magnet that attracted lazy immigrants (Haskins 2009). Public perceptions about 
immigrants are not limited to their work ethic. Other negative stereotypes of immigrants 
include the view that immigrants have yet to pay into the welfare system, illegal 
immigrants are falsely believed not to pay taxes, and immigrants send money to their 
native country (Chavez 2010; Crepaz 2008; Haskins 2009). On the surface, one can 
argue that these perceptions result in immigrants being perceived by natives as an 
economic threat. As I show in Chapter 4, the driving force to limit immigrant access to 
welfare is authoritarianism due to a lack of social conformity by immigrants. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter, I built on a dynamic theory of situational triggers and predisposing 
factors by providing a historical narrative about how immigration politics changed over 
the last fifty years. The increasing size of the immigrant population and media stories 
with negative frames create cues from both political elites and the environment. These 
political cues are in turn influenced by existing predisposing factors that from a 
worldview linking immigration to other political issues, such as welfare. 
The combination of the findings on immigration patterns and media stories with 
worldview evolution help explain when we should see immigration as a polarizing issue. 
Immigration was not one of the issues that candidates in the 1960s used to clarify their 
political positions from one and another. But as the immigrant population grew, we find 
Democrats and Republicans taking competing positions on the issue and connecting the 
issue to domestic policies.   In addition, the issue vertically cuts across the political 
48  
landscape as the state governments adopt restrictive immigration policies, a domain that 
has been restricted to the federal government since 1875. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss four predisposing factors: authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, 
economic self-interest, and political identifications. I build on this chapter by 
investigating a relationship between situational triggers and the four predisposing factors 
to explain the relationship between attitudes toward welfare and immigration at the 
individual-level. In Chapter 5, I use the findings from Chapters 3 and 4 to predict which 
states will limit immigrant access to welfare through an opinion-policy linkage. 
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Figure 3.1. The Pathway of Issue Evolution. 
Source: Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1986.  “On the Structure and Sequence of Issue 
Evolution.” The American Political Science Review 80(3): 901-920. 
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Figure 3.2. Significant Immigration Policy and Immigration Levels. 
Source:  Percentage of Foreign Born (U.S. Census Bureau). Immigration acts (Tichenor, Daneil J. 2002. 
Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
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Figure 3.3. Population Change among Immigrants, Blacks, Whites, and Latinos 
from 1960-2004. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
52  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Distribution of Magazine Covers on Immigration by Type and Decade. 
Source:  Chavez, Leo R. 2001. Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
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Figure 3.5. Number of Immigration Magazine Covers by Year, 1965-1999. 
Source:  Chavez, Leo R. 2001. Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
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Figure 3.6. Number of National News Stories on Immigration by Year, 1965-2008. 
Source:  Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
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Figure 3.7. Mean Number of News Stories on Immigration. 
Source:  Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
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Table 3.1.  The Preferential Categories of the Immigration Act of 1965. 
 
Preference Description Number Allotted (%) 
Exempt Spouses, minor children, and parents of No Limit 
 U.S. citizens  
 
First 
 
Unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens 
 
58,000 (20%) 
 
Second 
 
Spouses and unmarried children of 
 
58,000 (20%) 
 permanent aliens  
 
Third 
 
Professionals 
 
29,000 (10%) 
 
Fourth 
 
Married children of U.S. citizens 
 
29,000 (10%) 
 
Fifth 
 
Adult brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens 
 
69,600 (24%) 
 
Sixth 
 
Skilled and unskilled labor needed for labor 
 
29,000 (10%) 
 shortages  
 
Seventh 
 
Refugees 
 
17,400 (6%) 
Source: Tichenor, Daneil J. 2002. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 216. 
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Table 3.2. The Change in White Populations between 1960-2004 at the State Level. 
 
State 1960 
White 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
White 
Population 
(%) 
White 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
State 1960 
White 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
White 
Population 
(%) 
White 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
69.9 
77.2 
89.8 
78.1 
92.0 
97.0 
95.6 
86.1 
82.1 
71.4 
32.0 
98.5 
89.4 
94.1 
99.0 
95.4 
92.8 
67.9 
99.4 
83.0 
97.6 
90.6 
98.8 
57.7 
90.8 
69.5 
66.9 
61.1 
77.2 
44.5 
72.5 
75.9 
70.2 
62.8 
60.2 
23.3 
87.2 
66.2 
84.6 
91.7 
81.9 
88.7 
61.8 
96.1 
59.8 
80.8 
78.1 
86.7 
60.0 
83.1 
-0.4 
-10.3 
-28.7 
-0.9 
-47.5 
-24.5 
-19.7 
-15.9 
-19.3 
-11.2 
-8.7 
-11.3 
-23.2 
-9.5 
-7.3 
-13.5 
-4.1 
-6.1 
-3.3 
-23.2 
-16.8 
-12.5 
-12.1 
2.3 
-7.7 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
96.4 
97.4 
92.3 
99.6 
91.3 
92.1 
91.1 
74.6 
98.0 
91.8 
90.5 
97.9 
92.4 
97.6 
65.1 
96.0 
83.5 
87.4 
98.1 
99.8 
79.2 
96.4 
95.1 
97.6 
97.8 
89.1 
85.7 
61.2 
94.3 
63.8 
43.5 
61.1 
68.6 
91.1 
83.3 
72.9 
82.0 
82.9 
80.5 
65.6 
87.1 
78.1 
49.8 
83.8 
96.0 
68.7 
77.5 
94.4 
86.2 
88.6 
-7.3 
-11.7 
-31.1 
-5.3 
-27.5 
-48.6 
-30.0 
-6.0 
-6.9 
-8.5 
-17.6 
-15.9 
-9.5 
-17.1 
0.5 
-8.9 
-5.4 
-37.6 
-14.3 
-3.8 
-10.5 
-18.9 
-0.7 
-11.4 
-9.2 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
58  
Table 3.3. The Change in Black Populations between 1960-2004 at the State Level. 
 
State 1960 
Black 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Black 
Population 
(%) 
Black 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
State 1960 
Black 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Black 
Population 
(%) 
Black 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
30.0 
3.0 
3.3 
21.8 
5.6 
2.3 
4.2 
13.6 
17.8 
28.5 
0.8 
0.2 
10.3 
5.8 
0.9 
4.2 
7.1 
31.9 
0.3 
16.7 
2.2 
9.2 
0.7 
42.0 
9.0 
26.0 
3.4 
3.0 
15.3 
6.2 
4.0 
9.3 
19.8 
15.1 
28.7 
1.7 
0.3 
14.7 
8.1 
2.2 
5.1 
6.8 
32.5 
0.6 
28.5 
6.0 
14.0 
4.1 
37.2 
11.2 
-4.0 
0.4 
-0.3 
-6.5 
0.6 
1.7 
5.1 
6.2 
-2.7 
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
4.4 
2.3 
1.3 
0.9 
-0.3 
0.6 
0.3 
11.8 
3.8 
4.8 
3.4 
-4.8 
2.2 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
0.2 
2.1 
4.7 
0.3 
8.5 
1.8 
8.4 
24.5 
0.1 
8.1 
6.6 
1.0 
7.5 
2.1 
34.8 
0.2 
16.5 
12.4 
0.5 
0.1 
20.6 
1.7 
4.8 
1.9 
0.7 
0.3 
3.6 
6.9 
0.8 
13.1 
2.3 
15.8 
21.2 
0.6 
11.7 
7.1 
1.7 
10.0 
5.5 
28.9 
0.8 
16.3 
11.0 
0.8 
0.5 
19.3 
3.3 
3.1 
5.7 
0.8 
0.1 
1.5 
2.2 
0.5 
4.6 
0.5 
7.4 
-3.3 
0.5 
3.6 
0.5 
0.7 
2.5 
3.4 
-5.9 
0.6 
-0.2 
-1.4 
0.3 
0.4 
-1.3 
1.6 
-1.7 
3.8 
0.1 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Table 3.4.  The Change in Hispanic Populations between 1970-2004 at the State 
Level. 
 
State 1970 
Hispanic 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Hispanic 
Population 
(%) 
Hispanic 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
State 1970 
Hispanic 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Hispanic 
Population 
(%) 
Hispanic 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
09 
2.1 
17.3 
.05 
13.7 
11.6 
2.4 
1.1 
6.6 
.06 
3.0 
2.6 
3.3 
1.3 
0.6 
2.1 
0.3 
1.9 
0.4 
1.4 
1.1 
1.4 
0.6 
0.4 
0.9 
2.0 
4.8 
28.1 
4.4 
34.9 
19.2 
10.6 
5.9 
19.1 
6.7 
7.9 
8.9 
14.0 
4.4 
3.7 
6.1 
1.9 
2.7 
0.9 
5.4 
7.7 
3.6 
3.5 
1.5 
2.6 
1.91 
2.7 
10.8 
4.35 
21.2 
7.6 
8.2 
4.8 
12.5 
6.64 
4.9 
6.3 
10.7 
3.1 
3.1 
4.0 
1.6 
0.8 
0.5 
4.0 
6.6 
2.2 
2.9 
1.1 
1.7 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
1.1 
1.4 
5.6 
0.4 
4.3 
37.4 
8.0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.9 
1.4 
1.7 
0.9 
0.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
17.7 
4.1 
0.6 
1.0 
2.1 
0.4 
0.9 
5.6 
2.2 
7.0 
22.9 
2.1 
15.0 
43.4 
16.1 
6.1 
1.1 
2.2 
6.4 
9.6 
3.7 
10.5 
3.0 
1.7 
2.9 
34.9 
10.6 
0.9 
5.8 
8.5 
0.6 
4.4 
6.7 
1.1 
5.6 
17.3 
1.7 
10.7 
6.0 
8.1 
5.7 
0.8 
1.3 
5.0 
7.9 
2.8 
9.8 
2.6 
1.3 
2.5 
17.2 
6.5 
0.3 
4.8 
6.4 
0.2 
3.5 
1.1 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Table 3.5.  The Change in Immigrant Populations between 1970 -2004 at the State 
Level. 
 
State 1960 
Immigrant 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Immigrant 
Population 
(%) 
Immigrant 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
State 1960 
Immigrant 
Population 
(%) 
2004 
Immigrant 
Population 
(%) 
Immigrant 
Population 
Change 
(%) 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
0.5 
3.6 
5.4 
0.4 
8.5 
3.4 
10.9 
3.3 
5.5 
0.6 
10.9 
2.3 
6.8 
2.0 
2.0 
1.5 
0.6 
0.9 
6.2 
3.0 
11.2 
6.8 
4.2 
0.4 
1.8 
2.5 
6.1 
14.4 
3.6 
26.8 
9.7 
11.6 
7.6 
17.9 
8.4 
18.5 
5.9 
13.3 
3.9 
3.1 
4.8 
2.4 
2.9 
3.0 
11.0 
13.7 
6.1 
6.1 
1.3 
3.2 
1.91 
2.7 
10.8 
4.35 
21.2 
7.6 
8.2 
4.8 
12.5 
6.64 
4.9 
6.3 
10.7 
3.1 
3.1 
4.0 
1.6 
0.8 
0.5 
4.0 
6.6 
2.2 
2.9 
1.1 
1.7 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
4.5 
2.9 
4.6 
7.4 
10.1 
2.3 
13.6 
0.5 
4.7 
4.1 
0.9 
4.0 
5.3 
10.0 
0.5 
2.7 
0.4 
3.1 
3.6 
6.0 
1.2 
6.3 
1.3 
4.3 
2.9 
1.6 
4.9 
18.0 
4.9 
18.8 
9.2 
21.0 
6.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.4 
9.2 
4.7 
12.3 
3.9 
1.7 
3.8 
15.1 
7.0 
3.9 
9.5 
11.3 
0.8 
4.1 
3.0 
-2.9 
2.0 
13.4 
-2.5 
8.7 
6.9 
7.4 
6.0 
-2.2 
-0.6 
3.5 
5.2 
-0.6 
2.3 
3.4 
-1.0 
3.4 
12.0 
3.4 
-2.1 
8.3 
5.0 
-0.5 
-0.2 
0.1 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Triggering Predisposing Factors: How Immigration Undermines Support for 
Welfare 
 
 
 
 
"In the first place we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith 
becomes an American and assimilates himself to us... We have room for but one 
language here, and that is the English language...and we have room for but one sole 
loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people." Theodore Roosevelt in a letter to 
the American Defense League (1919) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) in 1996 dramatically altered the U.S. welfare system. PRWORA 
eliminated federal entitlements to cash benefits, increased work requirements, increased 
devolution of policymaking authority to the states (e.g., Fellowes and Row 2004; Soss et. 
al. 2001), and increased restrictions on immigrants’ access to welfare programs (Graefe 
et. al. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007). These historic changes to welfare policy make it 
important to understand the climate of opinion and the determinants of welfare attitudes 
that existed in the 1990s, prior to passage of PRWORA. Understanding public opinion is 
important since other studies have demonstrated that public opinion is an important 
predictor of the type of welfare policies adopted nationally (e.g., Brooks and Manza 
2007; Crepaz 2008). 
In Chapter 2, I proposed a theoretical framework of how forces related to 
immigration operate as situational triggers that interact with predisposing factors to shape 
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opposition to welfare as shown in the bold part of Figure 4.1. In Chapter 3, I examine the 
historical development of the relevant situational triggers -- patterns of immigration and 
its portrayal in the news. But which predisposing factors are associated with support for 
welfare and immigrants’ access to it? 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.1 about here) 
 
 
 
 
 
To answer this question, I examine individual attitudes in this chapter. I begin with a 
discussion of four predisposing factors: economic self-interest (social class), political 
identifications (partisanship and ideology), racial and ethnic stereotypes, and 
authoritarianism. I discuss how each factor connects to preferences on policy attitudes 
for immigration levels and indirectly influences welfare preferences (i.e., spending 
preferences and support for immediate immigrant access to welfare). The connection 
between predisposing factors, immigration, and welfare spending preferences is not an 
easy matter to sort out. The statistical evidence indicates that one of the four factors, 
authoritarianism consistently predicts policy preferences regarding welfare and 
immigration policy and the intersection between the two (i.e., immigrants’ access to 
welfare). 
 
 
 
FOUR PREDISPOSING FACTORS 
 
Immigration patterns and news coverage act as situational triggers by activating 
predisposing factors that decrease support for welfare. The Latino Threat Narrative is the 
media image of immigrants as an illegal invasion of culturally different individuals who 
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are unwilling to conform to American social norms and are “stealing” American jobs 
(Chavez 2008). The Latino Threat Narrative contains multiple frames that can trigger all 
four factors: economic self-interest, political identifications, authoritarianism, and racial 
stereotypes. I hypothesize that patterns of immigration activate different predisposing 
factors, which in turn decrease support for welfare. Below I discuss the theoretical 
justification for expecting each of the predisposing factors to influence policy preferences 
toward welfare and immigration policies. 
 
Self-Interest 
 
Campbell and his co-authors described Americans as having a “primitive self- 
interest” or self-interest without ideological pretensions (1960). The economic self- 
interest thesis assumes that individuals seek to increase their economic resources and 
hold many policy preferences that are congruent with their material self-interest 
(Feldman 1982). Individuals are more likely to support public policies when they 
perceive themselves as directly benefitting from the policy. Less affluent individuals, for 
example, are expected to be more supportive of social spending programs because they 
benefit from them materially. By contrast, middle and upper class individuals pay the 
costs of these programs without seeing much direct benefit themselves, and are thus 
expected to oppose welfare programs. 
Research provides only mixed support for the economic self-interest thesis in the 
area of welfare policy and other policy domains (Feldman 1982; Gilens 1999; Kinder and 
Sanders 1996; other domains includes Citrin and Green 1990; Sears, Lau, Tyler and 
Allen 1980; Sears and Funk 1990). Kinder and Sanders (1996) find a significant but 
weak relationship between economic self-interest and support for a range of racial policy 
64  
preferences among Blacks and Whites, including fair employment, school desegregation, 
federal spending, government effort, preferential hiring, and college admission quotas. 
Measures of economic self-interest, such as income, occupation, education, 
homeownership, and the number of children are only weak predictors of policy 
preferences. On the other hand, Gilens (1999, p. 52-53) finds a statistically significant 
relationship between an individual’s income and support for welfare: as income increases 
the likelihood of supporting additional welfare spending decreases. However, he finds 
that stereotypes of Blacks and other factors are much more important in explaining 
opposition to welfare policy. 
Shifting the focus from welfare preferences to immigration policy preferences, 
economic self-interest, for the most part, seems to be a secondary explanation to 
symbolic considerations - i.e., the other three predisposing factors (e.g., Citrin et. al. 
1997; Kehrberg 2007; McLaren 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Voss, Kehrberg, and Butz 2013). Several scholars 
find a relationship between economic self-interest and immigration preferences (e.g., 
Fetzer 2000; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Wilson 2001). 
The fiscal burden hypothesis predicts that the middle and upper classes will oppose more 
liberal immigration and generous welfare policies because they pay more of the costs of 
social spending for immigrants’ access to social programs without themselves qualifying 
to receive benefits (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson, 
Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). On the other hand, the labor market hypothesis predicts a 
positive relationship between income and immigration policy preferences due to job 
market competition (Mayda 2006; Quillian 2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).   Low 
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skilled labor and the lower class compete with immigrants for jobs and, as a result, hold 
more negative attitudes towards immigrants, whereas highly skilled labor and members 
of the upper class have more positive attitudes toward immigrants because they are less 
likely to compete with them for jobs. 
In conclusion, I expect a significant but weak relationship between economic self- 
interest, measured as income (see discussion in research design section for justification of 
this measure), and welfare preferences, welfare chauvinism (opposition to immigrants’ 
access to welfare), and immigration levels. I do not expect the relationship to be in the 
same direction for each dependent variable, however. Based on research by Gilens 
(1999), I predict that as income increases, support for generous welfare programs 
decreases (Hypothesis1). In addition, based on the fiscal burden hypothesis, income 
should be negatively related to support for immediate immigrant access to welfare 
programs (H2). In other words, individuals with higher incomes are expected to oppose 
access to welfare programs. When it comes to support for increasing immigration levels, 
however, the labor market hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between income and 
preferences for increasing immigration levels (H3). 
 
Political Identifications 
 
For some scholars, policy preferences are not based so much on negative racial 
attitudes, self-interest, or authoritarianism, but on political identifications (Feldman and 
Huddy 2005; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Political 
identifications are general orientations, such as party identification and liberal- 
conservative identification (often referred to as “ideology,” which is something of a 
misnomer), that orient citizens to groups they like and dislike and serve as heuristics for 
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interpreting ambiguous political information and inferring one’s policy positions 
(Conover and Feldman 1981). For example, Sniderman and Piazza (1993, 45) wrote that 
“contemporary American society is divided by ideological outlook, with liberals differing 
systematically from conservatives.” Political identifications have a symbolic and 
affective component that serve as a form of group consciousness that can be triggered by 
political issues (Levitin and Miller 1979; Conover and Feldman 1981). As such, political 
identifications act “as a basis for social differentiation” (Conover and Feldman 1981, p. 
622). 
I focus on two types of political identification that have wide currency in American 
politics: partisanship and ideology, which research suggests play a similar role in guiding 
issue preferences, with one important difference: ideological identifications tend to be 
less widespread than partisan identifications (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960; Conover and Feldman 1981; Fiorina 1977; Gerber and Green 1998; 
Levendusky 2009). Partisanship has received more attention in the literature. Scholars 
have conceptualized the influence of political identifications on policy attitudes in several 
different ways. The original conceptualization of partisanship in The American Voter 
viewed partisanship as a loyalty developed early in life that was stable throughout 
adulthood and was largely impervious to new contrary information (i.e., Campbell et al 
1960; summarized by Fiorina 1981). In contrast to this view, Fiorina (1981, p. 84) 
viewed partisanship as a running tally that is constantly updated with new information 
and “retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance.” Gerber and Green 
(1998) have expanded on Fiorina’s notion of a running tally where partisans follow the 
principles  of  Bayesian  learning  in  updating  their  priors  based  on  new  information. 
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Bartels (2002) takes exception to the view of partisanship as a running tally updated 
through Bayesian learning, and he marshals a variety of survey evidence to show that 
partisans often distort information to preserve their prior identifications and 
commitments. More recent experimental evidence amplifies Bartels’ position, finding 
that partisans often act as motivated reasoners whose judgments are influenced by 
selective perceptions and disconfirmation biases (Taber and Lodge 2006). 
Regardless of the exact process that partisans follow in processing political 
information, nearly everyone agrees that one of the most common and useful functions of 
partisanship is that it serves as a heuristic, an information shortcut, that allows individuals 
“to make reasonable decisions with minimal cognitive effort in all aspects of their lives” 
(Lau and Redlawsk 2001, p. 952). Individuals can use partisanship and ideology of elites 
as a form of cue-taking. In addition, partisans rely heavily on cues from party elites 
when interpreting information (Berinsky 2007, Zaller 1992). For my purposes, partisan 
and ideological identifications are important predictors of many policy preferences 
because individuals use political identifications to determine which cues are accepted 
from elites that in turn influence individual policy preferences. And for this reason, 
divisions between party elites on various issues are often reflected in similar divisions in 
the same issues among the parties in the electorate. 
Thus, the association between political identities and policy attitudes often depends 
on the clarity of partisan cues and whether the parties and candidates have taken distinct 
positions on the issue (see the discussion on issue evolution and clarification in Chapter 
3). As an economic issue, the parties’ positions on welfare policy have been distinct 
since the New Deal era.  Welfare has been described as one of the most divisive political 
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issues in American politics (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). 
Conservatives and Republicans have traditionally supported cutting or eliminating 
welfare programs, while liberals and Democrats have fought to preserve them (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). 
On the other hand, the issue of immigration has historically been a crosscutting 
political issue (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002), meaning that support and opposition to 
immigration could often be found on both sides of the left-right divide. Until recently, 
support for liberal and conservative immigration policies could not be easily predicted by 
the ideology or party membership of elites. Traditionally, classic exclusionists opposed 
immigration reform while free-market and big business Republicans provide support. On 
the other side, Democrats with strong labor unions opposed immigration reforms,while 
those in more cosmopolitan (multi-cultural liberal) legislative districts support liberal and 
progressive reforms (Tichenor 2002). 
The combination of the two issues, welfare and immigration, can create the 
necessary cues from partisan elites for the masses to use political identifications when 
forming attitudes about immigrants and domestic programs. In the 1990s, the political 
rhetoric shifted from border control to immigration’s influence on domestic programs 
(Calavita 1996; Faist 1994). This rhetoric quickly became partisan. For example, in 
1996, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich summarized the Republican position by 
saying, “Come to America for opportunity. Do not come to America to live off the law- 
abiding American taxpayer.” 
In summary, I expect a significant and consistent relationship between political 
identifications (partisanship and political ideology) and policy preferences that involve 
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welfare programs (welfare preferences and welfare chauvinism). I predict that, in 1992, 
conservatives and Republicans will support less spending for welfare programs (H4-H5) 
and a longer waiting period before immigrants are permitted access to benefits from 
welfare programs (H6-H7). I expect a much weaker relationship between political 
identifications and immigration levels due to the cross-cutting nature of immigration as a 
political issue early in the 1990s (i.e. before the promotion of an anti-immigrant ballot 
initiative in California by Governor Pete Wilson in 1994). Democratic and Republican 
office holders did not yet fully distinguished their positions on the issue of immigration 
until the 2008 presidential campaign. I predict that political identifications will not 
significantly predict respondents’ preferred level of immigration in 1992 (H8-H9). 
 
Racial Stereotypes 
 
Before discussing racial stereotypes and authoritarianism, it is important to briefly 
discuss the “racialization” and “ethnicization” of contemporary immigration15, since 
opposition to immigration often reflects animosity, prejudice, stereotypes and perceived 
threats of various types from particular immigrant groups. Such fears and animosities are 
likely influenced more by elite rhetoric and news coverage than experience, since many 
people do not have direct contact with the group in question. As indicated earlier, the 
Latino Threat Narrative frames news about Latino immigrants in a way that suggests they 
are unwilling to integrate into the national community (Chavez 2008). As previously 
mentioned,  the  racial  and  ethnic  identity  of  immigrants  has  changed  from  White 
 
15 I use the term racialization as a synonym for ethnicity. Despite Latinos being an ethnic group and not a 
race, much of the scholarly literature and survey questions treat Latinos the same as racial minorities, such 
as Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans (for examples see Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010 or Hero and 
Preuhs 2007). For example the 2000 General Social Survey includes a question saying “Besides whites, 
what was the largest racial group in your high school [or the last high school you attended] – Blacks/ 
African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, or American Indians?” (Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011). 
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immigrants from developed countries to Latino and Asian immigrants arriving from 
developing countries. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that forty percent of the U.S. 
Latino population are immigrants. The overlap between the Latino and immigrant 
populations influences public perceptions. Survey data by Opinion Research Corporation 
for CNN Opinion Research (2009) asked a representative sample of Americans if “you 
saw a Latino man or woman who you did not know. Would you be most likely to assume 
that they were born in this country, that they immigrated to this country legally, or that 
they were an illegal immigrant?”  Nearly one-half of the respondents answered that they 
would assume the unknown Latino was an immigrant16, a clear exaggeration of reality, 
 
while only thirty-eight percent assumed the individual was a U.S. citizen. The results of 
the CNN study provide evidence for the hypothesis that immigration is racialized in the 
minds of many Americans who assume the prototypical Latino is an immigrant, not a 
U.S. citizen. 
 
A second survey provides further support for the idea that immigration is shifting 
from a race-neutral policy to a “racialized” policy. Gallup (2008) asked respondents if 
they preferred the size of the immigrant population from particular regions of the world 
to increase, decrease, or stay the same. The results of these survey questions are 
interesting, since 48% of the respondents believed there are too many immigrants from 
Latin American countries but only 31% felt the same about immigrants from Asian 
countries (Gallup 2008). Thus, many Americans associate immigration with Latinos, and 
public perceptions about Latinos influence immigration policy preferences. 
Several studies clearly show that an important source of opposition to welfare among 
Whites  is  their  negative  views  of  Blacks,  whom  many  Whites  view  as  lazy  and 
16 30% answered legal immigrant and 19% answered illegal immigrant. 
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mistakenly see as the primary beneficiaries of welfare programs (e.g., Gilens 1996; 1998; 
Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997b). Gilens' (1998) 
study demonstrates that Whites’ negative stereotypes of African Americans are strongly 
linked to Whites’ opposition to welfare. He uses two sets of analyses to determine the 
sources of welfare opposition. One set of analyses uses a correlational approach to 
estimate the direct and indirect effects of the sources of opposition to welfare spending 
among Whites. He finds that White opposition to welfare is driven substantially by 
Whites’ beliefs that Blacks are lazy, even after controlling for a host of other factors, 
including the belief that the poor are lazy. Stereotypes towards Blacks and the poor are 
confounded since Blacks (and other ethnic minorities) are disproportionately represented 
among the poor and unemployed. 
To compliment the correlational approach, Gilens also uses an experimental design 
to separate the confounding nature of poverty and race from each other. The welfare 
mother experiment frames a story about a welfare mother whose race is randomly 
manipulated. Respondents who are asked about the Black welfare mother register greater 
opposition to welfare policy in a subsequent portion of the survey. The results indicate 
that attitudes toward Blacks impact individual perceptions of and support for welfare 
policies. Specifically, the studies suggest that when many Whites think about welfare, 
they think about Black welfare mothers. 
Further, immigration has developed into an important news story and political elites 
have argued that immigrants are net benefactors of welfare programs (Tichenor 2002). 
For example, the November cover of Atlantic Monthly had the headline “The Price of 
Immigration” (Chavez 2001, p. 199).   In California, Governor Wilson supported and 
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campaigned for Proposition 187, a ballot initiative that would eliminate the social rights 
of illegal immigrants from receiving government benefits from 200 state programs. These 
images may have a similar influence on welfare attitudes as Black stereotypes (Gilens 
1995; 1998; 1999). For example, the majority of magazine covers either picturing 
immigrants as a threat to the American society or as culturally different from Americans 
show Latinos (Chavez 2001; 2008). Many magazine covers highlighted Mexican 
immigrants as the “enemy within,” an invading force, or a nation within the nation. As 
such, I expect individuals who view Latinos as being lazy, relative to the work-ethic 
stereotypes of Whites (see my discussion below for more details of this measure), are 
more likely to prefer lower welfare spending levels (H10), lower immigration levels 
(H11), and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs (H12). 
 
Authoritarianism 
 
The Latino Threat Narrative also increases perceptions of threat from foreigners who 
challenge the existing social and political order, which are likely to trigger 
authoritarianism, an orientation long associated with ethnocentrism and hostility toward a 
variety of outgroups (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009). 
Authoritarianism is a general orientation “concerned with the appropriate balance 
between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and 
diversity, on the other hand” (Stenner 2005; p. 14). A core  component  of 
authoritarianism is social conformity (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005), defined as “a desire for an orderly and 
structured world” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992, p. 400). A need for social order among 
authoritarians leads to a black-and-white view of the world that distinguishes sharply 
73  
between ingroups and outgroups (Altemeyer 1981; 1996; Feldman and Stenner 1997; 
Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Katz 1960; Stenner 2005; Walker 2009). 
As a result, authoritarians are much more likely than non-authoritarians to express 
prejudice toward a range of outgroups that are perceived to challenge the existing social 
and political order. Authoritarians are much more likely to perceive threats from such 
outgroups and to prefer policies designed to minimize such threats, including an 
aggressive military posture in world affairs and restrictions on the immigration of groups 
perceived to be racially or culturally different from “true” Americans (Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009; Kinder and Kam 2009). Authoritarians are more likely than non- 
authoritarians to view immigrants as an alien out-group. Immigrants are commonly 
portrayed as being “unwilling or incapable of integrating, of becoming part of the national 
community” (Chavez 2008, p. 2) resulting in “the failure of Mexican-Americans over 
several generations to increase their identification with American values" (Huntington 
2004, p. 242)17. 
 
Exaggerated perceptions of the differences between ingroups and outgroups fuel 
authoritarians’ jaundiced view of outgroups and a preference for largely punitive policies 
that restrict the social, economic and political rights of out-groups. Authoritarians support 
the aggressive and “harsh application of rules” (Adorno et. al. 1950) with a preference for 
policies that either punish or eliminate threats to conformity (Stenner 2005). There is a 
long tradition of research in the social sciences finding that authoritarians are not only 
prejudiced toward outgroups but are politically intolerant toward them as well, meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
17 The concern over the failure of immigrants to assimilate American values may not accurately reflect reality 
(Schildkraut 2011). 
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that they support limiting their civil liberties (e.g., Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005)18. As 
such, I hypothesize that immigrant groups that are branded as alien outgroups will be 
targeted by authoritarians for a series of harsh and punitive measures. In addition to 
supporting restrictive immigration policies and policing the borders, authoritarians are 
likely to oppose welfare as a means to prevent undeserving outgroups, such as immigrants 
as well as Blacks and other minorities, from receiving support. Despite the fact that 
welfare programs are designed to be ethnically and racially neutral, welfare programs 
become a mechanism for enhancing social solidarity by "defining structures of social and 
political inclusion and exclusion" (Lieberman 2003, p. 30).   As a result, authoritarians 
have a preference for welfare policies “to become more aggressive in enforcing social 
order, defining behavioral expectations, and demanding self-discipline from the poor” 
(Soss, Fording and Schram 2011, p. 63). In this way, support for welfare is predicted by 
group identities with support for limiting access to out-group members (Kinder and Kam 
2009; Theiss-Morse 2009) by adopting restrictive policies (Stenner 2005). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I hypothesize that, compared to non-authoritarians 
(i.e., those who score on the lower half of the authoritarianism scale described below), 
authoritarians are more likely to prefer lower welfare spending (H13), more restrictive 
immigration policies (H14) and a longer waiting period before immigrants are deemed 
eligible for welfare benefits (H15). 
 
 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Recent research has studied the relationship between authoritarianism and a wider range of issues 
including immigration (Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and support for the war on terror (Hetherington and 
Suhay 2011). 
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In the analysis, I examine whether non-Latino Whites’ attitudes toward welfare and 
immigration are a function of predisposing factors and situational triggers. I limit the 
analysis to non-Latino Whites because, unfortunately, the American National Election 
Study (ANES) survey studies rarely oversamples Blacks and Latinos in order to have 
representative samples of these two groups. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
I use questions from the 1992 ANES to measure welfare spending preferences, 
welfare chauvinism, and immigration preferences19. The 1992 ANES has two important 
advantages over other surveys. First, the 1992 ANES includes a question that directly 
asks respondents about immigrant access to welfare, my measure of welfare chauvinism. 
This question is rarely included in surveys and the 1992 ANES is the only survey that I 
am aware of that includes this welfare chauvinism question and the necessary items to 
measure authoritarianism, an important independent variable of interest. Second, the 
1992 ANES comes before the 1996 welfare reforms, allowing me to study public opinion 
that influenced which reforms were adopted. 
Policy preferences are the dependent variables in the analysis. Each of the dependent 
variables are coded from more conservative to more liberal preferences. To measure 
support for welfare, I use a general question asking individuals about their preferred 
welfare spending levels used by Gilens and others. Respondents are asked "We are faced 
with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. 
I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me 
whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the 
19 Please see Appendix A for further discussion about variable selection, exact question and response 
wording, and details about variable coding for all dependent and independent variables. 
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right amount. First (welfare) . . . are we spending too much (coded as -1), too little 
(coded as 1), or about the right amount (coded as 0) on (welfare)?" I use a similarly 
designed question to measure immigration attitudes. Respondents are asked “Do you 
think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the 
United States to live should be increased a little (coded as .5), increased a lot (coded as 
1), decreased a little (-.5), decreased a lot (-1), or left the same as it is now (0)?” This 
survey question is a standard one for measuring attitudes towards immigration policy (see 
Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Lu and Nicholson-Crotty 2010; Voss, Kehrberg, 
Butz 2013). Finally, the 1992 ANES includes a question that captures individuals’ 
attitudes on welfare chauvinism by directly asking about preferences for immigrants’ 
access to welfare with the following question: “Do you think that immigrants who come 
to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as 
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare (coded 1), or should they have to be here a year or 
more? (coded 0).” A more ideal question would allow more differentiation in responses 
and allow individuals to select a longer waiting period, such as five years, or even a 
permanent ban on benefits for immigrants. Nevertheless, although the variation in 
responses to the question is undoubtedly truncated, individuals with more restrictive 
preferences for immigrants’ access to welfare should map onto the two responses, since a 
waiting period is closer to restrictive preferences than no waiting period. 
 
Independent Measures 
 
As indicated earlier, economic self-interest should guide both immigration attitudes 
(Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004; Sniderman et al. 2004; Lahav 
2004a; 2004b) and welfare policy preferences (Gilens 1999).  To measure economic self- 
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interest, I follow Gilens and others by using a simple measure of yearly household 
income in constant dollars. The ANES question asks respondents to indicate the “letter 
of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 
1991 before taxes.”   I code the responses into nine categories ranging from less than 
$5,000 yearly (coded as 0) to more than $105,000 yearly (coded as 1). 
 
I measure authoritarianism with an additive index of four questions on childhood 
values (e.g., Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 
2005). Each childhood values question asks respondents to choose between two 
desirable values for children, such as being independent or respectful of elders (the 
authoritarian value option). The wording of the stem of the battery is, “Although there 
are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks 
that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable 
qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have.” The 
four sets of childhood value options are “being independent or respectful of elders,” 
“self-reliance or obedience,” “curiosity or good manners,” and “being considerate or 
being well behaved.” The wording of the battery is designed to minimize social 
desirability bias and tap respondents' value priorities for order, conformity, and obedience 
to authority (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). The authoritarian values in 
this battery are “respect for elders,” “obedience,” “good manners,” and “being well 
behaved.” Each question is coded as 0 for non-authoritarian values, .5 for the small 
percentage of respondents who volunteer that both values are equally important, and 1 for 
authoritarian values (Chronbach’s alpha=.674).   To recode the additive scale to range 
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from a low of 0 to a high of 1 (indicating high authoritarianism), I added responses to the 
four questions together and divided by four. 
This measure has several advantages over traditional measures of authoritarianism, 
such as the F-Scale (Adorno et. al. 1950) and the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
measure (Altemeyer 1981). As Feldman (2003) points out, previous measures of 
authoritarianism, such as Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA index, included questions that asked 
about prejudice, intolerance, and conservatism, which made predicting prejudice and the 
like from authoritarianism tautological. By contrast, the child values measure is clearly 
distinct from the attitudes it is designed to predict (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and 
Suhay 2011)20. 
 
To measure party partisanship, I use a 7-point Party ID scale developed by the ANES 
based on multiple questions starting with an individual’s general partisanship to how 
strongly or weakly they consider their partisanship. The partisanship scale ranges from 
“strong Democrat” (coded as 0) to “strong Republican” (coded as 1). In addition, 
individuals were given the option of picking “No preference” or “Other party.” I decided 
to code these respondents (n=5) as Independents (coded as .5) since independents are 
usually described by the mass media as individuals who are registered as neither 
Democrats nor Republicans but are registered as independents or members of third 
political parties. Political ideology is assessed on a seven-point scale asking respondents 
to self-place themselves on the ideological spectrum. Respondents are asked, “We hear a 
lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which 
the  political  views  that  people  might  hold  are  arranged  from  extremely  liberal  to 
 
 
20 For a more detailed examination of the construct validity of the child-rearing measure and how it relates 
to other measures of authoritarianism see Hetherington and Weiler (2009, p. 51-58). 
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extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you 
thought much about this?” The seven-point scale for political ideology ranges from 
extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservatives (1). 
Due to the racialization of immigration policy, racial stereotypes of Latinos are likely 
to influence immigration policy preferences. Respondents are told, “Now I have some 
questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale 
on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a 
score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are “rich." A score 
of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are "poor." A score of 4 means 
you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose 
any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” 
Afterwards, the respondents are given a series of questions about different groups. For 
work-ethic stereotypes, the respondents are asked, “The second set of characteristics asks 
if people in the group tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy.” The 
respondents rate a series of social groups one at a time. The work-ethic stereotype 
questions are commonly used in the scholarly literature when conducting research on 
welfare (see Gilens 1999). The advantage of using the work-ethic stereotypes is that 
these stereotypes should be influenced by negative media stories about welfare recipients, 
especially those that include a racial image or frame, that distinguish between deserving 
and undeserving recipients of government aid. In the early 1990s, some political elites, 
including Governor Pete Wilson of California, argued that the generous American 
welfare system was attracting lazy and undesirable immigrants that take advantage of our 
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government programs.  I believe that the work-ethic stereotype question captures these 
attitudes. 
To construct my measure of Latino stereotypes, I code individual assessments for the 
work ethic of “Whites” and “Hispanics”21  on a 7-point scale ranging from hardworking 
(0) to lazy (1). Previous scholars have suggested that respondents use different rating 
systems (e.g., Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). For example, one respondent may 
view all groups as being hardworking and a second respondent may view all groups as 
being lazy. To make sure that the Latino stereotype measure taps beliefs about Latinos 
and not a misanthropic view of everyone, scholars recommend subtracting ratings of the 
target group from ratings of the respondent’s own racial group. The Latino stereotype 
gap (e.g., Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011), therefore, subtracts Whites’ ratings of the 
work ethic of “Whites” from their ratings of “Hispanics”. The work ethic measure 
captures non-Latino Whites’ views of Latinos’ work ethic in relative terms to their 
perceptions of their own racial group's work ethic22.  The Latino stereotype gap ranges 
 
from -1 to 1, with positive values indicating a belief that Latinos are more hard working 
than Whites, and negative values indicate the view that Whites are more hardworking 
than Latinos. In the 1992 survey, 13.32% of Whites rated Whites as more hardworking (- 
1 on the Latino stereotype gap) while 10.03% rate Latinos as more hard working (1), with 
36.25% seeing no difference (0). 
 
Control Variables 
 
21 For the sake of consistency, I use the term "Latino" throughout the text of this manuscript.  The 
American National Election Study uses the term Hispanic in the actual survey questions. The terms are 
interchangeable and I do not believe that the use of either term biases the results. 
22 Positive values indicate individuals believe that Latinos are more hard working than whites and negative 
values indicate that they view whites as being more hardworking than Latinos. Kinder and Mendelberg 
(1995), Peffley and Hurwitz (2010), and Piston (2010) use a similar coding scheme to estimate racial 
stereotypes about Blacks relative to Whites. 
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As Figure 4.1 indicates, individual demographics influence predispositions and 
policy preferences. Based on previous research, I include several demographic 
characteristics as control variables: education, female, and age. I include these 
demographic characteristics since each might shape individual policy preferences. Based 
on prior research, I expect older individuals, measured in years, to prefer less welfare 
spending (H16) (Gilens 1999), fewer immigrants (H17) (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 
2009; Kehrberg 2007), and a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare 
benefits (H18). 
More  educated  individuals  should  support  increasing  immigration  levels  and 
 
immediate immigrant access to welfare programs. Education can influence a range of 
factors, from income to democratic attitudes. Recent research on immigration attitudes 
found that individuals with higher levels of formal education hold more positive attitudes 
toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In addition, Gilens found education 
to be negatively correlated to welfare spending preferences, but the relationship was 
insignificant (1999, p. 90). To measure education, I use a question asking respondents 
“What is the highest degree that you have earned?” I coded the responses into a 4-point 
scale to match the coding developed by Lax and Phillips (2009a; 2009b) used in Chapter 
5. The first category includes individuals who did not complete a high school degree 
(coded as 0). Respondents who have completed a high school degree are coded as .333. 
Individuals who are attending college or completed a two-year degree are combined into 
a single category (coded as .667). For the final category, I combine individuals who have 
completed a bachelor’s degree or an advanced degree into a single category (coded as 1). 
I expect that higher educated individuals are more likely to support increased welfare 
82  
spending (H19), increased immigration levels (H20), and immediate access to welfare for 
immigrants (H21). 
Finally, research has found that women (coded as 1) prefer more social services (e.g., 
Hutchings et. al. 2004) but the research has mixed findings for immigration attitudes with 
gender gaps in both directions and at other times insignificant results (Beaulieu and 
Kehrberg 2008). In sum, I expect that females are more likely to prefer increased welfare 
spending (H22), increased immigrations levels (H23) and less likely to support welfare 
chauvinism (H24), but I am less certain about a prediction for gender differences on 
immigration policy and welfare chauvinism. Nevertheless, I include gender in the 
analysis to eliminate spurious effects that confound the effects of the theoretical 
variables. 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION, WELFARE, AND PREDISPOING FACTORS: 
AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented a theory explaining why some states restrict immigrant 
eligibility to welfare programs and other states grant access to immigrants. I argued that 
the key difference between states is public opinion. To be more precise, I constructed a 
theory of predisposing factors at the individual level that are triggered by levels of 
immigration and news coverage that decrease support for generous and inclusive welfare 
programs, see Figure 4.2. At the state level, I predict that states with larger 
concentrations of individuals holding specific predisposing factors are more likely to 
restrict immigrants’ access to welfare. In order to test my theory, I follow a three step 
process that follows the figure presented in Chapter 2.  Each step of the analysis builds on 
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the previous one by using the results to develop expectations for the next step. The first 
step is to examine the individual level component of my theory in the first portion of the 
analysis in this chapter. I use this analysis to identify the most important predisposing 
factors-- authoritarianism and the Latino stereotype gap--that consistently predict the 
three policy preferences. The second step, also considered in this chapter, will be to 
include state-level contextual factors in a multilevel analysis of individual-level policy 
preferences to examine how one trigger, state immigration levels, both activates and 
shapes predisposing factors. Based on the findings in this chapter, I turn to the third and 
final step in the analysis in the next chapter (Chapter 5). Based on the individual-level 
findings that authoritarians prefer less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and more 
supportive of a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare, I predict that states 
with larger populations holding authoritarian attitudes are more likely to limit immigrant 
access to social spending programs. 
I summarize the predicted relationships between the four predisposing factors and the 
three policy preferences in Table 4.1, with reference to specific hypotheses. Because 
two of the dependent variables (welfare spending preferences and immigration policy 
preferences) range from -1 to 1 with three to five categories, I use ordered logistic 
regression for my analysis. The third policy preference, welfare chauvinism, has three 
categories ranging between 0 and 1, so I also use ordered logistic regression. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.1 about here) 
 
 
 
Welfare Spending Preferences 
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The results from regressing each of the three policy preferences (i.e., welfare 
spending preferences, immigration policy preferences, and welfare chauvinism) on the 
four predisposing factors and the control variables (i.e., education, gender, and age) are 
presented in Table 4.2. The first column for each policy preference provides the 
estimates for the model including only the control variables. The second column adds the 
four predisposing factors (authoritarianism, racial stereotypes, self-interest, and political 
identifications). The far left column of coefficients presents the results from regressing 
welfare spending preferences on the control variables. Both female and education have a 
significant direct impact on welfare spending preferences, as more highly educated 
individuals and males are less likely to support increasing welfare spending, consistent 
with H19 and H22. The coefficient for age is small and far from being significant. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.2 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The effect of the control variables should be indirect and mediated by the inclusion 
of the predisposing factors. In the second column of table 4.2, I report estimates for the 
equations including the predisposing factors. The effects of demographic factors are 
clearly muted once the predisposing factors are included. Each of the predisposing 
factors is significantly related to welfare spending preferences. As predicted, the more 
traditional determinants of welfare spending preferences – i.e., identifying oneself as 
conservative and Republican, having higher income, and viewing Latino as less hard- 
working than Whites- are associated with support for reducing welfare spending. As 
indicated by the coefficient in the first row of the table, a less traditional determinant of 
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welfare preferences, authoritarianism, is also associated with a preference for reducing 
welfare spending.  Thus, the results provide support for hypothesis H13. 
 
Immigration Policy Preferences 
 
Shifting to the two middle columns in Table 4.2, I present the ordered logit estimates 
predicting preferred levels of immigration. Focusing first on the impact of the control 
variables, as an individual’s education increases, so does support for increasing 
immigration levels. The education coefficient becomes smaller once the predisposing 
factors are included, but does not lose significance. As Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) 
have shown, the impact of education on immigration preferences is mediated by self- 
interest, social tolerance, and democratic attitudes. 
Three of the predisposing factors are significant predictors of immigration policy 
preferences. The coefficients for authoritarianism, ideology, income, and Latino 
stereotypes are each negatively associated with immigration preferences, as 
authoritarianism, income, ideology, or Latino stereotypes increase preferences for fewer 
immigrants also increase. The results are consistent with several of the individual 
hypothesis in that authoritarians (H14) and individuals who hold negative Latino 
stereotypes (H11) prefer restricting levels of immigration. An unexpected finding is the 
significant coefficient for ideology; conservatives are more likely to prefer fewer 
immigrants than liberals. Although smaller than the impact of ideology for welfare 
preferences, this results is nevertheless unexpected because I hypothesized an 
insignificant relationship between ideology and immigration policy preferences due to the 
lack of divergent positions among ideological elites on the immigration issue in 1992 
(H8).   In addition, the labor market hypothesis (H2) and the fiscal burden hypothesis 
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setup competing predictions for the relationship between income and immigration 
preferences. The labor market hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient and the fiscal 
burden hypothesis predicts a negative relationship. The results in Table 4.2 finds that 
income is negatively related to immigration levels, that more affluent individuals are 
more likely than the less affluent to support lower immigration levels. This finding is 
inconsistent with the labor market hypothesis (H2), which predicted that the lower class 
prefers restricting immigration levels to decrease job competition, but supportive of the 
fiscal burden hypothesis, that more affluent individuals prefer fewer immigrants that can 
drain social services that the upper class support through taxes (Mayda 2006; Quillian 
2005; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). 
In comparison, partisanship has no discernible impact on immigration preferences, as 
predicted (H9). This suggests that party elites had yet to clarify their distinct positions on 
immigration levels, either increasing or decreasing the population size, but conservatives 
were already supporting a decrease in immigration levels creating a possible “breeding 
ground” of support for Republican elites to draw upon. 
 
Welfare Chauvinism 
 
In the final two columns, the dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, indicates 
whether individuals would rather see immigrants receive immediate access to welfare 
programs or a one year waiting period before immigrants receive access. Judging from 
the first column of coefficients where only demographic factors are considered, education 
and age are significant predictors of welfare chauvinism, while being female is not. 
Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to support giving immigrants’ 
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immediate access to welfare.  On the other hand, older individuals are more supportive of 
a one year waiting period before allowing immigrants access to welfare benefits. 
The estimates for the impact of the predisposing factors on welfare chauvinism are 
presented in the final column of Table 4.2. Partisan and ideological identification both 
fall short of statistical significance: knowing one’s political identifications provides no 
real insight into whether they support welfare chauvinism or not. The lack of distinct 
positions and partisan cues (i.e., clarification) doubtless helps explain the lack of findings 
here. I expect that over time, as party elites began to diverge more on issues related to 
immigration, political identifications become more important predictors of these issue 
preferences. For example McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle (2012) find that ideology 
significantly predicts immigration attitudes using data from 2006 and 2008. 
Three of the predisposing factors — authoritarianism, income (economic self- 
interest), and the Latino stereotype gap are significantly related to welfare chauvinism. 
Authoritarians are more likely to prefer a waiting period before immigrants can access 
welfare programs than non-authoritarians, consistent with (H15). In support of the fiscal 
burden hypothesis, individuals with higher levels of income are, on average, more 
supportive of an immigrant waiting period (H2). Finally, individuals who view Latinos 
as less hardworking than Whites prefer to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare programs 
by supporting a waiting period before they become eligible (H12). 
 
Overview of Individual-Level Findings 
 
Examining the statistical models for each individual policy preference provides 
important insights, but a comparison of the coefficients for the predisposing factors 
across models makes the comparisons easier.  Thus, I report the coefficients for only the 
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predisposing factors in Table 4.3. Looking at the patterns in Table 4.3, several 
predisposing factors are not consistently significant predictors of all three policy 
preferences. First, given the traditional economic split between the parties and liberals 
and conservatives, it is no surprise that both ideology and partisanship are important 
predictors of welfare spending. But the impact of ideology shrinks considerably for 
immigration policy, and partisanship becomes insignificant, while neither identification is 
important for welfare chauvinism, all suggesting that the parties and ideological elites 
had not yet diverged enough to provide clear cues to the electorate on immigration issues 
by 1992. An alternative explanation for the non-findings is that ideology and 
partisanship are too closely related to separate the effects of both predictors in the 
equations, thus increasing standard errors and making it difficult to find a significant 
effect for either variable.   The correlation between the ideology and partisanship is 
substantial (r = .39, p<.05), but not too high to estimate separate coefficients reliably23. 
 
Rather,  the  political  variables  simply  fall  short  in  explaining  immigration  attitudes, 
especially welfare chauvinism. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.3 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Individuals with higher levels of income (our measure of economic self-interest) are 
less likely to support increasing welfare spending and providing immigrants immediate 
access to welfare, but surprisingly, are more favorable to reducing immigration levels. 
 
 
23 I also estimated the models with an additive index of partisanship and ideology; the new combined 
measure of political identifications was not significant either. I also estimated the models separately for 
ideology and party identification, the results are identical in terms of coefficient direction and significance 
as the models that include both measures. 
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This is contrary to the labor market hypothesis (H2), which predicts that as income levels 
rise, individuals are less opposed to increasing immigration levels because the affluent do 
not compete with immigrants for jobs and government aid. Exactly why income has this 
effect is a matter of speculation. One possibility is the framing of immigration in the 
early 1990s as a drain on government resources. Some political elites, such as Newt 
Gingrich, portrayed immigrants as flocking to the United States to “live off” government 
programs instead of being hardworking and contributing to society. One of the goals of 
the welfare reforms of 1996, studied in Chapter 5, was to end the “magnet effect” of 
attracting undesirable immigrants and increase the flow of hardworking immigrants. As 
such, the observed coefficient for income is more consistent with the fiscal burden 
hypothesis, which assumes that individuals with higher incomes oppose generous welfare 
policies to immigrants because they pay more of the costs of such programs (Facchini 
and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). 
Individuals concerned about the fiscal burden of immigrants would be more likely to 
prefer decreasing that burden by lowering immigration levels. Thus, across the three 
policies, affluent individuals appear to opposing programs (welfare and immigration) that 
they view as conflicting with their narrow economic self-interest. 
The three consistent predictors across all three policy areas are authoritarianism, 
income, and the Latino stereotype gap. Authoritarians, the affluent, and individuals 
holding negative Latino stereotypes are more likely to prefer lower levels of welfare 
spending and immigration levels and less immigrant access to welfare. To gain a better 
understanding of the impact of these predisposing factors, I compare the effect sizes of 
authoritarianism, income, and Latino stereotypes by graphing predicted probabilities for 
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each policy. I simulate the predicted probability of an individual supporting a decrease in 
welfare spending (value -1), a lot smaller immigrant population (value -1), and a waiting 
period before immigrants can receive welfare benefits (value 0) by independently shifting 
each independent variable from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation 
above the mean while holding other independent variables constant24. 
As is evident in Figure 4.2, the three predisposing factors are powerful predictors of 
 
policy preferences. I have included descriptive statistics for each variable discussed in 
Figure 4.2 to allow for comparisons of the simulations to a baseline. Racial stereotypes 
are the strongest predictor of immigration preferences and welfare chauvinism. 
Individuals holding negative Latino stereotypes are seven percent more likely to prefer a 
decrease in welfare spending than individuals who view Latinos as being hard-working 
relative to their views of Whites’ work-ethic. Authoritarians, on the other hand, are five 
percent more likely to prefer decreased welfare spending than non-authoritarians. In 
regards to immigration and immigrant welfare access, the racial stereotype gap is the 
strongest predictor of both variables. Whites that view Latinos as being lazy are almost 
ten percent (immigration attitudes) and six percent (immigrant welfare access) more 
likely to prefer restrictive policies than those that view Latinos as being hard working. 
Income is a powerful predictor of welfare attitudes, as income is shifted from the lower 
class to upper class, individuals are twelve percent more likely to prefer decreasing 
welfare spending. The same simulation for immigration preferences (immigration levels 
and welfare chauvinism) provides smaller predicted probabilities for income with results 
of  four  percent  for  welfare  chauvinism  and  four  percent  for  immigration  levels. 
 
 
24 All continuous variables were set at their mean value while dichotomous variables, such as female, were 
set to the value 0 (i.e., male). 
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Authoritarianism has a smaller substantive impact compared to the Latino stereotype gap, 
with an increase in the probability of preferring restrictive policies by five percent for 
immigration to six percent for immigration welfare access in comparison to non- 
authoritarians. The primary reason for the lower predicted probabilities for 
authoritarianism is the difference in policy preferences among non-authoritarians 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have found that policy 
preferences vary more among non-authoritarians than authoritarians. For  example, 
72.8% of non-authoritarians support welfare chauvinism, while 85.25% of authoritarians 
prefer the same policy. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argued that perceptions of threat, 
including immigration, alter non-authoritarian policy preferences making them similar to 
authoritarians in which policies non-authoritarians support. 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.2 about here) 
 
 
 
Further Exploring Authoritarianism 
 
In the previous section, I showed that authoritarianism is related to three policy 
preferences with authoritarians preferring less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and a 
waiting period before immigrants can access welfare programs. Authoritarianism is a 
non-traditional predictor of these policy preferences, in the sense that the scholarly 
literature rarely studies the relationship between authoritarianism, attitudes on 
immigration, and welfare preferences. Starting with immigration, Hetherington and 
Weiler (2009, p. 166-171) also find that authoritarians prefer fewer immigrants. 
Authoritarianism has to this point received less attention as a predictor of welfare 
preferences.   The closest research on authoritarianism and welfare was conducted by 
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Hurwitz and Peffley, who focused on social conformity (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; 
Peffley and Hurwitz 1997a). As discussed earlier, social conformity is a key component, 
along with submission and aggression, of the personality cluster that forms 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996). As matter of fact, Hurwitz and Peffley's measure of 
social conformity includes "three 3-point childhood value priorities" (1999, p. 237). 
These childhood value priorities are included in the child-rearing measure of 
authoritarianism that I am using in this dissertation. They find that social conformity 
significantly predicts a wide range of policy attitudes including welfare, affirmative 
action, and foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992) and that social conformity is 
related to racial stereotypes, particularly work-ethic stereotypes (Peffley and Hurwitz 
1997a). Finally, I am unaware of any studies that directly test for a relationship between 
authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism. The majority of the research on welfare 
chauvinism, as an attitude, focuses on European politics (e.g., Banting 2000; Crepaz 
2008; Faist 1994). In the American context, some studies examine immigration and mass 
support for welfare, but do not include authoritarianism as a predictor, such as the fiscal 
burden hypothesis discussed earlier in this chapter. Peffley and Hurwitz conduct a more 
direct test of welfare chauvinism using the 1991 Race and Politics Survey (1997a). They 
use survey questions asking whether new immigrants from Europe who want to work 
versus those who are in trouble should be able to access welfare programs. White 
respondents are significantly less likely to support welfare access to new European 
immigrants who are in trouble (65.6%) than to new European immigrants who want to 
work (81.9%) (Peffley and Hurwitz 1997a, p. 74). Below, I turn my attention to 
expanding our understanding of how authoritarianism influences policy preferences by 
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showing how authoritarians hold different feelings towards specific out-groups in 
American society and how racial stereotypes mediate and moderate the relationship 
between authoritarianism and policy preferences. 
According to scholars who study authoritarianism, the connection between 
authoritarianism as a predisposing factor and political attitudes is that authoritarians 
desire social conformity and view certain outgroups as threats to the established order 
(e.g., Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 
2005). For example, immigrants that primarily speak Spanish are viewed as failing to 
assimilate and as a threat to the social norm of speaking English (Schildkraut 2005; 
2011). As such, I argued that underlying this relationship between authoritarianism and 
policy preferences is that authoritarians dislike immigrants due to their perceived failure 
to conform to society. My measure of authoritarianism does not ask about any specific 
ethnic group.  In the next step, I provide evidence that authoritarians hold more negative 
feelings toward immigrants and illegal immigrants25  while comparing these feelings to 
other important ethnic and social groups. The goal is to show that authoritarians are 
concerned about immigrants and their feelings are significantly lower than non- 
authoritarians. Each feeling thermometer measures how “favorable” the individual feels 
about a particular group or person26 on a continuous scale ranging from 0 (extremely 
unfavorable) to 100 (extremely favorable)27. 
 
 
 
25 So far, I have used a measure of immigration policy preferences. The measure relates directly to policy 
preferences, not individual feelings towards immigrants. It is likely, but not always, that individuals that 
hold negative feelings towards immigrants also prefer fewer immigrants. In the following analysis, I shift 
to a more direct measure of feelings towards immigrants. 
26 The order of the feeling thermometer questions randomly varied for each respondent to neutralize 
question order effects. 
27 Feeling thermometers are not without problems. Research indicates that individuals have different 
reference points resulting in inter-personal incompability (Brady 1985; Green 1988; Wilcox, Sigelman, and 
Cook 1989). Despite the problem of inter-personal incompability, feeling thermometers tend to meet face 
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The first two columns of Table 4.4 are OLS regression models with immigration and 
illegal immigration feeling thermometers as the dependent variable. In both models, 
authoritarianism is a significant predictor of feelings towards legal and illegal 
immigrants: authoritarians are more likely to rate immigrants and illegal immigrants 
harshly than non-authoritarians. These results provide support that authoritarians are 
concerned about immigration and are more likely to view immigrants as an outgroup. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.4 about here) 
 
 
 
In addition to the feeling thermometers on immigration and illegal immigration, the 
ANES also includes questions that are related to the lower class and other racial groups. 
I use feelings toward the poor and welfare recipients as measures of attitudes on the 
lower class. In addition, I include feeling thermometers asking about feelings towards 
Whites and Blacks to compare racial attitudes. Starting, with the questions on welfare 
recipients and the poor, a comparison of the two questions, the middle columns in Table 
4.4, shows a conflicting pattern. Starting with people on welfare, non-authoritarians have 
slightly more positive feelings than authoritarians, but the difference is marginal and 
insignificant. On the other hand, when asked about poor people, the pattern is the reverse 
and significant. Authoritarians hold more positive views of the poor than non- 
authoritarians. 
In terms of racial attitudes, authoritarians essentially hold the same attitudes as non- 
authoritarians towards Blacks.  The results concerning Blacks are surprising due to the 
 
 
 
validty and operate as a rank-order preference system.  As such one can use feeling thermometers in 
relative terms but not as exact interval level differences across individuals or groups. 
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negative association between Blacks and welfare created by the media (Gilens 1999). 
These negative images do not seem to “trigger” an authoritarian response based on these 
feeling thermometer results. As expected, White authoritarians do hold more positive 
feelings toward members of their racial in-group. 
I predicted that authoritarians would hold more negative attitudes  towards 
immigrants than non-authoritarians. The evidence supports my proposition, 
authoritarians are significantly more likely to hold negative feelings. Authoritarians hold 
more negative attitudes towards immigrants. In sum, authoritarians differ from non- 
authoritarians in their perception of the threat posed by immigrants (Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009), but only marginally differ in their attitudes toward welfare recipients and 
the poor. The lack of a significant difference between authoritarians and non- 
authoritarians may be due to authoritarians not viewing these two groups as a social 
threat. The perceived threat posed by immigrants results in authoritarians viewing them 
as being undeserving recipients while other groups, such as the poor, are deserving 
recipients resulting in different policy preferences regarding immigrant accessibility to 
welfare programs. 
Authoritarianism is not a necessary or sufficient condition for negative racial 
stereotypes, but it is also well established that authoritarians are more likely to be 
prejudiced and hold negative stereotypes of outgroups (e.g., Adorno et. al. 1950; 
Altemeyer 1981; 1996; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and 
Weiler 2009; Hurwitz and Peffley 1992; Stenner 2005). Racial stereotypes and 
authoritarianism are both predisposing factors and yet they are not independent of each 
other.  Perceptions of Latinos failing to adopt the Puritan work-ethic can be viewed as a 
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failure to adopt American social norms or essentially a failure to conform to society. As 
such, racial stereotypes can be placed between authoritarianism and policy preferences, 
meaning that the Latino stereotype gap can possibly mediate or moderate the effect of 
authoritarianism on individual preferences for welfare spending, immigration levels, and 
welfare chauvinism. Based on the work of Baron and Kenny (1986), I graph  the 
mediated and moderated relationships in Figure 4.3. In the top half of the figure, I show 
how the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences can be mediated by 
an indirect relationship through racial stereotypes. At the basic core, a mediated 
relationship is when a third variable (Latino stereotype gap) decreases the relationship 
between the dependent variable (policy preferences) and an independent variable 
(authoritarianism) since the third variable (Latino stereotype gap) is a result of the 
independent variable (authoritarianism). 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.3 about here) 
 
 
 
To test for a mediated effect, I calculate a series of statistical models in Table 4.5 
(the first four columns), estimate predicted probabilities, and compare the probabilities to 
estimates from Table 4.2. In the first column, I regress racial stereotypes on 
authoritarianism and the other independent and control variables that I use throughout 
this chapter. This column is a test for the arrow linking authoritarianism to the Latino 
stereotype gap in Figure 4.3a. The coefficient for authoritarianism is positive and 
significant. Authoritarians are more likely to view that Latinos as being lazy relative to 
their work-ethic stereotypes of Whites. The next step in testing for a mediated 
relationship  is  to  estimate  models  for  each  policy  preference  (welfare  spending, 
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immigration levels, and welfare chauvinism) that includes authoritarianism but excludes 
Latino stereotype gap. These models establish a baseline and the direct relationship 
between authoritarianism and the policy preferences. The second, third, and fourth 
columns present the results for each policy preference. In all three models, 
authoritarianism is negatively related to each preference, as expected. Authoritarians 
prefer lower welfare spending, fewer immigrants, and at least a one-year waiting period 
before immigrants can receive welfare benefits. We can compare the authoritarianism 
coefficients from the three models that excludes the Latino stereotype gap to models from 
Table 4.2 that includes the Latino stereotype gap. The inclusion of the Latino stereotype 
gap does not significantly mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and the 
dependent variables. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.5 about here) 
 
 
 
To better visualize the similarity in the models from Tables 4.2 and 4.4, I graph the 
first difference for authoritarianism in Figure 4.4. The black columns are the predicted 
probabilities for a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above the mean for the models excluding the Latino stereotype gap. The gray 
columns represent the same change, while holding all other variables constant, for the 
models from Table 4.2 that include Latino stereotype gap. The inclusion of the Latino 
stereotype gap does decrease the substantive effects of authoritarianism but the decrease 
is small and minor. These results support recent findings that authoritarianism is weakly 
related to a measure of ethnocentrism that is based on similar racial stereotype questions 
that I am using to calculate the Latino stereotype gap (Kinder and Kam 2009). 
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(Figure 4.4 about here) 
 
 
 
On the other hand, racial stereotypes could moderate the relationship between 
authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism. A moderator effect is a variable that influences 
the “direction and/or the strength of the relation between an independent or predictor 
variable and a dependent or criterion variable” (Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1774). Baron 
and Kenny (1986) suggest the use of interaction terms to test moderator effects, see 
Figure 4.3B. In this scenario, I interact authoritarianism with the Latino stereotype gap 
and graph predicted probabilities to better analyze the interaction. Recent research has 
found that authoritarianism interacts with threat to provide unusual results. Several 
scholars argue that authoritarians change their attitudes in the presence of a normative 
threat (e.g., Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Other scholars find that perceived threat of 
out-group members interacts with authoritarianism to decreases the gap in policy 
preferences between authoritarians and non-authoritarians by shaping the attitudes of 
non-authoritarians (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). 
Perceived threat results in non-authoritarians adopting similar attitudes as authoritarians. 
In addition, authoritarians' attitudes do not vary (or vary less depending on the subject 
matter) as threat increases. In this possible scenario, authoritarians’ preferences should 
remain the same regardless of their perceptions of Latino work-ethic and non- 
authoritarians’ preferences should be influenced by racial stereotypes. 
In the last three columns of Table 4.5, I include an interaction term between 
authoritarianism and the Latino stereotype gap in a model for each dependent variable. 
The interaction term is significant and positive in the models for welfare spending and 
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immigration levels. For welfare chauvinism, the interaction term is not significant. In 
order to better analyze the interactive effects, I graph the predicted probabilities as 
recommended by recent research (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Berry, Demeritt, 
and Esarey 2010). In each graph in Figure 4.5, I display the predicted probability of an 
individual supporting less welfare spending, much fewer immigrants, and a  waiting 
period before immigrants can access welfare by adjusting the Latino stereotype gap, 
authoritarianism, and the interaction together, while holding all other variables constant. 
Basically, for each value on the authoritarianism measure (0 to 1 with a 10-point scale) I 
calculate the predicted probability for someone who believes Latinos are hardworking 
and Whites are lazy (-1 on the Latino stereotype gap), who believes Latinos are slightly 
more hardworking than Whites (-.5), neutral (0), who believes Whites are slightly more 
hardworking than Latinos (.5), and who believe Whites are hardworking and Latinos are 
lazy (1). An overall pattern emerges across all three graphs in Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7, 
the Latino stereotype gap has a larger influence on non-authoritarians' attitudes than 
authoritarians' attitudes. In Figure 4.5, authoritarians (authoritarianism=1) prefer lower 
welfare spending at essentially the same rate regardless of viewing Latinos as being 
hardworking (predicted probability= 50.4%) or as being lazy (49.7%) as evident by the 
slope of the line being flat. The results for non-authoritarians (authoritarianism=0) is a 
very different story. Non-authoritarians shift from being less supportive of  cutting 
welfare spending to being more supportive of cutting welfare spending as their work- 
ethic stereotypes of Latinos (relative to Whites) change from hardworking to lazy. For 
example, a non-authoritarian who believes that Latinos are hardworking and Whites are 
lazy is roughly 18.1% likely to support cutting welfare spending.  On the other hand, a 
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non-authoritarian who views Latinos as being lazy and Whites as being hardworking is 
71.2% likely to hold the same policy preference, a shift of 53.1 points between the two 
non-authoritarians. 
 
(Figure 4.5 about here) 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.6 about here) 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 4.7 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Shifting our focus to immigration preferences in Figure 4.6, we find a similar pattern 
as welfare spending. The Latino stereotype gap has a larger influence on non- 
authoritarian attitudes than authoritarian preferences for fewer immigrants. 
Authoritarians shift from 17.4% to 34.8% in their probability of wanting fewer 
immigrants as the stereotype gap shifts from net positive Latino work-ethic stereotypes to 
net negative Latino work-ethic stereotypes. So unlike welfare spending preferences, the 
Latino stereotype gap does have a larger influence on authoritarians' preference for fewer 
immigrants. When I compare the same change in stereotype attitudes for non- 
authoritarians, I find a much larger shift in attitudes. Non-authoritarians who view 
Latinos as being hardworking and Whites as being lazy are 2.5% likely to prefer fewer 
immigrants. Changing the Latino stereotype gap to Latinos being lazy and Whites being 
hardworking increases the probability of supporting a decrease in immigration to 61.7%, 
a much larger change than with authoritarians. 
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The final graph, Figure 4.7 displays the predicted probabilities for the dependent 
variable measuring welfare chauvinism. The pattern in Figure 4.7 is similar in some 
regards to Figures 4.5 and 4.6, but has some unique characteristics to itself. The 
similarities are that authoritarians' preferences for an immigrant waiting period for 
welfare increases at slightly a lower rate than non-authoritarians' preferences. 
Authoritarians start with a probability of supporting a waiting period at roughly 57.8% 
and the probability increases to 90.3% as I shift the Latino stereotype gap. In 
comparison, the predicted probability for non-authoritarians changes from 26.5% to 
87.9%. The difference in Figure 4.7 is that individuals who view Latinos as being lazy 
and Whites as being hardworking do not significantly vary in their probability of 
supporting welfare chauvinism regardless of being either an authoritarian or non- 
authoritarian. This finding can be seen as each line merges on the right side of the graph. 
On the left side, I find that the lines are spaced further apart, indicating a greater 
difference in the predicted probabilities between authoritarians and non-authoritarians. 
In this section, I set out to further explore the relationship between authoritarianism 
and policy preferences. I found that authoritarians hold significantly more negative 
feelings towards immigrants and illegal immigrants. Their feelings towards the poor are 
significantly more positive than non-authoritarians. In addition, authoritarians and non- 
authoritarians do not hold significantly different feelings towards welfare recipients. 
These findings support the argument that authoritarians do view immigrants, both legal 
and illegal, as an out-group from their view of American society. Further, I found that 
the relationship between authoritarianism and policy preferences is moderated by racial 
stereotypes.  Racial stereotypes have a larger impact on non-authoritarians' preferences 
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than authoritarians' preferences. In the next section, I estimate multi-level models to see 
if immigration can "trigger" authoritarian responses in states with larger immigrant 
populations. 
 
Adding Context to the Analysis 
 
Thus far, I have examined the influence of four predisposing factors (economic self- 
interest, political identifications, racial stereotypes, and authoritarianism) on three policy 
preferences (welfare spending preferences, immigration policy preferences, and welfare 
chauvinism). After examining a series of statistical models, I found that Latino racial 
stereotypes and income, traditional predictors from the scholarly literature, and 
authoritarianism, a non-traditional predictor, have a substantial impact on all three policy 
preferences. Unfortunately, the statistical models estimated so far, fail to test for the 
hypothesized relationship between immigration levels at the state level (a situational 
trigger) and individual predisposing factors. As discussed in Chapter 2, a component of 
the theory presented in this dissertation is that individuals are influenced by their 
surrounding environment, particularly one’s social context, which may influence by 
immigration levels on predisposing factors and policy preferences. In Chapter 3, I 
provided more details about situational triggers, including immigration levels, and how 
these situational triggers have changed since the 1960s. Based on the discussion in 
previous chapters, I expect the influence of immigrant social context (measured as the 
percentage of foreign-born at the state level) to influence Latino racial stereotypes and 
trigger authoritarian responses. The next step in this chapter is to conduct a more direct 
test of this hypothesis using multilevel data consisting of the 1992 ANES survey data and 
state-level measures of the percentage of foreign-born. 
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As is usually the case for a representative national survey like the ANES, the use 
of cluster sampling based on census tracts samples individuals from the more populous 
states. In 1992, although the national sample included 1800 non-Latino White 
respondents, they were drawn entirely from 33 of the more populous states. Because two 
of the states (Louisiana and Nebraska) had fewer than 20 respondents, they were dropped 
from the analysis, leaving 31 states for the multi-level analysis. The number of 
respondents per each of the 31 states, ranging from a low of 25 for Wyoming to a high of 
161 for California, is listed in Table 4.6. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.6 about here) 
 
 
 
I created a multi-level dataset by merging the survey data with state-level data for 
individuals living in these 31 states. The state-level measure is the percentage of foreign- 
born individuals living in the state taken from the 1990 U.S. census. The variable ranges 
from .9% in West Virginia to 21.7% in California, with a mean of 5.5% and a standard 
deviation of 5%. 
Because the multi-level data are “nested,” I rely on multi-level modeling estimation 
as given by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). The primary advantage of estimating a multi- 
level model in this case is to avoid biased (i.e., inflated) estimates of macro-level 
variables when the multi-level structure of the data is ignored. More specifically, the 
multi-level models estimated below provide more conservative estimates of the 
percentage of the impact of foreign born population in an individual’s state on his or her 
support for welfare spending, immigration levels and welfare chauvinism, and the net of 
the individual-level predictors (authoritarianism, stereotype gap, ideology, partisanship, 
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income, gender, age, and education). In addition, the multi-level model is  able  to 
estimate cross-level interactions between state-level context and individual-level factors. 
I use Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Model (HLM) estimation with random effects, 
which allows the intercepts and slopes of some of the individual-level predictors to vary 
across the states. Since all three of my dependent policy variables of interest are ordinal- 
level measures, I estimate ordinal logit models. 
The multilevel results for the three policy preferences appear in Table 4.7. The 
estimated effects of the individual level predictors for the multilevel models match, in 
terms of significance and coefficient direction, the pattern found in the earlier individual 
level results (in Table 4.2). The percentage of foreign-born living in the individuals’ state 
is not a significant predictor for any of the three dependent variables. But this must be 
considered a preliminary test of the hypothesized effect of immigration levels in a state, 
since the multilevel models estimated in Table 4.7 assess only the direct impact of 
immigration context on policy preferences. 
 
 
 
(Table 4.7 about here) 
 
 
 
In my theory, situational triggers, such as immigration levels, are hypothesized to 
trigger predisposing factors that influence policy preferences. To estimate the 
moderating influence of immigration levels on two predisposing factors (authoritarianism 
and racial stereotypes), I include cross-level interactions between immigration levels and 
each of the predisposing factors in Table 4.8. Contrary to expectations, the cross-level 
interaction term is not significant in five of the six models. In fact, in the majority of the 
models, the coefficients for the interaction terms are close to zero.  I suspect that these 
105  
negative findings are likely due to several factors. First, it may be that the survey data for 
the multi-level analysis simply do not include sufficient respondents per all 50 states and 
thus introduce noise and bias, and, as a result, decreases the accuracy and reliability of 
my estimates. Unfortunately, these are the only survey data collected prior to the 1996 
welfare reform act that include appropriate measures of authoritarianism and welfare 
chauvinism. Second, state percentages of the foreign born may not be the best measures 
of situational triggers. Individuals tend to overestimate the population size of immigrants 
(Citrin and Sides 2007) in part because they lack contact with immigrants living in 
segregated communities and working in segmented labor sectors (Hopkins 2010). Media 
stories may be a better measure of situational triggers, but estimates of the number and 
framing of immigration news stories do not exist at the state-level. 
 
(Table 4.8 about here) 
 
 
 
Even though I cannot directly include a measure of media stories in my statistical 
models, it possible that regional proxies can partially capture different regional focuses 
on the importance of the immigration media story. For example, Branton and Dunaway 
(2009) found that areas closer to the U.S.-Mexico border receive a greater number and 
more negative newspaper coverage on immigration. Hopkins (2010) predicted that 
regions with higher concentration of immigrants and more media stories will hold more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. He called this the Politicized Places Hypothesis. 
The states along the U.S.-Mexico border fit the overall premise of his hypothesis. These 
areas have large concentrations of immigrants and the immigration issue has been 
covered the media in these states longer than at the national level.   A second possible 
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region is the American south. The majority of the American south lacked large number 
of immigrants, Texas and Florida are two exceptions. Despite this lack of a large 
immigrant population, politicians have long stressed authoritarian issues in the south 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009). The focus of politicians using the media to focus on 
issues of social conformity may make the south a politicized place ripe for an anti- 
immigrant response. In order to test for these two possibilities, I include a dummy 
variable for each regional grouping in a multi-level statistical model presented in Table 
4.9. 
 
(Table 4.9 about here) 
 
 
 
The results are mixed. Starting with the first three columns, the dummy variable for 
the south is never significant. On average, being in the south does not generate a stronger 
preference for less welfare spending, fewer immigrants, or a waiting period before 
immigrants can access welfare programs. One possible conclusion is that immigration 
levels were extremely low in most southern states in the early 1990s and immigration 
maybe a necessary condition for the Politicized Place Hypothesis. In the final three 
columns, I include a dummy variable for states having a border with Mexico and the state 
of Florida. Florida may not have a border with Mexico but the state experiences many of 
the same problems with immigration from the Caribbean Sea. The dummy variable for a 
border state is not statistically significant in predicting individual attitudes toward welfare 
chauvinism, but the variable is significant in predicting attitudes towards welfare 
spending and immigration levels. Individuals in these states are more likely to prefer 
restrictive immigration policies and less generous welfare programs.   The border state 
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variable is probably tapping into the politicized nature of immigration in these states. 
States along the U.S.-Mexico border were among the first to pass English-only laws and 
the first to attempt banning immigrant access to government programs since the late 
1800s 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
In this chapter, I set out to determine which predisposing factors acted as a 
worldview connecting immigration context to support for welfare. The combination of 
theory and initial findings eliminated partisanship and ideology as possible predisposing 
factors for this connection, leaving Latino racial stereotypes, self-interest, and 
authoritarianism as two likely predisposing factors. It is possible that the stereotype gap 
is being influenced by racial context but in the opposite direction with attitudes becoming 
more positive towards Latinos in states with large Latino populations (Fox 2004), but 
further research, beyond the scope of this dissertation, is required. In addition, different 
racial stereotypes, such as trust, maybe better measures of negative attitudes towards 
Latinos. Further, I explored the relationship between authoritarianism and policy 
preferences finding a moderating relationship between authoritarianism and racial 
stereotypes. Racial stereotypes have a smaller impact on authoritarians than non- 
authoritarians. This indicates that authoritarians hold restrictive policy preferences 
regardless of the racial stereotypes they hold, but non-authoritarians that hold negative 
racial stereotypes are more likely to prefer restrictive policies. 
In the end, immigration appears to be triggering an authoritarian response. 
Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarians view immigrants as a threat to 
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social order and my evidence supports their conclusion. Additionally, I find that 
authoritarians prefer to decrease welfare spending and want a waiting period before 
immigrants can access welfare. Authoritarianism is a previously unexplored predictor of 
welfare attitudes and a rarely explored consideration of immigration attitudes. 
Perceptions of failing to conform to social norms drives authoritarians and some non- 
authoritarians, those holding negative racial stereotypes of Latinos, to support barriers 
against entry into the welfare system. This finding provides an extra dimension to the 
complexity of welfare attitudes. Previous research finds that individuals are willing to 
grant welfare access and benefits to members of the ingroup (Theiss-Morse 2009). My 
findings suggest that perceptions of conformity is one of the dividing lines between 
ingroup and outgroup membership for many Americans. This finding fits with the 
previous research on welfare attitudes that distinguish between perceptions of deserving 
and undeserving welfare recipients. In my study, welfare access is a tool or reward for 
those deserving recipients, individuals that are perceived to have  adopted  American 
social norms. 
 
In the following chapter, I build on these results to see if social spending policies 
adopted by states are influenced by authoritarianism through an opinion-policy 
relationship. Authoritarians prefer strong and punitive policies in response to perceived 
threats to social order. Authoritarians should support additional limitations and 
restrictions on welfare access. 
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Figure 4.1. Policy Preferences as a Function of Situational Triggers and 
Predisposing Factors. 
Note:  The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. 
To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a possible relationship between the 
predisposing factors themselves. Variables that appear in the earlier stages can influence any variable or 
relationship that appears in later stages. 
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Figure 4.2. Substantive Impact of Select Predictors on Welfare Spending, 
Immigration, and Immigrant Welfare Access Policy Preferences. 
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased, 
immigration should be decreased, and support for a 1 year waiting period before immigrants can access 
welfare, based on Table 4.2. The probabilities are estimated by shifting each independent variable from 
one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding other 
independent variables constant.  The values in the parentheses are the mean and standard deviations for 
each variable. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Figure 4.3A.  Model for the Mediating Influence of the Latino Stereotype Gap on 
the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences. 
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Figure 4.3B.  Model for the Moderating Influence of the Latino Stereotype Gap on 
the Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences. 
Note:  The diagrams are based on the models presented in Baron and Kenny (1986). 
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Figure 4.4. The Mediated Impact of Stereotype Gap on the Relationship between 
Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences. 
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased, 
immigration should be decreased, and support for a 1 year waiting period before immigrants can access 
welfare, based on Table 4.2 (with stereotype gap) and Table 4.5 (without stereotype gap).  The probabilities 
are estimated by shifting each independent variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one 
standard deviation above the mean while holding other independent variables constant. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Figure 4.5. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Less Welfare Spending 
at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap. 
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that welfare spending should be decreased 
based on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are estimated by shifting authoritarianism, 
racial stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while holding other independent variables 
constant. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Figure 4.6. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Lower Immigration 
Levels at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap. 
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for believing that immigration should be decreased based 
on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are estimated by shifting authoritarianism, racial 
stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while holding other independent variables constant. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Figure 4.7. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Support for Welfare Chauvinism 
Levels at Various Levels of Stereotype Gap. 
Note: The figure displays predicted probabilities for supporting a 1 year waiting period before immigrants 
can access welfare (welfare chauvinism) based on interaction models in Table 4.5. The probabilities are 
estimated by shifting authoritarianism, racial stereotype gap, and the interaction one unit at a time while 
holding other independent variables constant. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Table 4.1.  Predicted Relationships between Predisposing Factors, Control 
Variables, and Policy Preferences. 
 Increase Welfare 
Spending 
Increase 
Immigration 
Levels 
Immediate 
Welfare Access 
for Immigrants 
Authoritarianism 
 
 
 
Ideology 
Party ID 
Income 
Latino Stereotype 
Gap 
 
Age 
Education 
Female 
Decreases 
Support (H13 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H4 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H5 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H1 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H10 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H16 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H19 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H22 ) 
Decreases 
Support (H14 ) 
 
Neutral (H8 ) 
Neutral (H9 ) 
Increases 
Support (H2 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H11 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H17 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H20 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H23 ) 
Decreases 
Support (H15 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H6 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H7 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H3 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H12 ) 
 
Decreases 
Support (H18 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H21 ) 
 
Increases 
Support (H24 ) 
Note:  Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). 
Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to 
$5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to 
Republicans (1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than 
Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1).
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Table 4.2. Predicting Policy Preferences from Demographic Variables and Predisposing Factors. 
 
 Welfare Spending Immigration Levels Welfare Chauvinism 
Demographic 
Variables 
Predisposing 
Factors 
Demographic 
Variables 
Predisposing 
Factors 
Demographic 
Variables 
Predisposing 
Factors 
Authoritarianism  -.367*  -.585**  -.780*** 
  (.177)  (.178)  (.231) 
Political Ideology  -1.973***  -.577*  .170 
  (.274)  (.257)  (.349) 
Party ID  -.642**  -.153  -.358 
  (.151)  (.148)  (.229) 
Income  -.999***  -.503*  -.614* 
  (.220)  (.207)  (.293) 
Stereotype Gap  -.600**  -1.357***  -.835** 
(Latino)  (.207)  (.220)  (.271) 
Education -.374** -.235 .908*** .814** .652*** .763** 
 (.135) (.155) (.135) (.152) (.157) (.226) 
Age .001 .001 .005* .006* -.001 -.005 
 (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
Female .305** .158 .042 -.016 -.017 -.066 
 (.089) (.092) (.087) (.088) (.101) (.129) 
 
Chi2 
 
21.69 
 
192.42 
 
46.22 
 
114.81 
 
18.84 
 
57.60 
Prob> Chi2 .001 .001 .001 .001 (.001) (.001) 
Pseudo R2 .006 .057 .010 .030 .007 .037 
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 
 
Note: Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the above variables 
indicate greater support for increasing welfare spending, increasing immigration levels, and supporting immediate welfare access for immigrants 
(welfare chauvinism). Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to 
conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1). 
Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1). 
Source: 1992 ANES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables, Authoritarianism, and 
Latino Stereotype Gap. 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Welfare Spending Preferences 
 
Welfare Chauvinism 
Immigration Policy Preferences 
Authoritarianism 
Latino Stereotype Gap 
Income 
-.311 
 
.193 
 
-.285 
 
.551 
 
.127 
 
.513 
.693 
 
.395 
 
.463 
 
.280 
 
.233 
 
.240 
-1 
 
0 
 
-1 
 
0 
 
-1 
 
0 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Source: 1992 ANES 
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Table 4.4. Predicting Authoritarian Feelings toward Racial Groups, Immigrants, and the Lower Class. 
 
 Immigration Illegal 
Immigration 
Welfare 
Recipients 
Poor 
People 
Whites Blacks 
Authoritarianism -.052** -.063** -.029 .038* .075*** .016 
 (.017) (.019) (.017) (.016) (.017) (.016) 
Stereotype Gap -.046* -.174*** -.081*** .053** .153*** -.051* 
(Latino) (.021) (.022) (.020) (.018) (.019) (.020) 
Political Ideology -.021 -.038 -.058* -.012 .031 -.041 
 (.025) (.027) (.023) (.021) (.023) (.023) 
Party ID -.006 -.038* -.069*** -.052*** -.013 .002 
 (.015) (.016) (.014) (.013) (.014) (.014) 
Income .011 -.020 -.059** -.047** -.052** -.024 
 (.019) (.022) (.019) (.018) (.019) (.018) 
Education .085*** .033* .007 -.029* -.011 .030* 
 (.015) (.016) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.014) 
Age .001 .001 .001*** .001* .001*** .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Female -.003 .024* .006 .018* .028** .036* 
 (.009) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Constant .538*** .405*** .562*** .674*** .587*** .585*** 
 (.023) (.026) (.023) (.021) (.023) (.023) 
R2 .049 .072 .064 .055 .098 .172 
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 
 
Note:  Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the 
above variables indicate more positive feelings. Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). 
Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party 
identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans (1).  Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than 
Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1). 
Source: 1992 ANES 
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Table 4.5. Testing for a Mediated and Moderated Relationship between Authoritarianism and Policy Preferences. 
 
 Stereotype 
Gap 
Welfare 
Spending 
Immigration 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Welfare 
Spending 
Immigration 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Authoritarianism .110*** -.427* -.727*** -.994*** -.539** -.830*** -.911*** 
 (.020) (.176) (.178) (.204) (.199) (.207) (.224) 
Stereotype Gap     -1.497** -2.556*** -1.884** 
(Latino)     (.490) (.535) (.599) 
Interaction     1.508* 1.983* -.686 
     (.764) (.808) (.909) 
Political Ideology -.017 -1.965*** -.527* .304 -1.964*** -.559* .295 
 (.032) (.275) (.257) (.280) (.275) (.257) (.281) 
Party ID .038 -.658*** -.215 -.350* -.640*** -.146 -.303 
 (.020) (.151) (.146) (.177) (.151) (.148) (.180) 
Income .026 -1.012*** -.519* -.535* -1.009*** -.510* -.512* 
 (.024) (.220) (.206) (.231) (.219) (.209) (.230) 
Education -.073*** -.193 .883*** -.577** -.259 -.780*** .488** 
 (.019) (.154) (.154) (.171) (.156) (.153) (.173) 
Age -.001 .001 .006* -.001 .001 .005* -.001 
 (.001) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Female .021 .148 -.043 -.087 .167 -.008 -.053 
 (.011) (.092) (.088) (.103) (.092) (.088) (.103) 
Chi2  182.43 83.52 49.78 192.69 121.44 81.16 
Prob> Chi2  .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Pseudo R2 .038 .055 .020 .018 .058 .032 .030 
N 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880 
 
Note: Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Higher values on the above variables 
indicate greater support for increasing welfare spending, increasing immigration levels, and supporting immediate welfare access for immigrants 
(welfare chauvinism). Authoritarianism ranges from low authoritarianism (0) to high authoritarianism (1). Ideology ranges from extreme liberals (0) 
to conservatives (1). Income ranges from 0 to $5,000 (0) to $105,000 or more (1). Party identification ranges from Democrats (-1) to Republicans 
(1). Latino Stereotype Gap ranges from Latinos as less hardworking than Whites (-1) to more hardworking than Whites (1). Interaction is 
authoritarianism * Latino stereotype gap. 
Source: 1992 ANES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6. Sample Size for 31 States included in the Multi-Level Analysis. 
 
 
State Sample Size State Sample Size 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Georgia 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
27 
51 
25 
161 
25 
29 
60 
74 
59 
86 
31 
56 
41 
64 
123 
77 
Missouri 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
39 
31 
54 
136 
21 
69 
40 
66 
79 
87 
93 
38 
38 
47 
25 
 
Note:  The 31 states included in the multi-level models in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. A 
minimum of 20 respondents per state. 
Source: 1992 ANES 
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Table 4.7.  The Relationship between Immigration Levels and Policy Preferences. 
 
 Welfare 
Spending 
Immigration 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Contextual Factors  
-.001 
 
-.001 
 
.003 Immigration Pop. 
 (.012) (.012) (.011) 
Individual-level Factors    
Authoritarianism -.339+ -.597** -.885** 
 (.182) (.179) (.205) 
Ideology -2.004** -.610* .249 
 (.261) (.250) (.286) 
Party ID -.678** -.147 -.302+ 
 (.155) (.151) (.177) 
Income -1.057*** -.465* -.516* 
 (.214) (.209) (.239) 
Stereotype Gap -.551** -1.353** -1.427** 
(Latino) (.202) (.196) (.251) 
Education -.221 .859** .496+ 
 (.159) (.155) (.179) 
Age .001 .005+ -.001 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Female .162+ -.012 -.057 
 (.093) (.091) (.105) 
 
Chi2 
 
56.243 
 
57.846 
 
40.317 
Prob>Chi2 .002 .001 .079 
Variance Component .063 .061 .032 
Micro N 31 31 31 
Macro N 1852 1852 1852 
 
Note: Standard errors in the parentheses.  +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  All models were estimated using 
HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis. 
Missing States: Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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Table 4.8.  The Moderating Relationship of Immigration Levels on Policy 
Preferences through Predisposing Factors. 
 
 Authoritarianism Interactions Stereotype Gap Interactions 
 Welfare 
Spending 
Imm. 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Welfare 
Spending 
Imm. 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Predisposing Factor -.043 .002 -.002 -.006 .016 .069+ 
x Immigration Pop. (.028) (.027) (.031) (.032) (.031) (.039) 
 
Contextual       
Factors       
Immigration Pop. -.001 -.010 .003 .001 -.009 .007 
 (.013) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.011) 
Individual-level       
Factors       
Authoritarianism -.277 -.600** -.882** -.339+ -.594** -.878** 
 (.186) (.183) (.210) (.183) (.179) (.205) 
Ideology -2.001** -.610* .248 -2.004** -.611* .247 
 (.261) (.250) (.286) (.261) (.250) (.286) 
Party ID -.665** -.148 -.302+ -.677** -.150 -.311+ 
 (.156) (.152) (.178) (.155) (.151) (.178) 
Income -1.068** -.464* -.517* -1.059** -.461* -.510* 
 (.214) (.209) (.237) (.214) (.209) (.239) 
Stereotype Gap -.553** -1.352** -1.427** -.543** -1.377** -1.565** 
(Latino) (.202) (.196) (.251) (.208) (.202) (.265) 
Education -.218 .860** .496** -.221 .861** .499** 
 (.159) (.155) (.179) (.159) (.155) (.179) 
Age .001 .005+ -.001 .001 .005+ -.001 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Female .163+ -.012 -.056 .162+ -.012 -.058 
 (.093) (.091) (.105) (.093) (.091) (.105) 
Chi2 
 
57.685 
 
57.783 
 
40.383 
 
56.327 
 
57.347 
 
39.077 
Prob>Chi2 .001 .001 .078 .002 .002 .100 
Variance .066 .061 .032 .063 .060 .029 
Micro N 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Macro N 1852 1852 1852 1852 1852 1852 
Note: Standard errors in the parentheses.  +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  All models were estimated using 
HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis. 
Missing  States:  Alaska,  D.C.,  Delaware,  Hawaii,  Idaho,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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 Welfare 
Spending 
Imm. 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Welfare 
Spending 
Imm. 
Levels 
Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Contextual  
 
-.090 
 
 
-.060 
 
 
.096 
   
Factors 
South 
 (.140) (.140) (.130)    
Border State    -.302+ -.353* .108 
    (.167) (.167) (.160) 
Individual-level       
Factors       
Authoritarianism -.333+ -.587*** -.896*** -.347+ -.599** -.873*** 
 (.183) (.179) (.205) (.182) (.179) (.205) 
Ideology -1.995*** -.597* .230 -2.012*** -.605* .440 
 (.261) (.250) (.286) (.260) (.250) (.294) 
Party ID -.683*** -.152 -.295+ -.662*** -.137 -.237 
 (.074) (.151) (.177) (.155) (.151) (.179) 
Income -1.063*** -.478 -.501* -1.045*** -.468* -.436+ 
 (.214) (.209) (.239) (.213) (.208) (.239) 
Stereotype Gap -.556** -1.352*** -1.425*** -.573** -1.369*** -1.418*** 
(Latino) (.202) (.196) (.250) (.260) (.196) (.252) 
Education -.222 .853*** .499** -.210 .864*** .509** 
 (.159) (.155) (.178) (.159) (.155) (.179) 
Age .001 .005+ -.001 .001 .005+ -.001 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Female .162+ -.013 -.056 .166+ .010 -.070 
 (.093) (.091) (.105) (.093) (.091) (.106) 
Chi2 
 
55.810 
 
62.413 
 
39.332 
 
48.470 
 
49.766 
 
38.035 
Prob>Chi2 .002 .001 .095 .013 .010 .122 
Variance .061 .066 .027 .043 .048 .024 
Micro N 1852 1852 1852 1852 1852 1852 
Macro N 31 31 31 31 31 31 
 
 
Table 4.9.  The Moderating Relationship of Immigration Levels on Policy 
Preferences through Predisposing Factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors in the parentheses.  +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  All models were estimated using 
HLM 6.02. States with 20 or more respondents were included in the analysis. 
Missing States: Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Source: 1992 ANES. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Immigration and Welfare Reform in the States: 
The Mediating Role of Public Opinion 
 
 
 
 
"Why should we take the bread out of the mouths of our own children and give it to 
strangers?" President John Adams on immigration in a letter to Secretary of State John 
Marshall on August 14, 1800. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the influence of several predisposing factors 
(economic self-interest, political identifications, authoritarianism, and racial stereotypes) 
on preferences for three policies: welfare spending, immigration levels, and welfare 
chauvinism (a waiting period before immigrants can access welfare). I delved deeper 
into the relationship between authoritarianism, immigration, and welfare by examining 
authoritarian versus non-authoritarian feelings (i.e., thermometer ratings) toward several 
social groups. Although authoritarians do not rate people on welfare more negatively 
than non-authoritarians and tend to hold significantly more positive attitudes toward the 
poor in general, these groups lack the degree of social threat that authoritarians are 
hypothesized to perceive from immigrants. But what are the political ramifications of 
this relationship between immigration, authoritarianism, and welfare? Does public 
opinion influence the legislative process and shape public policy? One possible 
implication  of  my  findings  is  that  state  governments  may  adopt  more  restrictive 
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government policies towards immigrants in states with larger proportions of individuals 
who are authoritarian, have more negative stereotypes of Latinos, and are conservative. 
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the policies that are most relevant to 
investigating the relationship between public opinion and policy-making in the states: 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), which partially 
shifted domestic policy on immigration from the federal government to the state 
governments, at least in terms of welfare policy. I then turn to the literature on the 
opinion-policy linkage to expand the theory present in Chapter 2. In order to test my 
theory of an opinion-policy relationship, I detail my use of a new statistical method, 
multi-level regression with poststratification (MRP). Finally, I present an empirical 
analysis that provides evidence that public mood shapes government policy reforms. I 
find that state policies are predicted by noneconomic considerations concerning group 
identities resulting in the desire for welfare chauvinism, limiting immigrant access to 
welfare programs. The statistical evidence indicates that states with a larger proportion 
of the population holding authoritarian and other attitudes are more likely to restrict 
immigrant access to welfare. 
PRWORA eliminated federal entitlements to cash benefits, instituted rigid work 
requirements, and most importantly for our purposes decentralized policymaking 
authority downward to states and localities (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 
2001). While all states follow a standard workfare framework that requires employment 
in conditional exchange for benefits, “devolution” in welfare policymaking means that 
states and localities are responsible for crafting decentralized welfare policies, resulting 
in substantial variation in state-level welfare policies (Fording and Kim 2010; Soss et al. 
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2001). Most existing studies of state-level welfare policy adoptions examine dimensions 
of welfare policy related to cash benefit levels (e.g., McGuire and Merriman 2006), work 
requirements (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001), or sanction for non- 
compliance (e.g., Fording et. al. 2007; Soss et al. 2001). Additional forms of policy 
stringency include initial eligibility or access to government programs. Determining 
welfare eligibility is a crucial gate-keeping step in receiving government assistance, and 
states vary in terms of selecting who qualifies for benefits. Some states attach citizenship 
requirements to welfare boundaries statutorily denying undocumented immigrants access 
to public assistance (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009; Graefe et al. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 
2007; Tichenor 2002). 
Besides granting states with the limited ability to shape their own welfare policies, 
PRWORA represents a critical policy in the evolution of state powers in the realm of 
immigration. For the first time in over 100 years, states hold the power to  adopt 
individual immigration policies. Traditionally, federal and state governments divided 
policy in the realm of immigration between immigration policy, under federal control, 
and immigrants policy, under state control (Fix and Passel 1994). In the basic and most 
rigid delineation of policy between federal and state roles, the federal government 
controls entry into the United States (immigration policy) and state governments control 
the integration of immigrants into U.S. society (immigrants policy). This distinction 
between federal and state policies is a result of multiple Supreme Court rulings starting in 
the late 1800s, such as Henderson v. Mayor of New York, Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States and Hines v. Davidowitz.  In addition, states were further limited in their ability to 
pass  immigrants  policy  by  the  "equal  protections  standard"  providing  the  federal 
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government, particularly Congress, with the power to establish the treatment of 
immigrants within the United States. Using the "equal protections standard," state laws 
regarding immigrants were subject to the Equal Protection Clause, thus limiting states to 
"treat immigrants as people, that is persons protected by the Constitution" (Varsanyi 
2010, p. 8). The federal government controlled entrance to the United States and the 
rights, liberties, and privileges of immigrants. As a result, states were limited to very few 
policy options, such as English-only laws, in the realm of immigration until the 1990s. 
In 1996, the ability of state governments to shape policies toward immigrants and 
immigration policy changed dramatically with the passage of three laws. First, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) gave authority to local and state 
law enforcement agencies to arrest immigrant felons who had been previously deported. 
Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
allowed for state and local law enforcement agencies to apply for training in enforcing 
federal immigration laws. Third, the passage of PRWORA reshaped the  American 
welfare system. On the national level, PRWORA limited using federal funds to provide 
welfare benefits to future immigrants. At the same time, PRWORA granted states the 
authority to include or exclude immigrants from state-funded social programs. With the 
passage of AEDPA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA, the door has opened for states to expand 
their role in immigration policy. In 2005, state representatives introduced 300 bills on 
immigration, 45 of which passed (NCSL 2005). By 2010, state legislation increased to 
1,400 bills, of which 208 were enacted (NCSL 2010). PRWORA represents a watershed 
moment in immigration policy and requires further study of the political environment that 
shaped state policies. 
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In this chapter, I focus on one of the three acts passed in 1996: PRWORA. The study 
of PRWORA offers several important advantages over the study of AEDPA and IIRIRA. 
PRWORA is a point in time when states decided between inclusionary and exclusionary 
polices (welfare chauvinism). The law enforcement powers given under AEDPA do not 
require local and state governments to form policy to use these new powers. Some cities, 
the so called "sanctuary cities," did pass ordinances directing local law enforcement not 
to work with the federal government on illegal immigration, but these cases are few and 
far between (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Under the IIRIRA, state and local 
governments could request training to enforce federal immigration law (called 287(g) 
agreements). Between 1996 and 2001, the number of requests for this training was zero 
(Creek and Yoder 2012; Varsanyi 2008). After, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the number of agencies requesting training increased to 12 states by 2009. The 
287(g) adopters are states that have decided to receive training to enforce federal 
immigration law to "crackdown" on immigrants, an anti-immigrant decision. The 
decision not to request a 287(g) agreement is not the same as making a pro-immigrant 
decision. Further, the 287(g) agreements are spread out over time, allowing for 
additional contextual factors to influence this particular decision. Almost all the states 
made decisions regarding immigrant access to welfare at the same time, in 1996, and the 
states had to decide between pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant policy decisions. As 
such, I decided to focus on PRWORA but I do believe that my general findings, that 
authoritarianism influences welfare chauvinism, can equally apply to other immigrant 
policies. 
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WELFARE REFORM, ELITE RESPONSIVENESS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 
In 1994, the Republican Party introduced the Contract for America. A component of 
the Contract for America called for denying immigrants access to Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, and other welfare programs. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich summarized 
the Republican position by saying, “Come to America for opportunity. Do not come to 
America to live off the law-abiding American taxpayer.” This quote is an example of the 
political rhetoric portraying immigrants as failing to socially conform to the American 
norm of a strong work-ethic. Later, this sentiment was included in The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), welfare reform legislation that 
required at least a five-year waiting period before newly arrived immigrants could receive 
federal aid from welfare programs. The original restrictions included programs such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (replacement for welfare), Medicaid, 
Supplemental  Security  Income  (SSI),  and  Food  Stamps28.     PRWORA  included 
 
exceptions to the five year waiting period for refugees, asylum seekers, military veterans, 
the disabled, victims of domestic violence, and immigrants employed for at least four 
calendar quarters. The federal restrictions on immigrant access to welfare programs have 
changed since the passage of PRWORA. In legislation passed in 1997, 1998, and 2002, 
Congress changed several restrictions on immigrant accessibility to social programs by 
allowing disabled immigrants access to Food Stamps, lowering the waiting period for 
Food Stamps from seven-years to five-years, and decreasing restrictions on accessibility 
for immigrant children who do not meet the five-year residency requirement.  None of 
 
 
 
 
28 Besides TANF, most programs had a seven-year waiting period. 
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these changes dramatically changed state policies on immigrant access to welfare 
programs. 
PRWORA allowed for the creation of state-funded programs with each state 
determining its own eligibility requirements for legal immigrants. As seen in Figure 5.1, 
immigrant accessibility to social spending programs varies across states. Darkly shaded 
states allow immigrant access to specific government programs based on data collected 
by Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost (1999).  Non-shaded states either are undecided states 
or do not allow immigrant access29.  I excluded Alaska and Hawaii from the maps due to 
 
image stretching allowing for a better visual representation. Alaska restricted immigrant 
access to TANF during the federal ban, to food stamps, to Medicaid, and to SSI but 
provided TANF benefits to immigrants after a five-year waiting period. Hawaii provided 
TANF aid to immigrants during and after the federal waiting period but restricted access 
to food stamps, Medicaid, and SSI. 
Starting with TANF, states considered granting immigrants program access during 
 
the five-year federal ban and after the federal ban. The top two maps in Figure 5.1 show 
the states that provide immigrant access to TANF. Nineteen states granted immigrants 
access to TANF during the five-year federal ban and thirty-seven allowed for access after 
the federal ban. Of these nineteen states that grant immediate access to welfare 
programs, only Utah and Georgia limit TANF access to immigrants after the federal five- 
year waiting period. 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.1 about here) 
 
 
 
29 I have missing data for TANF aid after the federal waiting period for Indiana, Massachusetts, South 
Carolina, and Virginia. I have complete data for all other social spending programs. 
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The second row of maps shows the states that grant immigrants access to state 
funded Food Stamps and Medicaid programs. Fewer states allow immigrants access to 
these programs than TANF. Seventeen states provide Food Stamps to the immigrant 
population. The final map displays the fifteen states that provide Medicaid benefits 
during the federal waiting period. In the end, the maps leave us asking why did some 
states restrict immigrant access to social programs under PRWORA and others did not? 
Unfortunately, the answers are far and few between. The differences in social 
program eligibility requirements for immigrants across the American states remains 
largely unstudied, despite the important role that immigration has played in reshaping the 
American political landscape (Graefe et al. 2008; Filindra 2013; Hero and Preuhs 2007; 
Tichenor 2002). The lack of scholarly attention on this area is probably due to the 
historical dominance of the federal government in the area of immigration policy. The 
few studies on immigration state policies provide a solid foundation for this dissertation 
chapter to build on (Graefe et al. 2008; Filindra 2013; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Tichenor 
2002)30. At the core of each of these studies is the concept of willingness or public 
 
opinion (see Creek and Yoder 2012; Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; 
Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010 as examples of how public opinion influences more recent 
immigration policies). States that are willing to provide benefits to immigrants grant 
them access to social programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
30 It should be noted that Tichenor’s (2002) research does not focus entirely on the changes to social 
spending programs due to PRWORA. Instead, his research examines how elite coalitions change and shift 
throughout U.S. history in order to explain when and what type of immigration reform will be passed by 
legislatures. 
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Graefe et al. (2008) examine fourteen different theoretical relationships to explain 
why states restricted and granted immigrant access to social spending programs. They 
include variables measuring teenaged childbearing behavior, racial demographics, 
economic factors, and voter turnout. Their findings can be divided into the “means” to 
provide benefits to immigrants and the “willingness” to do so. The evidence primarily 
supports one side of the division, mainly that states that are “willing.” Willingness is 
measured as having a more liberal ideology and wealthier population. 
Filindra (2013) uses demographic data (percentage of blacks and percentage of 
immigrants per state) as proxies for public opinion. She finds that larger immigrant 
populations do not result in restrictive welfare programs at the state-level. Instead, states 
with larger black populations are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare. 
Butz and Kehrberg (2012) argue that states with larger black populations are historically 
more likely to have racial resentment that decreases levels of social trust that minorities 
will properly use welfare benefits. 
Hero and Preuhs (2007) test how political ideology and racial/ ethnic diversity 
influence immigrant accessibility to welfare programs. Ideology builds on the previous 
state level research on welfare policies and attitudes (e.g., Berry et al. 1998; Brace et al. 
2002; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Theoretically, conservative states prefer to 
restrain immigrant access and provide lower benefits levels. Conservatives are in 
opposition to welfare due to their desire for a smaller government. As a result, 
conservative states are less “willing” to provide benefits.  Second, the authors examine 
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the influence of racial context. 31 According to Hero and Preuhs, as the proportion of 
minorities increases, support for benefit levels and access to welfare among the masses 
should decrease as the minority population increases (Fellowes and Row 2004; Giles and 
Evans 1986). 
In addition, Hero and Preuhs hypothesize how ideological and racial context can lead 
to lower welfare benefits, which they term, the erosion hypothesis. First, the argument 
predicts that welfare access is based on state political ideology. Red states are more 
likely to restrict welfare access to immigrants and blue states will grant access to welfare 
programs. Once the question of access is determined, policy-makers most set the level of 
generosity of welfare programs. Under the erosion hypothesis, benefit levels are 
influenced by racial context. Immigrants are viewed similar to blacks, in that the 
immigrant population is perceived to be net benefactors of these programs. In addition, 
immigrants are believed to be attracted to states with more generous welfare programs, 
this is called the welfare magnet hypothesis (e.g., Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2003; 
Borjas 1999; Kaushal 2005). As the immigrant population increases, benefit levels 
should decrease due to the increased demand on welfare programs. 
To test the erosion hypothesis, Hero and Preuhs construct two continuous dependent 
variables. Their first dependent variable, immigrant welfare scale (IWS), measures 
immigrant access to welfare programs (see the methods section of this chapter for more 
details about the IWS). The second dependent variable measures the level of benefits, 
maximum cash benefits for a family of three.  They regress these two measures of state 
 
 
 
31 Hero and Preuhs (2007) use these terms racial, social, and ethnic diversity interchangeably throughout 
their article. I will refer to this theory simply as racial context or racial demographics for the purposes of 
this literature review. 
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welfare policy on three state-level independent variables32  of interest political ideology, 
percentage of foreign-born, and percentage of Latinos in the state’s population. 
The results from Hero and Preuhs’ empirical analysis are mixed. First, their 
empirical results find that conservative states are less likely to grant immigrants access to 
welfare programs. Second, Hero and Preuhs (2007) note that previous state  level 
research finds a negative association between the size of an immigrant population in a 
state and the state’s welfare benefit levels (e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 
2001). Oddly enough, however, the authors find that larger immigrant populations in the 
states are not related to welfare policy changes designed to restrict immigrant access to 
welfare benefits. 
In regard to Hero and Preuhs’ second dependent variable, the amount of cash 
benefits available under TANF, they find an interactive relationship between the 
percentage of foreign born in each state and the immigration welfare scale (their first 
dependent variable). The authors argue that the significance of the interaction variable, 
that states who grant immigrant access to welfare also provide lower benefits, is evidence 
supporting the erosion argument. 
Hero and Preuhs follow a long, confusing research tradition of immigration research, 
where scholars use very similar demographic measures as proxies for very different 
theoretical concepts. For example, Quillian (1995), Scheepers et al. (2002), Gijpserts et 
al. (2004) and Kunivich (2004) each treat the foreign-born population as a conceptual 
 
 
 
32 Control variables include the percentage of Democrats in each state legislature, level of party 
competition, multicultural predisposition, urbanization, percentage of state population with a high school 
degree, unemployment rate, caseload size of welfare programs, the average immigration welfare scale 
value of neighboring states, if the state shares a border with Mexico, and if the state has major sea port. Of 
these variables, only education and caseload are significantly related to the immigration welfare scale and 
cash benefit levels. 
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measure of economic group threat33. Other scholars treat foreign-born population as a 
measure of cultural conflict between immigrants and the native population (e.g., Golder 
2003). Other scholars use immigration population percentages as measures of the 
likelihood of social contact with immigrants that could result in more positive attitudes 
toward immigrants (e.g., Fox 2004, Graefe et al. 2008; McLaren 2003). Further, other 
scholars use immigrant demographics, either the proportion of legal  or  illegal 
immigrants, as a proxy for public opinion (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 
2011; Filindra 2013). The basic concept is that states with larger immigrant populations 
are more likely to have macro or mass attitudes that are less supportive of welfare 
programs (Filindra 2013) or more negative immigrant attitudes (Nicholson-Crotty and 
Nicholson-Crotty 2011). 
One likely explanation for this inconsistency between correlational and over-time 
evidence is that the relationship between immigration and welfare policies in the states is 
much more complex than prior research has suggested. It seems likely, for example, that 
the relationship between immigration and state welfare policies is not invariant over time 
or across different state characteristics; rather, the relationship between racial context and 
welfare policy is likely to be indirect, filtered or mediated through various political 
factors, specifically public opinion, state government actors, and institutions. 
Larger immigrant populations are not necessarily related to welfare inclusion of 
immigrants due to public opinion, or “willingness.” Public opinion moderates the impact 
of immigration patterns on policy-making.  In some states, an influx of immigrants fuels 
 
 
33 Foreign born population is also used as part of the economic component, specifically as a measure of 
realistic competition, of the ethnic competition theory. Economic competition theory is very similar to 
group threat theory in that both theories expect group competition to increase as the foreign born 
population increases (e.g., Blalock 1967; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002). 
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public opposition to welfare, such as in Arizona, but in other states the public reacts 
differently, such as in California. The point is that state demographic patterns do not lead 
inexorably to policy outcomes. There are a number of intermediary steps that condition 
the relationship. Representative democratic theories assume communication between 
citizens and elites concerning policy preferences (e.g., Gibson 1988; Goren 2001). Elites 
respond to the masses under certain conditions (Brooks and Manza 2007). First, the 
masses must be concerned about the policy options. The population needs to be aware of 
the different possible policy outcomes, concerned about the different outcomes, and 
communicate their preferred outcome to policy-makers. Second, the mass public needs 
to care about the political issue, meaning that the issue needs to be salient (Brooks and 
Manza 2007). Immigration, and its relationship to welfare reform, was a highly salient 
issue in 1996 (Chavez 2001; Hopkins 2010; Tichenor 2002). The third condition for elite 
response is that the signal from the mass public should be consistent (Brooks and Manza 
2007). Clear and strong messages from citizens constrain the acceptable policy options 
available to elites. 
It is my contention that the size of the immigrant population did not directly 
influence policy makers during the formulation of welfare policies regarding immigrant 
access and benefit levels. Rather, I argue that the policies adopted by each state are 
based on mass public opinion. As political issues and concerns change among the 
masses, the mobilized public shares their concerns with their elected representatives. 
Representatives are expected to adopt policies to meet these concerns in order to keep 
and maybe gain electoral support (Bartels 1988). Legislators are elected officials who 
formulate  policy  decisions  with  their  constituents  in  mind.    Elites  must  take  into 
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consideration various demographic and environmental conditions in order to get 
reelected. Politicians concerned with electoral survival should vote with the median 
voter position on an issue and those that violate this strategy do suffer at the polls by 
receiving a lower percentage of the votes (Canes-Wrone et al. 2002). As politicians 
adopt policy, the public updates their attitudes and provides electoral support in the 
future. 
Politicians do not always respond to public opinion, especially in the areas of 
immigration34 (Freeman 1995; Lahav 2004a, 2004b). Some even argue that pro- 
immigration policies are not responsive to mass attitudes, but instead are the result of 
elite business interests that capture the political system (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson- 
Crotty 2011). Failure to respond to mass attitudes results in questioning the quality of 
democracy but perfect matching between public attitudes and policy creates the fear of 
“tyranny of the majority.” 
In this chapter, I add to our knowledge of welfare reform and immigrant accessibility 
to social spending programs by building on the individual and multi-level findings on 
public opinion from Chapter 4. The previous findings from Chapter 4 indicate that 
authoritarianism is an important mediating variable between immigration patterns, 
support for welfare spending preferences, and immigrant access to welfare programs. I 
find in this chapter, that a macro measure of authoritarianism is a strong predictor of 
immigrant accessibility to social spending programs at the state level. 
 
 
 
 
34 It is important to note that previous research examined if politicians responded to public opinion on 
immigration in regards to immigration policy with mixed results. As such, these studies focus on a direct 
relationship between mass attitudes and a policy within the same realm.  Due to federalism, state 
governments are limited in their ability to influence immigration policy but can consider attitudes regarding 
immigration in other policy areas that affect immigrants, such as welfare. 
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OPINION-POLICY LINKAGE 
 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, how an individual responds to political stimuli is partially 
dependent on predisposing factors that influence individual interpretation of distinct 
objects (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Sniderman et al. 2004). 
Predisposing factors are situated at an early stage in the funnel of causality, allowing 
predisposing factors to influence policy preferences, as seen in Figure 5.2. One of these 
predisposing factors is authoritarianism (Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.2 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The diagram displays the aggregation of attitudes across individuals that in turn 
influence public policy outcomes through what is called an opinion-policy linkage, 
defined as the responsiveness of political elites to mass attitudes. At first glance, the 
political behavior research would predict a weak relationship in the responsiveness of 
elites to public attitudes. The American public is characterized as having low levels of 
political knowledge (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1989), weak ideological constraints 
(e.g., Converse 1964), weak attitudes (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), inconsistent attitudes 
(Zaller and Feldman 1992), and at times seemly random attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964). 
These results provide skepticism of the masses' ability to influence their political 
representatives or, more importantly, reasons for elites to consider mass attitudes. 
These studies on the negative characteristics of the masses are accurate, but are 
 
individual-level results.   The formation of constituencies is at the macro-level and an 
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aggregate outcome. Individual level attitudes predict which constituency a person 
belongs, but politicians respond to macro, group, or aggregate attitudes (Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). In general, several 
studies find an opinion-policy link at the federal and state level (e.g., Erikson et al. 2002; 
Stimson et al. 1994, 1995; Stimson 1999). Stimson, Erikson, and MacKuen find that 
congressional legislation reflect changes in the "public mood" of the nation. As mass 
mood shifts, legislative policy changes in the same ideological direction. At the state 
level, states with a liberal mass ideology are more likely to have liberal policies and 
conversely for conservative states (e.g., Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993). 
Most of the previously mentioned studies use estimates of political identification 
or ideology to measure mass political attitudes to from what Lax and Phillips call the 
ideology-policy correlation (2012, p. 148). Some scholars argue that other policy 
attitudes are too unstable and random to form an opinion-policy link. Recent political 
research has found a link between policy attitudes and policy outcomes in several areas 
(Lax and Phillips 2011). Focusing on welfare policies, studies find that public opinion is 
an important factor in the adoption of Medicare (Jacobs 1993), Social Security (Quirk 
and Hinchliffe 1998), and state-level differences in AFDC programs (Fording 1997). In 
the area of equal employment legislation, racial attitudes are an important predictor from 
the 1940s to the 1970s (Burstein 1998). In conclusion, an opinion-policy link is 
supported by studies at both the federal and state levels, including welfare policies. 
Immigrants are inherently in a weak position to influence policy outcomes. 
Individuals that participate in the political system have at their disposal a powerful tool, 
their votes.  Immigrants are less likely to vote, due to the requirements of naturalization. 
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The end result is unequal political participation and “unequal participation spells unequal 
influence” (Lijphart 1997, p. 1). The unequal influence goes beyond just simply voting, 
voters are more likely to communicate with politicians (Miller and Stokes 1963; Verba 
and Nie 1972). In the end, “political activity is the means by which citizens make their 
needs and preferences known to governing elites and induce them to be responsive” 
(Verba 2003, p. 663). Or as Key (1949, p. 527) concluded, “the blunt truth is that 
politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups 
of citizens [and non-citizens] that do not vote.” 
Based on the findings from Chapter 4, the opinion part of the opinion-policy link 
should be authoritarianism. As a predisposing factor, authoritarianism is characterized as 
the need for conformity, aggression, and a submission to established authorities (e.g., 
Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005)35. 
Authoritarians need for conformity results in a worldview that divides individuals into 
distinct in and out-groups. In addition, authoritarians prefer strong opposition towards 
out-groups that pose a threat to social conformity (Stenner 2005; Hetherington  and 
Weiler 2009; Huddy et al. 2005; Perrin 2005). Authoritarians see strong black and white 
differences  between  groups  and  membership  requires  "assimilation  of  principles" 
(Adorno et al. 1950). In the end, a strong relationship exists between the need and desire 
for social cohesion and the perceived threat posed by those with different group identities 
(Kruglanski et al. 2006). 
 
 
 
 
35 The concept of authoritarianism is historically debated within political science (see Stenner 2005 for a 
discussion of the criticism of past research). The source of authoritarianism is beyond the scope of this 
study as I examine a policy outcome that is the result of authoritarian preferences. Further, I focus on the 
first component of authoritarianism, the need for social order, as the theoretical cause for policy preferences 
since the question of a need for leadership is not a likely motivation for social spending preferences. 
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An alternative explanation to the opinion-policy linkage is that voters simply elect 
individuals who would similar attitudes, core believes, and personalities as themselves. 
In essence, representation may act within the gyroscopic model. I have several 
theoretical reasons to doubt that the gyroscopic model for an opinion-policy linkage with 
authoritarianism. At the individual-level authoritarians tend to be lower educated and 
more likely to be blue-collar occupations (Stenner 2005). Political elites tend to be the 
opposite, more highly educated and more likely to have a white-collar background. In 
addition, political elites tend to have more positive views of immigrants (Lahav 2004a; 
2004b) and be more political tolerant (Sullivan et al. 1993). On the other hand, 
authoritarians tend to be less politically tolerant and hold more negative attitudes towards 
immigrants. The world does hold exceptions to this pattern, such as, radical right parties 
in Western Europe and several American politicians with Tom Tancredo being an 
example. But overall I believe that authoritarianism works through a delegate model of 
representation. 
 
 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
 
 
In order to test the above theory, I need to construct estimates of public opinion at the 
state level. Unfortunately, I am unaware of a survey that contains the proper questions 
with representative samples from each state. The survey questions are a necessary 
component for this study. The ANES contains the necessary questions but lacks a 
representative sample from each state. The lack of a representative samples at the state 
level creates a concern about biases in the data (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993). For 
example, Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006) noted in their study of voting results that a 
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national random sample from a CBS/ New York Times survey included twelve individuals 
from Vermont. In 1988, 80% of the surveyed individuals supported George H.W. Bush, 
but President Bush won Vermont with 51% of the vote. Small samples are more error 
prone than large samples, a well-known concept in the study of public opinion. 
There are two potential solutions to this problem. The most common method of 
measuring public opinion on the state-level involves gathering and combining multiple 
national polls, a method called disaggregation that was developed by Erikson, Wright, 
and McIver (1993). Erikson, Wright, and McIver combined surveys from over 25 years 
to estimate political ideology, a common survey question, on the state-level. The larger 
sample sizes are used to estimate macro level attitudes for each state. The disaggregation 
solution contains both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of disaggregation 
include simplicity and being considered the "paradigm" method in the study of state 
politics. Unfortunately, disaggregation contains a significant disadvantage for this study. 
The disadvantage is that disaggregation requires the combination of multiple surveys. I 
am limited to the 1992 ANES. For example, the commonly used child-rearing measure 
of authoritarianism was first included in the ANES in 1992 and does not appear in each 
ANES since. As a result, the number of states with large samples in the ANES is limited 
and may introduce biases in the analysis. Combining different questions across surveys 
and time with disaggregation can introduce reliability and validity issues with the 
measure (Brace, Sims-Butler, Arceneaux, and Johnson 2002). 
A different possibility is Bayesian multi-level modeling with poststratification 
(MRP). MRP is a method that estimates state-level public attitudes  using  national 
surveys using two stages (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009a; 
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2009b; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006). The basic concept is to take a single national 
survey of roughly 1500 individuals and use these respondents to generate state-level 
estimates. MRP involves two steps: a multi-level model and poststratification. In the 
first stage, MRP estimates a multi-level model for individual responses with a 
combination of demographic and geographic variables as predictors. Individuals are 
nested within states, regions, and demographic groups. In addition, the state-level effects 
are modeled based on region and aggregate demographics. These demographic and 
geographic variables result in 4,704 total possible combinations in the data for the 
baseline MRP model used by Lax and Phillips (2009b). As a result, MRP is able to use 
respondents regardless of location to create public opinion estimates for all states, even 
those with few to no respondents. This allows MRP to overcome the small state-level 
sample sizes found in national surveys. The second stage of MRP is poststratification. In 
this stage, the MRP estimates for the demographic and geographic combinations from the 
multi-level model are weighted using by the actual percentages for each combination in 
the state populations using Census data. The additional step of poststratification corrects 
for oversampling or under sampling of categories (Voss, Gelman, and King 1995). 
Poststratification weights the simulated data based on the demographics of each state by 
matching census data to estimated attitudes of the categories (race, gender, age, 
education, and the interaction between race and gender). In the end, MRP estimates the 
percentage of individuals that holds a specific attitude for each state. 
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Pr(yi = 1) = logit-1(β0 + αj[i] race,gender + αk[i] age + αl[i] edu + αs[i] state) 
 
 
 
 
αsstate ~ N(αm[s] region + βrelig ∙ religs,σ2state) 
 
 
 
 
The advantages include the ability to estimate public opinion for states with small 
samples and MRP outperforms disaggregation on sample sizes smaller than 14,000 
respondents (Lax and Phillips 2009a). First, poststratification allows for public opinion 
estimates for states that lack respondents in the survey. The proportion of demographic 
combinations is known for each state from census data. Since, MRP estimates public 
opinion for each demographic combination, the estimated public opinions for each 
combination are weighted based on the proportion of combinations for each state. As a 
result, MRP allows for public opinion estimates of all fifty states. Second, MRP is highly 
accurate. Lax and Phillips (2009a) in a variety of tests find that MRP estimates have 
higher correlations with smaller standard errors to state polls and larger combined 
national polls (n>11,000) than the raw scores for each state and estimates using 
disaggregation. 
The primary disadvantage of MRP is that estimates of public opinion are restricted to 
data with two response categories, support and against. The model predicts the 
percentage of ones in a data set. The public opinion variable of interest needs to be 
dichotomous. My public opinion variables are ordinal with multiple categories. As a 
result, I recode the public opinion measures into dichotomous variables; see Appendix B 
for the exact changes to each variable. The recoding of the variables is not a dramatic 
change for immigration preferences and welfare spending preferences due to the limited 
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number of categories for each variable. For example, the survey question for welfare has 
three categories (decrease welfare spending, keep welfare spending the same, and 
increase welfare spending). As I discuss below, I estimate support in each state for 
decreasing welfare spending (coded as 1) and the other two categories are combined 
(coded as 0). The measures of authoritarianism and Hispanic racial stereotypes are more 
problematic, as discussed in the next section. In the end, I do not believe that my coding 
decisions to overcome this disadvantage of MRP is problematic based on the similarity 
between statistical results using different MRP estimates that vary the coding of 1s and 0s 
for authoritarianism. As I present in Appendix C, the MRP estimates maintain statistical 
significance and direction of the coefficient. . 
 
 
 
Public Opinion Variables  
 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, I measure authoritarianism by constructing an index 
composed of several questions about desirable personality traits of children designed to 
measure the respondent's values between authoritarianism and individualism36. At the 
individual level, this measure of authoritarianism is an ordinal measure with multiple 
values ranging between 0 and 1. Previous scholars, Hetherington and Weiler (2009), 
treat this range as 0 being non-authoritarian, 1 being authoritarian, and .5 as neutral 
between these two extremes. The values between 0 and .5 indicate a varying degree of 
being non-authoritarian from more to lesser, while the values between .5 and 1 are 
 
 
36 An individual’s child-rearing values tap their fundamental view of the world and human relations 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). The child-rearing values contain several advantages over 
traditional measures of authoritarianism, such as the F-Scale (Adorno et al. 1950) and the Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) measure (Altemeyer 1981). Previous measures included questions that directly 
ask about prejudice, intolerance, and conservatism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005) making the measures 
indistinguishable from these other political concepts. The child-rearing measure is neutral in these areas 
but yet correlates strongly with the RWA (Feldman 2003). 
147  
 
varying degrees of being less to more authoritarian. Since MRP requires public opinion 
measures to be dichotomous, I coded all values .625 or higher as being authoritarian (1s) 
and all values .5 or less as being non-authoritarian (0s). As mentioned earlier, I re- 
estimated the models from this chapter with varying coding for the authoritarianism 
measure.  I include those results in Appendix C. 
As shown in Table 5.1, low values indicate non-authoritarian states (the lowest value 
is 33.6% - Washington). Higher values indicate more authoritarian states (the highest 
value is 65.9% - Alabama). The mean value is 52.0% (closest state is Idaho with a value 
of 51.7%). I hypothesize that as the level of authoritarianism in a state increases the state is 
more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare programs (Hypothesis1). 
 
 
 
(Table 5.1 about here) 
 
 
 
 
My results from Chapter 4 show that authoritarianism is not the only possible 
political attitude related to welfare preferences. The scholarly literature identifies several 
policy-relevant attitudes, including racial attitudes and policy-specific attitudes, which 
elites may respond. Several survey studies clearly show that an important source of 
opposition to welfare among Whites is their negative views of minorities, whom many 
Whites mistakenly view as lazy and also mistakenly see as the primary beneficiaries of 
welfare programs (e.g., Fox 2004; Gilens 1996; 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Peffley 
et al. 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998). Consistent with past studies, I use a measure of 
stereotypes concerning the Latino work ethic. On the individual-level, the measure is a 7 
point scale ranging from hardworking to lazy.  Again, MRP requires variables to be on 
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dichotomous scale. As such, I code individuals above the neutral point (.5) as 
considering Latinos to be lazy (1s) and individuals at and below the neutral point as 
viewing Latinos as being hardworking (0s). Afterwards, I estimate the proportion of the 
state population that views Latinos as being lazy. Based on this measure, the state with 
the lowest percentage of their state population with negative Latino stereotypes is Utah at 
11.6%. The highest value for this measure is 29.8% (New Hampshire). The mean value 
is 22.5% (Virginia is the closest state to the mean at 22.4%). I predict that states with 
more negative views of Latino work-ethic are more likely to restrict immigrant access to 
welfare programs (H2). 
Political  identifications,  ideology  and  political  partisanship,  can  have  strong 
 
influences on individual policy preferences (e.g., Feldman and Huddy 2005; Sniderman 
and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) and policy outcomes at the macro level 
(e.g., Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page 
and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). The literature has a well established finding that states 
with a more liberal (Democratic) population are more likely to adopt liberal (Democratic) 
policies and the pattern is the same for conservative (Republican) states and conservative 
(Republican) policies. Unlike my other state-level measures of public opinion, I do not 
use MRP to estimate ideology and partisanship. The scholarly literature developed well 
established and useful measures for political identifications at the state-level. To measure 
ideology, I use MRP to estimate the percentage of conservatives in each state. To 
construct this measure I recode the 1992 ANES 7-point scale into a 2-point scale. I 
combine individuals who indicate they are "very conservative" with those who are 
"conservative" into a single category (coded as 1s).   All other response options and 
149  
 
missing data are coded as 0s. Afterwards, I generate state-level estimates with the same 
MRP used for authoritarianism and Latino work-ethic stereotypes. The measures range 
from the least conservative states, being Massachusetts at 13.88, to more conservative 
states, the most conservative being Utah at 42.5. The mean value is 22.56 and Ohio is the 
closest to the average value at 22.75. I present the values for each state in Table 5.2. I 
predict that more conservative states are less likely to grant immigrants access to welfare 
programs (H3). 
 
 
 
(Table 5.2 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Also in Table 5.2, I present my measure of state-level partisanship. I estimate the 
percent of Republicans in a state using MRP. The MRP estimates are based on a 1992 
ANES survey question asking individuals to self-identify if they are Republicans, 
Democrats, or Independents. I coded Republicans as 1s and all other options, including 
missing data, as 0s. I use the standard MRP model for these estimates as I used for the 
previous state-level public opinion measures. This variable has a mean value of 26.61%, 
the closest state to this value is Georgia at 26.49%. The variable ranges from the lowest 
state, Massachusetts at 13.13%, to the highest state, Kansas at 53.78%. I hypothesize that 
as the percentage of Republicans in a state increases so does the likelihood that the state 
will restrict access to welfare programs by immigrants (H4). 
Several measures of ideology and partisanship are standard in the literature, but my 
 
MRP measures have several advantages. First, my MRP estimates are direct measures of 
individual  self-placement  on  the  ideological  spectrum.    On  the  other  hand,  citizen 
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ideology uses elite ideology due to being a weighted measure of the ideological score for 
the district incumbent’s ideology and the electoral challenger’s ideology by their electoral 
share (Berry et al. 1997, p. 331). The challenger’s ideology is assumed to be the average 
ideology of all incumbents in the state from the challenger’s political party. Second, my 
MRP estimates are based on a single point in time from one survey. Erickson, Wright, 
and McIver's ideology measure is constructed using disaggregation of multiple surveys 
over a long period of time (1993). The same authors also use disaggregation, with the 
same benefits and handicaps, to estimate partisanship in each state. Disaggregation 
across time and surveys can introduce issues of validity and reliability (Brace et al. 2002). 
Barbara Norrander's measures of political ideology and partisanship use disaggregation 
but she increases validity and reliability by only combining the three ANES Senate 
surveys from 1988, 1990, and 1992 (2001). Her estimates are further away from the 
1996 welfare reforms than my MRP estimates. In Table 5.3, I show that my measures of 
state-level ideology and partisanship are highly correlated with these existing measures. 
 
 
 
(Table 5.3 about here) 
 
 
 
 
In addition, I provide the correlations between the MRP measures of state-level 
attitudes to show that these estimates are not just a product of the MRP process. As seen 
in Table 5.4, the majority of the MRP estimates are not highly correlated with each other. 
For example, authoritarianism and Hispanic Stereotypes are correlated at .151 (p- 
value<.05). The measure of the percent of conservatives in the state, a measure of 
ideology, is more strongly correlated with each of the other measures. 
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(Table 5.4 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
The main dependent variable is the immigration welfare scale (IWS) developed and 
provided by Rodney Hero and Robert Preuhs (2007). The components of the scale tap 
immigrant access to a wide variety of social spending programs, including state-funded 
TANF during the federal five-year ban for immigrants; access to TANF state funding 
after the federal five-year ban; general assistance programs; food stamps; state level 
programs similar to Supplemental Security Income; access to Medicaid during the federal 
five-year ban; undocumented immigrant access to nonemergency healthcare; and prenatal 
care. The data is coded as 1 for granting immigrants’ access and 0 for denying 
immigrants’ access for each social program. Hero and Pruehs (2007) use principal 
component factor analysis to generate an overall score of how inclusive each state’s 
social programs are for immigrants. The IWS ranges from -1.11 to 1.67 with positive and 
higher values being more inclusive states and negative and lower numbers being more 
restrictive states. The average value is -.02 with a standard deviation of .91. The Eigen 
value for the first factor is 2.56 and the value for the second factor is .67. In addition, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha is .75 indicating a high level of interitem reliability (Hero and Pruehs 
2007, p. 502). Further, Hero and Pruehs also compare the IWS to other measures of 
immigrant access to welfare programs. The IWS correlates with the Urban Institute’s 
measure of the immigrant welfare safety net (Pearson’s r = .85), Tumlin, Zimmerman, 
and Ost’s (1999) index of immigrant welfare provisions (Pearson’s r = .83), and an 
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additive index of the nine social programs used to estimate the IWS (Pearson’s r = .98). 
In the end, the IWS is a reliable measure of immigrant inclusiveness to state welfare 
programs. 
The IWS measures a single dimension of welfare programs, access by immigrants. 
To expand my analysis, I include a measure of generosity of welfare programs, the 
maximum amount of cash benefits available to a family of three. The addition of this 
second dependent variable, allows me to study if authoritarianism influences more than 
just barriers to access but actual benefit levels as well. I use the 1999 maximum cash 
benefit levels for a family of three. This measure was adjusted for cost of living in each 
state to create a standardized measure that is not dependent on local living conditions 
(Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000). 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND WELFARE CHAUVINISM 
 
 
 
Previous research indicates that politicians are likely to respond to macro attitudes 
(Erickson et al. 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). To see if the immigration 
accessibility fits the opinion-policy linkage, I start by examining the bivariate 
relationships between authoritarianism and the IWS in Figure 5.3. A clear linear and 
negative relationship exists between IWS and authoritarianism with a correlation of -.584 
(p.<.001). States with higher levels of authoritarianism are more likely to adopt welfare 
chauvinistic policies that limit immigrant access to social programs. The variance in this 
scatterplot further supports the elite response theory of Brooks and Manza (2007). States 
below the .4 value for authoritarianism have a positive value on the IWS, such as 
California, Hawaii, and Colorado.    States with high levels of authoritarianism, such as 
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Mississippi, North Carolina, and Alabama, are in the lower right hand corner and provide 
a low level of social benefits to immigrants. The one exception is Nebraska. Nebraska 
has a high level of authoritarianism but also adopted inclusionary welfare policies for 
immigrants. 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.3 about here) 
 
 
 
 
States in the mid range of values for authoritarianism are highly mixed between 
restrictive and inclusionary policies. For example, Maryland and Idaho both have similar 
levels of authoritarianism but Maryland adopted inclusionary programs and Idaho 
adopted exclusionary polices. Theoretically, the signal from the mass public to elites is 
mixed between preferences for granting and denying immigrant access. As 
authoritarianism becomes more consistent and one-sided, the policies adopted by the 
states match the authoritarian or non-authoritarian policy preferences. States with strong 
non-authoritarian preferences granted immigrant access to social spending programs 
while those with strong authoritarian preferences prevented immigrant access to these 
programs. The figure provides strong bivariate evidence for an opinion-policy link 
between authoritarianism and policies regarding immigrant accessibility to welfare 
programs. In conclusion, a higher need for conformity (Altemeyer 1996; Stenner 2005) 
seems to result in the exclusion of individuals that threaten that order, such as immigrants 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009). 
It is possible that the relationship between the proportion of authoritarians in the state 
and immigrant accessibility is due to a spurious relationship.  To examine this possibility, 
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I conduct regression models that include each of the public opinion measures. I use OLS 
regression models since IWS and cash benefit levels are continuous dependent variables. 
The dependent variable in the first model (see Model 5.5A) is the immigration welfare 
scale. The second dependent variable (see Model 5.5B) is the maximum cash benefit 
level37 available to families in each state. The results are presented in Table 5.5. Alaska, 
Hawaii, and Nebraska is excluded from Model 5.5B due to missing data for the 
dependent variable, the maximum amount of cash benefits for a family of three provided 
by TANF in 1999. 
 
 
 
(Table 5.5 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The results for Model 5.5A with the IWS provide two interesting findings. The 
coefficient for authoritarianism is in the predicted direction and significant, supporting 
H1. Welfare can be viewed as a system of inclusion into the American society 
(Lieberman 2003), the exclusion of people that lack cultural similarities would appeal to 
authoritarians. The coefficient is negative, as the proportion of authoritarians increases, 
the state is more likely to adopt restrict immigrant access to welfare programs. This 
relationship is the same as the bivarrate scatterplot but authoritarianism continues to be a 
strong predictor of restrictive welfare policies for immigrants, even in a multivariate 
model that includes other measures of public opinion. In Figure 5.4, I show the effect size 
of authoritarianism on the Immigration Welfare Scale by graphing the adjusted means 
(marginal effects of authoritarianism while holding all other variables constant) from the 
minimum value, 30.9, to the maximum value, 65.9, for authoritarianism. The IWS ranges 
37 The maximum adjusted cash benefit level for a family of three 
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from a maximum value of 1.667 (Washington) to a minimum value of -1.106 (Alabama) 
with more positive scores indicating greater immigrant access to welfare programs. The 
graph in Figure 5.4 shows a strong relationship between authoritarianism and immigrant 
access to welfare. As authoritarianism shifts from its minimum to maximum value, the 
likelihood of adopting restrictive welfare programs also rangers from almost the 
maximum and minimum values of the IWS. Further, once authoritarian attitudes are held 
by roughly fifty percent of a state's population, immigrants are most likely denied access 
to welfare programs on average. 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.4 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The other measures of predisposing factors and policy preferences are not significant 
predictors of either welfare chauvinism or liberal immigrant access to welfare programs. 
Racial stereotypes, partisanship (% of Republicans in the state population), and 
percentage of conservatives (measure of ideology) in a state are not significantly related 
to IWS. The measure of ideology lacking significance is important due to the central 
position that state-level ideology has played in the scholarly literature. 
Model 5.5B reports the results of a regression of TANF cash benefits on each of the 
measures of public opinion. Public opinion is a weaker predictor of cash benefit levels 
than the IWS. None of the public opinion measures are significant predictors of cash 
benefit levels. The effect size for authoritarianism is virtually flat with large confidence 
intervals, see Figure 5.5. The implications are that the mass public may have viewed 
immigration  accessibility  not  as  a  general  welfare  issue.     Instead,  immigration 
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accessibility to welfare is associated to immigration in general. Media images portray 
immigrants as an out-group taking advantage of the social safety net. Further, one can 
expect that immigrant accessibility is a more salient issue than the actual benefit levels. 
This factors are more likely to trigger a response from authoritarians to influence 
determining accessibility but less likely for them to lobby elites for lower benefits. As 
Brooks and Manza (2007) indicate, issue salience is an important factor for policy- 
responsiveness. With a lower level of issue salience regarding benefit levels, political 
elites are given more “space” to adopt policies. 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.5 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Alternative Explanations and Robustness of Authoritarianism  
 
 
The proportion of authoritarians in each state is certainly not the only factor that can 
influence public policy or mediate the relationship between authoritarians and the 
immigration welfare scale. To test for alternative explanations and robustness, I include 
a series of control variables to measure political factors, social factors, economics, and 
state characteristics. After controlling for several rival explanations, the proportion of 
authoritarians in each state continues to be significantly correlated with immigrant access 
to social welfare programs. There is one exception to this pattern, once I include the 
level of education in the state (proportion of state population with at least a high school 
diploma) and the percent of democrats in a state, the measure of authoritarianism is no 
longer significant.  Below I discuss this finding in more detail. 
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Besides ideology and partisanship, other political factors influence policy outcomes 
at the state level. Democratic legislatures are known to be more generous and inclusive 
in their welfare policy reforms. As such, I include the percentage of legislative seats held 
by the Democratic Party. Unfortunately, Nebraska has a non-partisan legislative body, 
and thus, I do not know the party identification of each state representative. As a result, I 
have to exclude Nebraska from the political model. The results presented in Table 5.6, 
Model 6A reflect controls for a series of political variables. The political variables can 
influence the willingness of states to adopt inclusive welfare policies for immigrants. Of 
the political variables, percent conservative becomes a significant predictor once I 
introduce a control for the percent of Democrats in a state legislature. But none of the 
political variables are significant predictors of the IWS. More importantly, the 
relationship between authoritarianism and the immigration welfare scale persists, even 
after adding other political variables. 
 
 
 
(Table 5.6 about here) 
 
 
 
 
The size of minority populations can influence individual attitudes (e.g., Blalock 
1967; Hopkins 2010; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002) 
and welfare policies (e.g., Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Johnson 2003; Fording 
2003; Wright 1976). As I theorize, the presence of immigrants can present a situational 
trigger that shapes public opinion (Sniderman et al. 2004) and possibly the policy- 
response relationship. The majority of the research on welfare policies and minority 
populations focus on the Black-White paradigm providing strong evidence that states 
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with a larger Black population are more likely to provide lower benefit levels (Hero 
1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Johnson 2003; Fording 2003; Wright 1976), stronger 
sanctions (Soss et al. 2003), stricter time limits (Soss et al. 2003), and second-order 
devolution (Soss et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, the findings are weaker for Latino and immigrant minority 
populations38. Soss, Schram, Vartanian and O'Brien (2003) find that Latino populations 
predict stricter time limits and family caps but failed to predict the strength of sanctions 
and stricter work requirements. Other research finds a similar relationship in that Latino 
racial context is a poor predictor of second-order devolution (Soss et al.  2008).  I 
included the proportion of each state’s population that is foreign born and Blacks to the 
basic model. I do not include a measure for the Latino racial context since the percentage 
of Latinos in a state is highly correlated with the percentage of immigrants (r=.758, 
p<.05). 
In addition to racial and ethnic demographics, educational demographics can be an 
important factor. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to be 
politically tolerant (e.g., Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003) and have positive attitudes 
towards immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Education lowers the perceived 
cultural threat posed by immigrants. I add the percentage of state population over 25 
with at least a high school diploma. 
None of the minority population variables are significantly related to the IWS, as 
presented in Model 6B.   At this point, the education variable is also not a significant 
 
 
38 It is difficult to separate ethnicity, Hispanic identity, from nationality, immigrant status, due to significant 
overlap, as the U.S. Census estimates that roughly 40% of Hispanics are immigrants.  Further, recent  
survey data also finds that 49% of Americans assume that any Hispanic they encounter is either a legal or 
illegal immigrant (CNN 2009). 
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predictor of the IWS.   Further, the inclusion of these additional independent variables 
fails to alter the relationships between authoritarianism and the IW Scale39. 
In Model 6C, I included additional variables to capture other characteristics of each 
state. I include a measure of the state's geographic location to Mexico. The flow of 
illegal immigration from Mexico into border states increases the media attention and 
importance of the immigration issue. Additionally, the economic situation of the state 
can influence the generosity of the legislature to fund social spending programs by 
providing a means to increase funding and the economy influences the demand on these 
programs by the general public (Graefe et al. 2008; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Tweedie 
1994). Yet, as can be seen in Model 6C, the inclusion of state gross domestic product, 
unemployment rates, and sharing a border with Mexico has very little impact on 
immigrant accessibility and no impact on the relationship between authoritarianism and 
the IWS. 
In the final column, Model 6D, I include all the control variables together. For the 
first time, I find that the coefficient for authoritarianism is no longer significant. The 
impact on the effect of authoritarianism can be seen in Figure 5.6. The slope of the line 
decreases and more importantly the confidence intervals increase at both ends of the 
graph. The reason for this change in the authoritarianism coefficient is due to the 
addition of both the percent of conservatives and the percent of high school educated 
individuals in the state. On one hand, the percent of conservatives is positively correlated 
with authoritarianism (r=.516, p<.05). And on the other hand, the measure of education 
is   negatively   correlated   with   authoritarianism   (r=-.612,   p<.001).      Conceptually, 
 
 
39 I also tested for the possibility of an interaction effect between the percentage of foreign born and 
authoritarianism and found no significant differences. 
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authoritarians are different from conservatives (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009; 
Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Conservatives support the status quo and authoritarians 
are willing to support dramatic changes to policy in order to support their view of social 
conformity. Unfortunately, Americans are presented with an ideological spectrum that 
contains a single left-right dimension instead of a spectrum with multiple dimensions. As 
a result, many Americans confuse the conservatism and authoritarianism as the same 
concept, which shows when they answer the survey questions that I use to construct my 
MRP estimates. 
 
 
 
(Figure 5.6 about here) 
 
 
 
 
Theoretically, the influence of education decreases the number of authoritarians and 
as such, states with a more educated public also have a less authoritarian public. At the 
individual level, research has show that education decreases the level authoritarianism 
(Stenner 2005). Theoretically, more educated individuals hold many attitudes and values 
that decrease individual concern for social conformity. As mentioned earlier, educated 
individuals tend to be more politically tolerant (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), socially 
tolerant (Weldon 2006), and less likely to view immigrants as a cultural threat 
(Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Overall, a more tolerant individual is also more likely to 
hold positive attitudes towards immigrants (Kehrberg 2007). As such, these individuals 
do not view immigrants as a social threat and are likely to support inclusive welfare 
policies for immigrants. 
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Using the same approach, I estimate models for TANF cash benefit levels controlling 
for political variables, state demographics, and state characteristics. The models in Table 
5.7, show a pattern of null findings. Authoritarianism is never a significant predictor of 
TANF cash benefit levels. Based on these findings, authoritarianism as a macro-level 
variable is a strong predictor of barriers to entry into the welfare system but not a 
predictor of the generosity of the programs. Of the additional variables I added to the 
statistical models, only the percentage of conservatives and the percentage of Blacks in a 
state are significant predictors of TANF cash benefit levels. Both variables are 
negatively correlated to TANF cash benefit levels, as such, more conservative states and 
states with larger Black populations are less likely to provide generous TANF programs. 
 
 
 
(Table 5.7 about here) 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The 1996 welfare reforms resulted in a host of significant changes in state welfare 
policies. State politics on immigration are one of the most understudied areas of political 
science. This study contributes to our understanding of state level immigration policies 
by focusing on welfare reforms that create inclusionary or exclusionary programs for 
immigrants. The decision to grant immigrants access to welfare programs can be divided 
into the “means” and the “willingness” to do so. My evidence finds a strong pattern that 
willingness of state populations predicts immigrant inclusion. Willingness is measured 
using multiple estimates of public opinion, therefore indicating an opinion-policy linkage 
with policy responsiveness by political elites to macro attitudes. 
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The macro attitudes associated with social spending policies regarding immigrant 
access are not predicted by the typical willingness explanatory variables found in the 
literature—i.e. welfare spending preferences and racial stereotypes. Conventional 
wisdom suggests that individuals who prefer a smaller welfare state should oppose 
allowing immigrants access to public assistance. Instead, the strongest and most robust 
predictor of immigrant access is level of authoritarianism in a state. In what I believe to 
be the first state-level analysis of authoritarianism and policy outcomes, I find the 
statistical evidence paralleling my findings at the individual-level in Chapter 4. At the 
state-level, the macro level estimate for authoritarianism is positively correlated with the 
macro estimate for immigration attitudes. Authoritarians are very concerned about 
immigrants, who are by definition cultural, social, and political outsiders in the United 
States. The authoritarian worldview pictures outsiders as a threat to the social order 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009). 
Previous research provides support that authoritarianism can influence individual 
attitudes and policy preferences (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 
2009) and that the crucial position of authoritarianism as a predisposing factor and core 
value can result individuals responding to political cues and eventually a partisan sort 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009) resulting in political polarization (McCarty et al. 2006). 
As a result of the partisan sort, authoritarians are becoming more concentrated within the 
Republican and as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have shown, the cleavage in 
authoritarian attitudes continues to divide the public and create policy dilemmas for 
policy makers, especially those in the Republican Party. As my research finds, 
authoritarianism  contributes  to  policy  dilemmas  as  authoritarians  make  their  policy 
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preferences known. Policy makers face policy dilemmas since authoritarianism view the 
world in “black and white” or “right and wrong” terms that decrease the likelihood of 
compromise on issues that are perceived threats to the American society and probably 
contribute to the increasing negative and polarized rhetoric currently being witnessed in 
U.S. politics. 
 
In addition to creating political polarization across party lines, authoritarianism can 
create tension within the Republican Party. The Republican Party has been described as 
a big tent that contains multiple and competing ideologies. But as Ronald Reagan 
correctly predicted, "Within our tent, there will be many arguments and divisions over 
approach and method and even those we choose to implement our philosophy." As 
authoritarians sorted themselves in to the Republican Party, the party has become further 
divided between authoritarians and Libertarians. And as a result, the Republican Party is 
currently seeing increased internal fighting and failing to follow the advice of Ronald 
Reagan who also said, "It is not your duty, responsibility of privilege to tear down, or 
attempt to destroy, others in the tent." 
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Figure 5.1. Immigrant Accessibility to Social Welfare Programs in the U.S. States. 
Notes: Darkly shaded states allow immigrants access to those individual welfare programs. Non- 
shaded states do not allow immigrants access to that particular welfare program. 
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Figure 5.2. The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy Outcomes. 
Note:  The relationships shown in this figure are not the only possible relationships between the variables. 
To avoid an overly complex figure, I have omitted the arrows for a possible relationship between the 
predisposing factors themselves.  Variables that appear in the earlier stages can influence any variable or 
relationship that appears in later stages. 
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Figure 5.3. The Relationship between Authoritarianism and the IWS. 
Note:  Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian 
attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian populations. Higher values for the Immigration 
Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs.  Negative values on 
the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs. 
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Figure 5.4. The Effect of Authoritarianism on IWS. 
Note:  Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.5A. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the 
proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian 
populations. Higher values for the Immigration Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater 
access to welfare programs.  Negative values on the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny 
immigrants access to welfare programs.  All other variables are held constant. 
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Figure 5.5. The Effect of Authoritarianism on TANF Cash Benefit Levels. 
Note:  Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.5B. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the 
proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values indicate larger authoritarian 
populations. Higher values for the Maximum TANF Cash Benefit levels indicate states that provide more 
generous cash benefits to a family of three. All other variables are held constant. 
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Figure 5.6. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Immigrant's Access to Welfare 
Programs while controlling for Education and Ideology. 
Note:  Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 5.6D. Authoritarianism is a MRP estimate of the 
proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes. Higher values for the Immigration  
Welfare Scale indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs.  Negative values on 
the Immigration Welfare Scale are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs.  All 
other variables are held constant. 
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Table 5.1.  MRP Estimates for the Level of Authoritarianism and Negative Hispanic 
Work-Ethic Stereotypes per State. 
 
State Authoritarianism Hispanic 
Stereotypes 
State Authoritarianism Hispanic 
Stereotypes 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
 
Mean 
SD 
65.9 
48.1 
42.5 
57.6 
38.3 
37.8 
46.7 
51.7 
56.3 
61.6 
35.4 
51.7 
50.1 
61.6 
52.4 
61.2 
62.0 
62.5 
47.5 
49.5 
37.8 
51.6 
47.1 
64.9 
56.1 
 
52.0 
9.0 
19.0 
21.3 
17.4 
16.2 
18.7 
19.6 
27.7 
24.4 
23.6 
21.2 
18.3 
18.3 
21.8 
24.6 
23.1 
25.5 
20.7 
24.6 
28.5 
19.6 
29.5 
25.3 
22.8 
18.0 
21.9 
 
22.5 
4.1 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
46.0 
62.2 
42.8 
47.2 
47.2 
43.0 
48.6 
58.8 
61.9 
54.9 
63.0 
36.0 
53.4 
44.0 
62.6 
60.0 
59.0 
63.7 
50.0 
41.6 
54.4 
33.6 
62.9 
50.5 
53.3 
21.2 
27.9 
19.8 
29.8 
26.0 
16.9 
24.2 
20.3 
28.7 
25.7 
19.6 
18.0 
29.7 
27.1 
20.5 
26.5 
20.0 
20.3 
11.6 
27.0 
22.4 
17.0 
24.5 
28.4 
21.4 
Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population holding authoritarian attitudes and negative 
Hispanic work-ethic stereotypes. Higher numbers indicate larger authoritarian populations and larger 
populations with negative Hispanic work-ethic stereotypes. 
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Table 5.2. MRP Estimates for the Level of Conservatism and Self-Identified 
Republicans per State. 
 
State % 
Conservative 
% 
Republican 
State % 
Conservative 
% 
Republican 
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
 
Mean 
SD 
31.1 
26.37 
22.29 
27.05 
17.91 
19.81 
16.68 
16.89 
21.25 
25.43 
18.5 
32.92 
16.8 
25.01 
21.01 
26.87 
28.13 
22.73 
17.89 
15.91 
13.88 
20.99 
19.15 
26.98 
22.95 
 
22.56 
5.51 
19.57 
41.34 
37.7 
18.27 
30.84 
28.14 
17.58 
21.79 
24.29 
26.49 
26.44 
39.09 
26.13 
34.0 
25.44 
53.78 
23.73 
20.84 
22.89 
20.53 
13.13 
25.07 
24.21 
16.85 
18.78 
 
26.61 
8.53 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VT 
VA 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
25.68 
27.92 
20.48 
18.44 
18.78 
20.31 
15.42 
24.64 
25.81 
19.4 
32.45 
19.97 
18.03 
15.13 
25.14 
25.44 
25.77 
24.89 
42.05 
15.81 
20.93 
19.1 
21.84 
19.18 
30.67 
39.84 
38.95 
29.34 
22.61 
18.8 
24.4 
24.32 
20.7 
42.62 
22.75 
25.15 
30.21 
19.44 
18.72 
20.36 
37.83 
15.26 
21.22 
28.47 
19.86 
25.35 
26.39 
23.36 
34.13 
43.63 
Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives or 
identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values of both variables indicate larger populations 
that identify themselves as conservatives or identifying themselves as being Republicans. 
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Table 5.3. Correlation between MRP Estimates for Political Identifications and 
Traditional Measures at the State-Level. 
 
 MRP % 
Conservative 
MRP % 
Republican 
Citizen Ideology -.754  
 
EWM Ideology 
 
-.787  
 
Norrander Ideology 
 
.590  
 
EWM Partisanship  
 
.580 
 
Norrander Partisanship  
 
.446 
Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives or 
identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values of both variables indicate larger populations 
that identify themselves as conservatives or  identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher value of 
Citizen Ideology and EWM Ideology indicate more liberal states.  Higher values of Norrander Ideology 
indicate more conservative states. Higher values of EWM Partisanship and Norrander Partisanship indicate 
states with larger Republican populations. 
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Table 5.4. Relationship between MRP Estimates of Predisposing Factors at the 
State-Level. 
 
 Authoritarianism Hispanic 
Stereotypes 
% Republican 
Hispanic .151   
Stereotypes    
 
% Republican 
 
-.023 
 
-.011  
 
% Conservative 
 
.516 
 
-.480 
 
.374 
Note: MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, 
authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being 
Republicans. All correlations are Pearson's R. 
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Table 5.5.  Responsiveness of Immigration Welfare Accessibility and TANF Cash 
Benefits to Public Opinion. 
 
 IWS 
Model 5.5A 
Cash Benefits 
Model 5.5B 
Constant 2.389** 1297.955*** 
 (1.074) (459.373) 
Authoritarianism -.061*** -1.282 
 (.018) (7.184) 
Racial Stereotypes .069 -7.273 
 (.045) (15.892) 
% Conservative -.011 -15.720 
 (.037) (13.645) 
% Republican -.020 .197 
 (.014) (5.206) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
.466 
 
.008 
N 50 47 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash 
benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. Independent variables are MRP estimates for 
the proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding 
negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher 
values indicate a greater proportion of the state population holding these attitudes. 
 
Missing State Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska in Model 5.2B. 
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Table 5.6.  The Influence of Controlling for Other Factors on the Relationship 
between Authoritarianism and the Immigration Welfare Scale. 
 
 IWS 
Model 6A 
IWS 
Model 6B 
IWS 
Model 6C 
IWS 
Model 6D 
Constant 4.325*** -.984 3.633*** -4.910* 
 (.948) (2.725) (.765) (2.674) 
Authoritarianism -.045*** -.046** -.062*** -.018 
 (.012) (.018) (.010) (.017) 
% Conservative -.060**   -.045** 
 (.024)   (.017) 
% Republican -.019   -.027 
 (.017)   (.017) 
% Democratic -.003   .012 
Legislature (.007)   (.008) 
 
% Foreign Born  
 
.024  
 
-.040 
  (.028)  (.048) 
% Black Population  .016  -.006 
  (.010)  (.011) 
% High School  .041  .086*** 
Diploma  (.024)  (.026) 
 
Border State - Mexico   
 
-.776*** 
 
-.345 
   (.200) (.279) 
State Unemployment   -.136 .067 
   (.101) (.093) 
State GDP   .002*** .002** 
   (.001) (.001) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
.502 
 
.320 
 
.412 
 
.582 
N 49 50 50 49 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs.  Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs.  Independent variables are MRP estimates for the 
proportion of a state's population identifying themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative 
work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and  identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values 
indicate a greater proportion of the state population holding these attitudes. 
Missing States: Nebraska (Models 3A and 3D). 
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Table 5.7.  The Influence of Controlling for Other Factors on the Relationship 
between Authoritarianism and TANF Cash Benefits. 
 
 Cash 
Benefits 
Model 7A 
Cash 
Benefits 
Model 7B 
Cash 
Benefits 
Model 7C 
Cash 
Benefits 
Model 7D 
Constant 1442.746*** 1786.133 976.49** 1420.893 
 (475.824) (1425.096) (408.516) (1528.17) 
Authoritarianism -1.652 -5.169 -5.709 5.636 
 (6.073) (10.484) (5.699) (13.870) 
% Conservative -12.977   -17.018* 
 (8.107)   (9.400) 
% Republican -5.186   -10.180 
 (5.993)   (7.146) 
% Democratic -4.115   -5.277 
Legislature (4.326)   (5.109) 
% Foreign Born  6.251  -1.620 
  (19.026)  (39.249) 
% Black Population  -7.682  -10.889* 
  (5.404)  (5.643) 
% High School  -9.732  -2.176 
Diploma  (13.060)  (12.943) 
 
Border State - Mexico   
 
53.306 
 
79.682 
   (195.974) (282.400) 
State Unemployment   4.155 43.278 
   (53.715) (59.063) 
State GDP   .119 .093 
   (.287) (.469) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
.011 
 
.007 
 
.039 
 
.039 
N 47 47 47 47 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. Cash 
benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash benefit available to a family of three from TANF per 
state.  Independent variables are MRP estimates for the proportion of a state's population identifying 
themselves as conservatives, authoritarians, holding negative work-ethic stereotypes of Hispanics, and 
identifying themselves as being Republicans. Higher values indicate a greater proportion of the state 
population holding these attitudes. 
Missing States: Nebraska, Alaska, and Hawaii. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
 
 
 
 
“We don’t mind taking care of people, let’s just take care of our own people. I don’t 
want to take care of Mexico’s people that are here illegally.” Renee Unterman, Georgia 
State Senator on the passage of a state anti-immigration law (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Public support of welfare and welfare policy are among the most widely studied 
political phenomenon in American politics. Despite the increasing amount of research on 
welfare attitudes and welfare policy, there is still a need for further study. I advance our 
knowledge of welfare attitudes and policy reform by developing a theory connecting 
predisposing factors, authoritarianism, to reforms that limit immigrant access to welfare 
programs. As a result, this dissertation presents a unique study for several reasons. First, 
my dissertation is one of the few studies that examine how public opinion influences 
welfare reforms by using the individual level findings to predict state level policy 
reforms. Second, I employ newer statistical models allowing me to examine relationships 
across levels of analysis. In Chapter 4, I use multi-level modeling to assess the 
relationship between contextual factors, demographics, and individual attitudes. In 
Chapter 5, I apply multi-level modeling with poststratification (MRP) to estimate macro 
level attitudes. The estimates of macro level attitudes are included in a regression model 
to predict inclusionary welfare policies for immigrants at the state level. The use of MRP 
allowed me to build on previous research by Hero and Preuhs (2007).  My study moves 
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beyond state characteristics to test for an opinion-policy relationship in greater detail by 
including measures of predisposing factors in a state-level model of policy reforms. In 
the end, these unique statistical tools would be unimportant and useless without 
interesting results that I discuss in the following section. 
 
 
Results and Implications 
 
I separate the predictors of welfare reforms into the "means" to provide benefits and 
"willingness" to grant access to benefits. The main finding is demonstrating the 
significant impact of authoritarianism on welfare attitudes and welfare policy reform. 
Authoritarianism undermines the willingness to provide inclusionary welfare benefits to 
immigrants by increasing support for welfare chauvinism. In general, I hypothesize that 
immigration levels trigger a predisposing factors (economic self-interest, racial 
stereotypes, political identifications, or authoritarianism). I find a strong pattern that 
authoritarianism is an important predisposing factor that influences policy. I build on 
previous research that finds a strong gap between authoritarians and non-authoritarians 
regarding preferences on immigration policy (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Kinder and 
Kam 2009). Neither of these previous studies connected the authoritarian gap on 
immigration to welfare preferences. But other studies find a strong relationship between 
conformity, a component of authoritarianism, and welfare preferences (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1997). In summary, immigrants are a key out-group 
for authoritarians, a group that is perceived as being illegal, Latino, poor, culturally 
different, and unwilling to adopt American norms and customs. Essentially, immigrants 
are viewed as a non-conforming group who desire a new social order. 
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The first implication of my dissertation is that changes in the patterns of immigration 
does influence political attitudes and policy preferences by triggering authoritarianism. 
The authoritarian personality cluster revolves around three components: authority 
(submission), conformity (conventionalism), and aggression (Altemeyer 1996). The Latino 
Threat Narrative creates an image of immigrates violating authority and conformity and, as 
a result, authoritarians’ aggressively prefer policies to punish immigrants, such as limiting 
access to welfare. 
Building on the first implication, I find that states with higher levels of 
authoritarianism are more likely to restrict access to welfare programs (welfare 
chauvinism). To be more precise, the states with this population characteristic denied 
immigrant access to welfare programs as indicated by those states with a higher 
concentration of authoritarians are more likely to have policy congruence. The 
relationship between authoritarianism and welfare chauvinism is extremely robust even 
with the inclusion of racial demographics, state characteristics, economic factors, political 
representation, and political institutions. I suspect that authoritarianism shapes policy 
preferences towards immigration beyond welfare chauvinism. In a recent study, Lax and 
Phillips (2013) examined 39 state policies finding that the lowest level of congruence 
between state policies and public opinion is in the area of immigration. They focused on 
four different immigration policies: bilingual education, drivers’ licenses for illegal 
immigrants, children of illegal immigrants attending public universities, and the creation of 
legal status databases for employment verification (e-verify programs). Based on my 
results, I believe these four policy are closely related to authoritarianism, a factor that Lax 
and Phillips did not include in their statistical models. 
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While, my findings contribute directly to the research on predisposing factors and 
situational triggers (Sniderman et al. 2004) and the opinion-policy relationship (e.g. 
Brooks and Manza 2007; Erickson et al. 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2009b; Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004), my results are also consistent with research in other areas. 
For example, research finds that authoritarians are on average less tolerant of others (e.g. 
Stenner 2005). Additional studies show that intolerant individuals have more negative 
attitudes towards immigrants (Kehrberg 2007; Weldon 2007). While my study did not 
examine measures of tolerance directly, I can argue that the underlying dynamic of my 
research on welfare attitudes and the research on tolerance are similar. First, immigration 
is portrayed in the Latino Threat Narrative as an external invasion of the United States. 
Second, it does not require a great leap for an individual to hold negative group-centric 
attitudes that are used as considerations for the formation of multiple and different 
political attitudes. 
 
 
Future Research 
 
This dissertation is the first step in a series of projects studying the relationship 
between immigration, authoritarianism, and public policy. As I wrote this dissertation, I 
realized that far more work is needed to be done on immigration and authoritarianism, as 
well as, immigration and public policy. I am planning two papers that build directly on 
the findings in my dissertation. The first is based on the individual level findings in 
Chapter 4 and the second on the state level policy findings in Chapter 5. Additionally, 
the work ethic racial stereotype findings require further research. In less than two 
decades, non-Latino whites have gone from viewing Latinos’ work ethic as being lazy, 
similar to Blacks, to seeing Latinos as being hardworking, similar to Whites.  The change 
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in these attitudes should be studied and how these attitudes vary across states due to 
immigration patterns (Fox 2004; Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011). 
Also at the individual level, experimental research can provide additional insights 
into how media images trigger authoritarianism. Forthcoming work by Wright and Citrin 
(2011) varied media images of the immigrant protests finding significant differences in 
attitudes towards the protests. Their experimental component was the presence of an 
American flag or not in the image. Images that contain the American flag generated 
more positive responses. Unfortunately, the authors do not include a measure of 
authoritarianism, particularly conformity, and do not include images of non-immigrant 
protests. Additionally, experimental research can explore the possibility that  media 
frames of assimilating immigrants decrease the authoritarian response to immigrants. 
Research on the opinion-policy relationship can be divided into two different 
categories based on the modeling of representation. The research design of this 
dissertation examined individual level attitudes and used the results from that chapter to 
predict welfare policy reform where the dependent variable is the adopted policy. On the 
other hand, the opinion-policy relationship can also be modeled with the representative 
roll call votes as the dependent variable. In order to test for a relationship between 
authoritarianism and roll call votes, I will probably have to shift the study to the United 
States Senate. Also, I could add an additional level of poststratification to the MRP 
model that allows for the estimation of public opinion of groups, such as Democrats and 
Republicans in each state (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2011). 
As I mentioned earlier, my dissertation focuses on welfare attitudes and welfare 
policies, but states are also adopting other policies regarding immigration.  Legislation in 
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other policy areas include restrictions on drivers' licenses, bilingual education, declaring 
English the official language, restrictions on government programs for children of illegal 
immigrants, and creating state-level penalties for illegal immigration (Hopkins 2010). 
Authoritarianism is a likely predictor of these additional policies and the overall level of 
immigration legislation in each state. Using data from The National Conference of State 
Legislatures, I can examine each piece of legislation and track changes in immigration 
related policies across time, while using the ANES data and MRP to measure 
authoritarianism in 2000, 2004, and 2008. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Coding for Individual Level Variables 
 
Racial Stereotypes: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. 
I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a 
group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of 
the people in that group are “rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in 
the group are "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end 
or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to 
where you think people in the group stand.” 
 
“The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or 
if they tend to be lazy.” 
 
Hispanic and White Work Ethic: 
 
1. Hardworking (recoded as 0) 
2. (recoded as .167) 
3. (recoded as .333) 
4. (recoded as .5) 
5. (recoded as .667) 
6. (recoded as .833) 
7. Lazy (recoded as 1) 
Missing data (recoded as .5) 
 
The racial stereotype gap is calculated by the subtracting White work ethic from Hispanic 
work ethic. 
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES: Hispanic - v926224  White - v926221 
 
Welfare Attitudes: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can 
be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for 
each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, 
too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending 
too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?" 
 
Too little (recoded as 1) 
About right (recoded as 0) 
Too much (recoded as -1) 
Missing data (recoded as 0) 
 
Variable names: 
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1992 ANES: v926242 
 
 
 
Immigration Attitudes: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries 
who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, 
increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?” 
 
Increased a lot (coded as 1) 
Increased a little (coded as .5) 
Same as now (coded as 0) 
Decreased a little (coded as -.5) 
Decreased a lot (coded as -1) 
Missing data (coded as 0) 
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES: v926235 
 
 
 
Welfare Chauvinism:  “Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be 
eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, Welfare, or should they have to be here a year or more?” 
 
Eligible Immediately (recoded as 1) 
Wait a year (recoded as 0) 
Missing data (coded as .5) 
Variable names: 
1992 ANES: v926242 
 
 
 
Authoritarianism:  “Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that 
children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am 
going to read you pairs of desirable qualities.  Please tell me which one you think is more 
important for a child to have.” 
 
1. “independence” (recoded as 0) v. “respect for elders” (recoded as 1), both (recoded as 
.5) 
2. “self-reliance” (recoded as 0) v. “obedience” (recoded as 1), both (recoded as .5) 
3. “curiosity” (recoded as 0) v. “good manners” (recoded as 1), both (recoded as .5) 
4. “being considerate” (recoded as 0) v. “being well behaved” (recoded as 1), (recoded as 
.5) 
 
The four components are added together and divided by four, therefore, the final variable 
ranges between 0 and 1. Missing data is coded as .5. 
185  
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES: 1. v926019 2. v926020 3. v926021 4. v926022 
 
 
 
Ideology:  “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7- 
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative.” 
“Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?” 
Extremely Liberal (recoded as 0) 
Liberal (recoded as .167) 
Slightly Liberal (recoded as .333) 
Moderate (recoded as .5) 
Slightly Conservative (recoded as .667) 
Conservative (recoded as .833) 
Extremely Conservative (recoded as 1) 
Missing data (recoded as .5) 
 
Variable names: I use a 7-point Party ID scale developed by the ANES based on multiple 
questions starting with an individual’s general partisanship to how strongly or weakly 
they consider their partisanship. 
 
Strong Democrat (recoded as 0) 
Weak Democrat (recoded as .167) 
Independent - Democrat (recoded as .333) 
Independent - Independent (recoded as .5) 
Independent - Republican (recoded as .667) 
Weak Republican (recoded as .833) 
Strong Republican (recoded as 1) 
Other - Minor Party (recoded as .5) 
Apolitical (recoded as .5) 
Missing Data (recoded as .5) 
 
1992 ANES: v923509 
 
 
 
Party ID: 
 
Variable names: v923634 
 
 
 
Education: “What is the highest degree that you have earned?” 
8 grades or less (recoded as 0) 
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9-11 grades, no further schooling (recoded as 0) 
High school diploma, or equivalency test (recoded as .333) 
More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree (recoded as .667) 
Junior or community college level degrees (recoded as .667) 
BA level degrees; 17+ years, no advanced degree (recoded as 1) 
Advanced degree, including LLB (recoded as 1) 
Missing data (recoded as .5) 
Variable names: 
1992 ANES: v923908 
 
 
 
Age:  “This variable was built by subtracting the month and year of R's birth from month 
and year of interview. For short form cross section (4 in V3011) and those cases who 
refused to give us their date of birth, we either transferred here their age from the 
Household Listing in the Cover Sheet (cross-section), or we updated their age from 1990 
(panel).” 
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES: v923903 
 
Gender: 
 
Male (recoded as 0) 
Female (recoded as 1) 
 
Survey years and variable names: 
1992 ANES: v924201 
 
Income:  Please look at this page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes 
the income of all members of your family living here in 1991 before taxes. This figure 
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (IF 
UNCERTAIN: What would be your best guess?) 
Income is broken into 8 categories: 
0 = 0 to $4,999 
.125 = $5,000 to $9,999 
.25 = $10,000 to $14,999 
.375 = $15,000 to $24,999 
.5 = $25,000 to $34,999 
.625 = $35,000 to $49,999 
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.75 = $50,000 to $74,999 
.875 = $75,000 to $104,999 
1 = $105,000 plus 
Missing data (recoded as .5) 
Variable names: 
1992 ANES: v924104 
 
 
 
Race/ ethnicity: Used to limit the sample to non-Hispanic White respondents only. The 
coding varied between surveys due to the 1992 ANES not including Hispanic as a racial 
category. 
 
1992 ANES required two questions, the first asking about race and the second asking 
about ethnicity. 
“Respondent's race is:” 
White (recoded as 1) 
Black (recoded as 2)  
American Indian (recoded as .) 
Asian or Pacific Islander (recoded as .) 
“Are you of Spanish or Hispanic origin or descent?” 
Yes (recoded as 1) 
No (recoded as 0) 
 
Respondents answering yes to the Spanish origin or descent (ethnicity) question are 
dropped from the dataset, and then Blacks are dropped from the dataset using the race 
question. 
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES: race - v924202 ethnicity - v924122 
 
 
 
Feeling Thermometers: “I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders 
and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'd 
like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer.  Ratings 
between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that 
person.  Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable 
toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the 
person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the 
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person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate 
that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.” 
 
For the multivariate models, I divided all feeling thermometers by 100 resulting in a 0 to 
1 scale. I coded all missing data as .5. 
 
Variable names: 
 
1992 ANES:  Illegal Immigration - v925331 People on Welfare - v925318 Poor People - 
v925320  Whites - v925333  Blacks - v925323 Immigrants - v925336 
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Table A1.  Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 4 Analysis 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Welfare -.311 .693 -1 1 
Welfare Chauvinism .233 .383 0 1 
Immigration Attitudes -.285 .463 -1 1 
Authoritarianism .551 .280 0 1 
Hispanic Work Ethic .488 .199 0 1 
White Work Ethic .338 .189 0 1 
Stereotype Gap .127 .233 -.667 1 
Ideology .544 .205 0 1 
Party ID .497 .334 0 1 
Income .513 .240 0 1 
White Feeling Th. .690 .188 0 1 
Black Feeling Th. .600 .173 0 1 
Immigration Feeling .567 .185 0 1 
Illegal Imm. Feeling .351 .209 0 1 
Welfare Feeling Th. .491 .181 0 1 
Poor Feeling Th. .666 .172 0 1 
Age 47.037 17.859 18 91 
Education .529 .343 0 1 
Female .520 .500 0 1 
Source: 1992 ANES 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Public Opinion Measures (pre-MRP estimation) 
 
Racial Stereotypes: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. 
I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a 
group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of 
the people in that group are “rich." A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in 
the group are "poor." A score of 4 means you think that the group is not towards one end 
or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to 
where you think people in the group stand.” 
 
“The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or 
if they tend to be lazy.” 
 
Source:  1992 ANES 
Hispanic Work Ethic: 
Coded as 0 for those that answered with positive characteristics, 1 for those that answered 
with negative characteristics. 
 
Welfare Attitudes: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can 
be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for 
each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, 
too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending 
too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?" 
 
Too little (recoded as 1) 
About right (recoded as 0) 
Too much (recoded as 0) 
 
Source: 1992 ANES 
 
Immigration Attitudes: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries 
who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, 
increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?” 
 
Increased a lot (coded as 1) 
Increased a little (coded as 1) 
Same as now (coded as 0) 
Decreased a little (coded as 0) 
Decreased a lot (coded as 0) 
 
Source: 1992 ANES 
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Authoritarianism: 
 
“Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, 
every person thinks that some are more important than others.  I am going to read you 
pairs of desirable qualities.  Please tell me which one you think is more important for a 
child to have.” 
 
“independence” (coded as 0) v. “respect for elders” (coded as 1) 
“self-reliance” (coded as 0) v. “obedience” (coded as 1) 
“curiosity” (coded as 0) v. “good manners” (coded as 1) 
“being considerate” (coded as 0) v. “being well behaved” (coded as 1) 
Source: 1992 ANES 
Demographic Coding for MRP: 
 
Racial Categories: White, Black, and Hispanic 
Gender Categories: Male and Female 
Age Categories: 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, and 65+ 
Educational Categories: Less than High School, High School graduate, some college, 
College graduate. 
 
Source: 1992 ANES 
 
Regional Classifications for MRP: 
 
Northeastern, southern, western, mid-west, and D.C. 
Source: 1992 ANES 
State Level Measures 
 
Immigration Welfare Scale: Combination, by factor analysis, of eight different state 
policies, see Table D1.  Source: Tumlin, Karen, Wendy Zimmerman, and Jason Ost. 
1999.  State Snapshots of Public Benefits for Immigrants: Occasional Paper Number 24, 
Supplemental Report. Washington, DC: the Urban Institute.  (For state-funded prenatal 
care) Fox News Online. 2004.  “Arkansas Debate Focuses on Pregnant Illegals.” 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/02933119144,00.html. 
 
(Table B1 about here) 
 
Political Ideology (1): Higher scores indicate more liberal states. Source: Berry, 
William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson.  1998. 
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93.” 
American Journal of Political Science 42(1): 327-348. 
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Political Ideology (2): Updated scores based on Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), 
higher values indicate more liberal states.  Source:  Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, 
and John P. McIver.  1993.  Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the 
American States.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Party ID: Percent of state population identifying themselves as Republicans.  Source: 
Aggregated CBS News/New York Times national polls [electronic file] collected by 
Gerald C. Wright, John P. McIver and Robert S. Erikson 
(http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603_pct.zip). 
 
Immigrant %:  Percentage of foreign born residents of the state population. Source: 
Tumlin, Karen, Wendy Zimmerman, and Jason Ost.  1999.  State Snapshots of Public 
Benefits for Immigrants: Occasional Paper Number 24, Supplemental Report. 
Washington, DC: the Urban Institute. 
 
Latino %:  Percentage of Latinos of the state population. Source: U.S. Census, Current 
Population Reports. 
 
Black %:  Percentage of Blacks of the state population. Source: U.S. Census, Current 
Population Reports. 
 
% Legislature Democratic:  Percent of state legislature held by Democrats. Source: 
Klarner, Carl.  2003.  “Measurement of Partisan Balance of State Government.” State 
Politics and Policy Quarterly 3(3): 309-319. 
 
Party Competition:  Higher numbers indicate more even proportion of legislative seats 
across political parties. Calculated as 50-|50-%|. Source:  Hero, Rodney E. and Robert 
R. Preuhs.  2007.  “Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining 
Policies in the U.S. States.” American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 498-517. 
Based on data provided by Klarner (2003). 
 
Urbanization:  Proportion of state population living in an urban area. Source: U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
 
Education: Proportion of state population over 25 years old with at least a high school 
degree. Source: State Politics and Policy Data 
Archive: http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/datasets.html. 
 
State Unemployment:  Percent of population that is unemployed. Source: State Politics 
and Policy Data Archive: http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/datasets.html. 
 
Mexico Border State: If the state shares a border with Mexico.  Source: Hero, Rodney E. 
and Robert R. Preuhs.  2007.  “Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: 
Examining Policies in the U.S. States.”  American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 
498-517. 
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Port: If the state has a major coastal port. Source: Source: Hero, Rodney E. and Robert 
R. Preuhs.  2007.  “Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare State: Examining 
Policies in the U.S. States.” American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 498-517. 
 
TANF Cash Benefit Level.  Maximum adjusted cash benefit level for a family of three. 
Source:  Source:  Hero, Rodney E. and Robert R. Preuhs.  2007.  “Immigration and the 
Evolving American Welfare State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States.” American 
Journal of Political Science 51(3): 498-517. 
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Table B1.  Immigration Welfare Scale Components 
 
Item Coding 
State-funded TANF during 1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
federal five-year ban.  
 
State-funded TANF after federal 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
five-year ban.  
 
Immigrant access to state general 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
assistance.  
 
Immigrant access to state-funded 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
food stamps.  
 
Immigrant access to substitute 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
program from SSI.  
 
State-funded Medicaid funding 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
during federal five-year ban.  
 
Undocumented immigrant access 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
to nonemergency Medicaid  
funding.  
 
Immigrant access to state 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
healthcare programs.  
 
Immigrant access to state-funded 
 
1 if allows, 0 otherwise. 
prenatal care. 
Note:  The primary source for the majority of the components is Tumlin et al. (1999) except for the 
prenatal care component (Fox News Online 2004). 
Source: Hero and Preuhs (2007). 
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Table B2. Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 5 Analysis 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Racial Stereotypes 22.320 4.290 11.6 29.8 
Authoritarianism 52.016 8.963 30.9 65.9 
Immigration Attitudes 53.851 4.750 32.1 62.1 
Welfare Preferences 50.441 7.478 19.2 65.6 
State GDP 150.19 175.792 14.6 958.5 
Political Ideology (1) 49.271 14.788 22.841 86.478 
Political Ideology (2) -14.3 7.515 -28 -.2 
Party ID 31.379 6.940 9.6 45 
Party Competition -10.982 9.504 -34 .910 
% Democratic 51.431 15.323 15 84.24 
Legislature     
% Foreign Born 3.760 3.745 0 19 
% Latino Population 6.705 8.439 .562 40.312 
% Black Population 10.167 9.578 .363 36.425 
State Education 76.286 5.631 64.3 86.6 
Border State - Mexico   0 1 
Port State   0 1 
Urbanization 67.25 21.213 23.5 100 
State Unemployment 4.338 1.021 2.5 6.6 
TANF Cash Benefits 719.59 292.179 202.092 1421.79 
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APPENDIX C 
 
In Chapter 5, I use multi-level regression with poststartification (MRP) to 
generate state level estimates of public opinion, including authoritarianism.  The theory 
and results of this dissertation present authoritarianism as a key and important 
independent variable in explaining welfare attitudes, welfare policy, immigration 
attitudes, and individual response to immigration. But, the findings of an opinion-policy 
linkage that connects authoritarianism to state level welfare policies regarding immigrant 
access maybe a result of my coding of the authoritarianism measure in order to generate 
the MRP estimates. 
 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, MRP uses demographic data and 
national level surveys to estimate micro level public opinion measures for each state. 
Unfortunately, MRP generates public opinion measures for one category, as a result, the 
variable must be coded as being dichotomous.  To fulfill this requirement, I coded 
authoritarianism as non-authoritarian, individuals with .5 or less on the ordinal 
authoritarian measure, and authoritarian, individuals who scored .625 or greater on the 
ordinal measure. The result is a dichotomous measure of the original ordinal measure of 
authoritarianism, but does my choice of the coding for the dichotomous measure create a 
false negative result in Chapter 5? 
 
In order to test for a possible false negative result, I alter the dichotomous coding 
for the MRP authoritarianism estimates and rerun the Chapter 5 models for each new 
MRP estimate. I narrowed the distribution of individuals that are coded as being 
authoritarian by increasing the critical threshold from .625 to .75 to .875 to 1 and 
generate estimates that I title author75, author875, and author1.  Each new estimate is 
smaller than the estimates used in Chapter 5, since each estimate is based on a smaller 
proportion of the survey sample. 
 
Besides changes in just the overall pattern between the authoritarianism estimates 
and welfare policy, the results can also vary based on theory. A decrease in the estimates 
maybe correlated with a small proportion of individuals supporting limited immigrant 
access to welfare programs.  One of Brooks and Manza’s (2007) conditions for an 
opinion-policy linkage is a sizeable proportion of the population providing a clear and 
one sided message with strong policy preferences. As the proportion decreases, so can 
the incentives for political elites to respond to this specific measure of public opinion.  
On the other hand, the literature claims that authoritarians have strong preferences and 
more likely to be vocal about those preferences. A small minority, with strong 
preferences and a willingness to share those policy preferences with elites, can influence 
legislation even when the majority holds a different policy preference.  An example of 
this situation was the failure of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 to 
reach cloture in the U.S. Senate.  Overall, the majority of Americans supported the 
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individual level components of the act, but several Members of Congress claimed that 
they were contacted overwhelmingly by individuals opposed to the act.  This is evidence 
for the possibility that individuals who hold anti-immigrant preferences have stronger 
opinions than those who hold pro-immigrant preferences, and as a result, more likely to 
make their policy preferences known and use those attitudes on immigration to influence 
political elites. 
 
The statistical results provide strong support for the pattern presented in Chapter 
5. Starting with the basic model results, as seen in Table E1, authoritarianism is a 
significant predictor with a negative correlation regardless of the critical threshold used in 
the data coding.  For the most part, the coefficient size is similar across the models, 
except for the most restrictive coding for authoritarianism, Author1 Model. In this 
model, the coefficient size is significantly larger, but still predicts that states with strong 
authoritarian preferences are more likely to restrict immigrant access to welfare. 
 
(Table C1 about here) 
 
In addition to the baseline model, I also conduct a series of robustness checks by 
including political variables, demographic variables, and measures capturing state 
characteristics.  Table E2 presents the models that include control variables for political 
ideology, party competition, proportion of the Democratic party in the state legislatures, 
and the level of professionalization in the legislature.  The inclusion of these political 
control variables result in a decrease in the coefficient size for the varying measures of 
authoritarianism, but in each model authoritarianism continues to be significant and 
negatively correlated with granting immigrant access to state welfare programs. 
 
(Table C2 about here) 
 
The next table, Table E3, includes the demographic control variables from Model 
3B in Table 5.3from Chapter 5. Again, the inclusion of additional control variables does 
not alter the relationship between authoritarianism and immigrant accessibility to welfare 
programs.  The relationship continues to be significant and negatively correlated.  One 
interesting change, that should be explored in additional research on a future date, is that 
the percentage of foreign born becomes significant as the authoritarianism measure 
becomes more exclusive. 
 
(Table C3 about here) 
 
The final table, Table E4, includes several state demographic variables that 
influence immigration and immigration attitudes, including economic factors.  With these 
results, the pattern begins to change as author875 and author1 coefficients are in the same 
direction as the Chapter 5 results, but the variables are no longer significant predictors. 
In conclusion, the pattern that as the level of authoritarianism increases the likelihood of 
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the state adopting restrictive policies regarding immigrant access to welfare programs 
increases is very strong, but not perfect, regardless of the critical threshold used to 
separate authoritarians from non-authoritarians to generate MRP estimates. Despite the 
imperfection, the models in this appendix increase the confidence in the results presented 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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Table C1. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the 
Measure of Authoritarianism in the Baseline Model from Chapter 5 
 
 Author625 Author75 Autho875 Author1 
Constant 3.995** 3.366* 4.763** 5.856*** 
 (1.837) (1.889) (1.858) (1.928) 
Authoritarianism -.059*** -.060*** -.060** -.088*** 
 (.012) (.014) (.016) (.023) 
Racial Stereotypes .066** .082** .020 .002 
 (.032) (.031) (.033) (.036) 
Welfare Attitudes -.019 -.031 -.010 -.021 
 (.022) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Immigration -.024 -.018 -.057 -.054 
Attitudes (.038) (.039) (.039) (.040) 
 -.005 .003 -.005 -.010 
% Republican (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
  .507 
 
.510 
 
.466 
 
.469 
R2 48 48 48 50 
N 
 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs.  Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs.  Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash 
benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. 
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii 
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Table C2. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the 
Measure of Authoritarianism with Political Control Variables 
 
 Author625 Author75 Author875 Author1 
Constant 3.211 3.033 3.724 4.236 
 (2.341) (2.322) (2.426) (2.644) 
Authoritarianism -.045** -.047** -.042* -.063* 
 (.017) (.018) (.024) (.036) 
Racial Stereotypes .020 .032 -.019 -.030 
 (.034) (.035) (.031) (.031) 
Welfare Attitudes -.016 -.025 -.009 -.013 
 (.023) (.024) (.024) (.025) 
Immigration Attitudes -.034 -.028 -.059 -.058 
 (.042) (.043) (.044) (.048) 
Political Ideology .023** .021* .026* .024* 
 (.011) (.011) (.032) (.012) 
% Republican .006 .008 .004 .003 
 (.031) (.031) (.032) (.031) 
Party Competition -.001 .001 -.001 .001 
 (.011) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
% Democratic -.001 .001 -.003 .001 
Legislature (.010) (.011) (.011) (.013) 
 
R2 
 
.621 
 
.621 
 
.588 
 
.584 
N 47 47 47 47 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash 
benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. 
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska. 
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Table C3. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the 
Measure of Authoritarianism with Demographic Control Variables 
 
 
Author625 Author75 Author875 Author1 
Constant 
 
Authoritarianism 
Racial Stereotypes 
Welfare Attitudes 
Immigration Attitudes 
Political Ideology 
% Republican 
 
% Foreign Born 
 
% Latino Population 
 
% Black Population 
 
 
 
R2 
N 
1.730 
(2.891) 
-.045** 
(.018) 
.041 
(.041) 
-.014 
(.028) 
-.014 
(.044) 
.018 
(.014) 
.008 
(.022) 
.034 
(.033) 
-.011 
(.012) 
-.001 
(.017) 
 
.550 
48 
1.448 
(2.915) 
-.044** 
(.019) 
.055 
(.044) 
-.025 
(.027) 
-.010 
(.046) 
.014 
(.014) 
.010 
(.022) 
.050 
(.035) 
-.013 
(.012) 
-.003 
(.016) 
 
.549 
48 
2.500 
(3.044) 
-.040 
(.027) 
.003 
(.039) 
-.011 
(.027) 
-.040 
(.049) 
.017 
(.014) 
.007 
(.023) 
.059 
(.041) 
-.021 
(.014) 
-.006 
(.017) 
 
.525 
48 
2.888 
(3.149) 
-.068 
(.041) 
-.008 
(.040) 
-.013 
(.028) 
-.035 
(.052) 
.017 
(.014) 
.003 
(.022) 
.055 
(.042) 
-.018 
(.014) 
.002 
(.020) 
 
.525 
48 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash 
benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. 
Missing States: Alaska and Hawaii. 
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Table C4. Relationship between Immigration Welfare Access and Varying the 
Measure of Authoritarianism with State Characteristics Variables 
 
 Author625 Author75 Author875 Author1 
Constant -5.120 -5.643 -7.614 -9.032 
 (4.062) (4.226) (4.561) (5.769) 
Authoritarianism -.016 -.013 .005 .022 
 (.023) (.026) (.032) (.056) 
Racial Stereotypes .021 .025 .016 .024 
 (.034) (.040) (.036) (.046) 
Welfare Attitudes -.015 .007 -.013 -.012 
 (.020) (.047) (.021) (.022) 
Immigration Attitudes .008 .007 -.002 -.003 
 (.046) (.047) (.049) (.050) 
Political Ideology .020 .019 .023* .025* 
 (.012) (.013) (.012) (.013) 
% Republican -.011 -.011 -.014 -.014 
 (.028) (.029) (.028) (.026) 
% High School Ed. .059** .063* .082** .092** 
 (.029) (.032) (.033) (.040) 
Border State - Mexico -.208 -.167 -.107 -.059 
 (.261) (.251) (.403) (.409) 
Port State -.028 -.052 -.084 -.110 
 (.280) (.275) (.274) (.299) 
Urbanization .007 .007 .007 .007 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
State Unemployment .031 .044 .078 .099 
 (.122) (.118) (.129) (.144) 
State GDP .001 .001 .001 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
 
R2 
 
.626 
 
.624 
 
.622 
 
.623 
N 48 48 48 48 
Note: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. *p<.10; **p<.05, ***p<.01. The 
IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher 
values indicate greater access to welfare programs. Cash benefits dependent variable is the maximum cash 
benefit available to a family of three from TANF per state. 
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska. 
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